

A
IVST DEFENCE
OF CERTAINE PASSAGES
in a former Treatise concerning the
Nature and Vse of LOTS,

Against such Exceptions and Opposi-
tions as haue beene made thereunto
by M^r. I. B.

*Wherein the insufficiencie of his Answers
giuen to the Arguments brought in defence
of a Lusurious Lot is manifested;*

The imbecillitie of his Arguments produced
against the same further discovered;

*And the Point it selfe in Controuersie more
fully cleared;*

vnde BY et quo

THOMAS GATAKER B. of D. and Author
of the former TREATISE.

LONDON,

Printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, and are
to be sold at his shop at the signe of the Bible in
Cheapside. 1623.

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A
IVST DEFENCE
OF CERTAIN PASSAGES

in a former Treatise concerning the

Nature and Use of LOTTS

Against such Exceptions and Opposi-

tions as have been made thereto



g-9

The impetuous of his Arguments produced
against the late Author's objections

and the Point is in controversy

fully claimed

THOMAS CARLISLE BOLT and Author

of the former Treatise

LONDON


Printed by John Baskin for Robert Baskin and one

to be sold at his shop at the sign of the Bible in

Ch. Church. 1703



MR. THOMAS GATAKER



IR, I haue perused your
 Answer to Mr. B. his
 Pamphlet against you;
 wherein you haue so clea-
 red the point in contro-
 uersie betweene you; that
 I much pittie your oppo-
 nents hard lot to fall vpon such a subiect and
 tenet concerning Lots, as afforded him so
 small store of Obiections against your Opi-
 nion,

A 2

nion, that he was even constrained, according to the manner of some old Roman Orators noted by Quintilian, *Caussarum vacua convitijs implere*. Neither the matter in hand, about which learned Protestants may differ in iudgement without breach of Charity, or preiudice to Christian vnity, nor your handling it dogmatically and scholastically without any gall at all, could occasion such heats. I cannot imagine therefore, what should so much moue him, but the badnesse of his cause, and the weaknesse of his owne Arguments, which he seeth by your handling them to be like wicker-strings ill-nealed, which would not endure the least straining. For albeit I confesse that we are all apt to take too much hold of any point of liberty reached vnto vs out of Gods word; and in particular I cannot but deplore *fortem fortis*, the Lot of Lot it selfe, which hath beene and is too much by the licentious abused, and thereby in a sort defamed, especially in Carding and Dicing: yet Gods truth must not be suppressed because of mans errors; neither is it a safe way to goe about to cure an error in practise, by another error in iudgement;

ment; I meane, to reforme the abuse in Lu-
lorie Lots by totally condemning the vse it selfe
of them. Though a Surgeon meane neuer so
well in letting his Patient bloud who needeth
it, yet if he strike not the right veine, he had
better haue spared his paines. The sinne too
regnant in sports and games now a-daies is
not in vsing the Lot, but in not obseruing those
Rules and Cautions in these and other Recre-
ations, which are iudiciously and piously set
downe by you in your compleat Treatise of
Lots. Let those Cautions be obserued, and
set aside the authoritie of some Diuines, whose
persons they haue in admiration aboue others;
what is there in the casuall falling of the Dye,
or dealing of the Cards, more than in the fall
of a Coyte, or lighting of an Arrow neerer
or further, or the turning of a Boule, to ensnare
the Conscience? Art more ruleth the one, and
Nature the other; Gods prouidence and con-
currence being equall in either. For to con-
clude, that because some Lots haue beene con-
secrated to an holy vse sometimes, therefore
all Lots are sacred, is a feeble kinde of ar-
guing. And to impose a speciall and immedi-

ate worke of Gods prouidence, vpon the
casuall euent of the Lot, more than vpon other
naturall accidents and deliberate actions of
men, is a temerarious and groundlesse assertion.
And furthermore to charge all those seruants
of God, who moderately vse their Christian
liberty in these Games, with so hainous a
sinne, as is the prophaning of a thing sacred,
or taking in vaine Gods deciding Iudge-
ments, is an vncharitable censure. The Lord
open the eyes of all that seeke to serue him in
sinceritie and singlenesse of heart, that neither
by enlarging their Christian liberty they open
a gap to licentiousnesse, nor yet by too much
restraining it lay a snare on weake Conscien-
ces. To deliuer you my iudgement and aduice
in a word; Satis actum est: you haue sifted
this point of Lots to the bran. Let me aduise
you hereafter non reciprocare serram con-
tentionis de ludis sortiarijs, but rather to
imploy your able pen against the Sorcerers of
Egypt now abounding in euery place, and
making aduantages of the least differences
among vs, who hold the like pretious faith pur-
ged from the drosse of their superstition. This
aduice,

advice, I know, you will take in good part, as
proceeding from

Your true affectionate friend and
fellow-labourer in the Lords
haruest,

DANIEL FEATLY,

Croydon Sept. 2,

1623.

admirer I know you will take in good part
proceeding from

This Discourse or Defence consisteth
of three Parts.

1. *An Answer to Mr. B^s. Preface, and his Post-script.*
2. *A Reply vpon Mr. B^s. Answer to Mr. G^s. Arguments.*
3. *A Rejoinder to Mr. B^s. Reply in defence of his owne Arguments.*

Mr. B^s. intire Context is without omission of
ought inserted; as also Mr. G^s. owne Argu-
ments and Answers are out of his former
Booke transcribed, that neither of them may
be wronged, nor the Reader inforced to run
from Booke to Booke, to search for that that
is either confirmed or confuted, or otherwise
dealt with, hauing all represented here toge-
ther vnto his view.



THE FIRST PART.
Mr. BALMFORDS
PREFACE,
WITH
ANSWER TO IT.

To the Christian Reader, being none of
those men, who (according to S. Pauls
Prophecie) ^a loue pleasures
more than God.

To the same Christian Reader, being
none of those men, who (contrary to
S. James his Rule) ^b hold the Faith
of Christ, or the Truth of God,
with respect of persons.



Could haue wished, good Reader, that Mr. B. had obserued those two Rules sometime prescribed their Orators at Athens, that they should speake when they spake, ^c without preface, or passion. For if any ^d Preface whatsoever,

B

I. B.

^a 2 Tim. 3. 4.

T. G.

^b 1am. 2. 1.

^c Αἰὲν ὁμιλοῦντες
καὶ μηδὲν. Lucian.
de gymnas.

^d Μακρὰ δὲ τὸ ὁμι-
λοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐπι-
διδουμένην ἀκούειν.
Plato de rep. l. 4. Νέ-
μις οἰοῖσα πεμπά-
ρες κίρκουσιβυς. Sc.
prefat. conuocatus.

as *Plato* saith, seeme long to those that desire to come to the maine matter; much more must a prolix and impertinent Preface, needs be no other than a meere *Purgatorie* to the studious Reader, either diuerting or with-holding him from that that most he desireth. And for *passion* and *affection*, it is apparent, that they doe not onely not helpe or further ought, but hinder much the *discouerie* either of truth or of right. But Mr. B. it seemeth, liked not to be tied to either of those *Lawes*: for he beginneth his Booke with a long *Proeme*, and his *Proeme* with much *passion*. Which course since he hath taken, and there is a necessitie of examining what he here saith, I must intreat thee to blame him (who hath giuen the occasion) and not me, if thou be kept longer than is fit, from that which thou hastnest vnto, and that should haue beene our principall aime in this worke.

SOME yeeres are past since Mr. G. tooke occasion, from casting of Lots to finde out for whose sake a dangerous storme was, to iustifie playing with Dice, Cards, &c. and to confute me by Name in open Pulpit.

κόν τε πέλλε. Εκ
 πτα malo, vix est ut
 Glossa paulò severa
 Fons reg. Juv. Civ. H

It hath beene euer deemed that *Beginnings*
are ominous: and such matter as men meet
with at the first entrance of a worke, they are

τόν τε μέλλει J. Enrip. Aol. *Rarus principii est exitus bonus mali. Principio quae sunt inchoata malo, vix est ut bono pergantur exitu.* Leo ad Maur. Ep. apud Grat. caus. 1. q. 1. *Vbi tamē Glossa paulō severius; Vix a. nusquam. Malum principium malus finis sequitur.* Petr. Fons reg. Jur. Civ. Hinc Cic. ad Attic. 1. 10. ep. 20. *Malē posuimus initia; sic cātera sequuntur.*

Went

wont commonly to looke for and expect in the processe. If this worke of Mr. B. should by this rule be iudged of, it would receiue no small *preiudice*; sithence it beginneth at the *first entrance* with a *flat vntruth*, to wit, that *I confuted him by name in open Pulpit*.

True it is, that handling the first of *Jonas*, Jonas. i. 7. I tooke occasion, by the *Lot* there cast, to entreat at large of the *Vse of Lots* in generall, the rather for sundry *doubts* and *scruples* that by diuers had beene moued vnto me concerning the *Vse* of them: And that among other things I defended the *Vse of a Lot* generally vsed in *disport*, either for *combination* of the *sporters* onely, or for *prosecution* and *determination* of the *sport*; and consequently did iustifie the *Lot* vsed in *Cards* and *Dice* &c. rather than the *Games* themselues simply, or any otherwise, considered. For my maine *question* concerning *lusurious Lots* is, whether the *light Vse of a Lot* be a thing utterly *unlawfull*, as Mr. B. and some others auouch it to be; and so whether that make such games among others to be *vnwarrantable*, nor whether in other respects they be *vnwarrantable* or no.

But that *by name in open Pulpit* I confuted Mr. B. or that in propounding of any *Argument* in this *Argument* by me refuted, I did in *Pulpit* once name any *Author* thereof, is a thing altogether *vntrue*; concerning which I haue cleared my selfe by *solemne protestation* to Mr. B. himselfe, as shall ^h after by his owne *confession* in

^h Post-script to his Preface.

part also appeare: And many also that heard me and tooke notes of what was deliuered, can yet testifie as much.

I. B.

I hearing thereof by many sent him this message; If it would please him to send the substance of the Confutation (for I dare not relie vpon report) I would either reply or change mine opinion with thanks to God for him; though for the present I thought he failed in Iudgement, Discretion, and Charitie.

T. G.

By whom M^r. B. heard this I know not. If they told him ought that was vntrue, the fault was not mine but theirs; peraduenture ^k his also, in being ouer-credulous in that which the party, whom he made vse of betweene himselfe and me, could haue informed him to be otherwise. And I cannot but wonder by the way, that M^r. B. who here telleth his Reader that

ⁱ Exod. 23.1.

Leuit. 19.16.

Falsos an vero laudent, culpent, quem velint, Non floccifaciunt; dum illud quod lubeat sciant.

Plaut. Trinum. 1.2.

^k Atque egomet me adeo cum illis una ibidem traho, Qui illorum verbis falsis acceptor fui. Ibid.

Multum enim derogatio preualet, quando deroganti fides habetur. Felix

2. ad Alban. c. 10.

Detrahere an de-

trahentem libenter audire, utrum sit damnabilis non facile dixerim. Bern. de consid. lib. 3. Pari reatu detrahentes & audientes detinentur. Idem modit. cap. 42. Similiter culpabilis est is qui detrahit, & qui detrahentem audit. Idem mod. vii. c. 33. Itaque scire Hier. ad Nepot. Cave ne aut linguam, aut aures priuantes habeas, i. ne aut ipse alijs detrahas, aut detrahentes audias. Nemo inuito auditori libenter refert. Disceat detractor, dum te videt non libenter audire, non facile detrahenda. *Αποστραφει οτις ταυτα, & ο συντακτικος*

now so far forth relie vpon it, as to auerre that
in print, which he could not haue but by report?
vnlesse his iudgement be altered since concer-
ning that point.

But hearing indeed, it seemeth, that among
other *Arguments* answer was giuen to those also
contained in his *Dialogue*; He shewed himselfe,
as I was informed, therewith to be much offend-
ed, and sent me word, that if I would let him
haue in writing what I had deliuered, it should
be answered. Whereupon I sent him so much
of it as concerned his *Dialogue* extracted out of
the rest. Which he promised to consider of,
and returne answer vnto.

Yea, but in this businesse, Mr. G. in Mr. B. his
opinion, hath failed much many waies. If he had
then either told me so meeting me, as he did
many times, or had sent me such word, I might
then haue giuen him some satisfaction therein.
But let vs now at length heare, and others deter-
mine, wherein

I. In iudgement: Because that Doctrine was
not drawne from his Text; Except this be a iudici-
ous deduction.

I. B.

Gentiles cast Lots in a most serious matter:
Therefore Christians may vse Lotterie in Di-
cing, Carding, &c.

I perceiue if Mr. B. might haue the framing
of Mr. G's *Arguments*, there would be very in-
dicious deductions in them indeed. But if without
any

T. 6.

any such *injudicious deduction*, the *Question of the Use of Lots* in generall might well by occasion of that *Text* be discussed, then is Mr. B. his *deduction* nothing *judicious*, from thence taxing Mr. G. as *failing in Iudgement*, for taking occasion thereby to discusse that *Question*. But herein Mr. B. dealeth with me as he doth with *Peter Martyr* in his *Dialogue*; where, because *m Peter Martyr* relateth in his discourse entreating of *Dice-play*, how *n Plato* compareth the *Life of Man* thereunto, he denieth, yea and seriously confuteth this *Consequence*, implying the same to be *Peter Martyrs*;

Plato compareth mans life to Table-play,

Therefore Table-play is lawfull.

I will not here stand vpon the *Ordinarie plea*, that it is *o no great disgrace* for a man (a meane man, as my selfe especially) *to goe astray with great Guides*, before he be infortmed (as my selfe neuer was till now) of their error. Nor will I say, as one sometime did (it was no warrantable saying) *p I will chuse rather to erre with such, than to goe the right way with any other*: as if it were safe, as some *q Papissts* auow, to erre at all with any. But yet, considering the ordinarie

m Petr. Martyr in Ind. cap. 14.

n χρὴ ὡς περ ἐν
ἡρώδῃ κωκῶν, περὶ
τῶν πηλωκόντων πῖ-
διδαι τὴν αὐτῶν
συναγματον, ὅπερ
ὁ λβ, & ἰπερὶ βέλ-
της' αὐτῶν. Plat.
de repub. l. 10. &
apud Plut. de tran-
quill. & consul. ad
Apollon. Sed & So-
crates apud Stob.
c. 123. Περὶ τῆς πνὴ
δοικαν ὁ εἰς & κ;
δὲ ὡς περ ἱππο-
πνῶν πνιδαι τὸ
συμπαρόν. & γὰρ
δὲ αὐτῶν βδῶν,
ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν &
ἱππορ.

o Magnos honestus
error est sequi du-
ces. Quintil. instit.
l. 1.

p Malo ego cum Pla-
tone errare, quam
cum istis vera sen-
tire. Cic. Tusc. l. 1.

Verum hoc est Platonem Deum facere: prout ipse alibi de eodem; Deus ille nos ter Plato. Cic. ad
Attic. l. 4. ep. 15. Melius sanctiusque Aristot. ethic. l. 1. c. 6. Δὲ ἐν σωματικῇ καὶ ἀλ-
θειας καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀνακρίν. Αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὅτι πῶς ἀλλοι, ὅτιον περὶ τῶν ἀλ-
θειας. Vnde & illud eiusdem fertur; Amicus Plato: si d magis amica veritas. Sed & Plin. ep. 8.
l. 5. Honestissimum maiorum vestigia sequi, si non à recto itinere processerint. q Cum Pastor
ordinarius & aliquis alius qui predicat non vocatus contraria docent, debet omnino populus
Pastorem suum potius sequi quam illum alterum qui non est Pastor, etiam si forte contingeret,
ut Pastor erraret. Bellarm. de Cleric. l. 1. c. 8. Quasi cum Cic. pro Balbo diceret, Vtilius
honestiusque illo duce errare, quam hoc magistro erudiri.

practise

with Answer to it.

7

practise of some *principal Divines* of our times, and such as Mr. B. himselfe (I am sure) esteemeth for iudicious; as also treading in the track of *two Reuerend Prelates* (besides others) in this very particular, who take occasion vpon the same Text (though not so largely as I doe) to consider of *Lots* in more generall manner than concerneth the *particular Lot* in the Text mentioned, and to speak the one of them somewhat of the *Lusorie Lot* also now questioned; I shall craue leaue of Mr. B. to incline to *their Iudgements* herein rather than his, till he bring better *Reasons* for his *Opinion* than as yet he hath brought. Nor will Mr. B. euer be able to proue that euery by-point handled by occasion of a Text, must of necessity be necessarily deduced euer from the words of the Text. Howsoever it be, it mattereth not much, since it neither mendeth Mr. B. his cause, nor yet marreth mine in the *Point* betweene vs controuerted.

*Petr Martyr,
Dr. Whitakers,
Mr. Perkins,
and others.*

*An ego verear ne
me non satis deceat,
quod illos decuit?
Plin. ep. 3. l. 5.*

*The now Lord
Archbishop of
Canterbury; and
the late L. Bishop
of London.*

*B. King on Ion.
lett. 9.*

2. *In Discretion.* Because that *Doctrine* (though occasioned by his Text, yet) so insisted vpon, encourageth *Gamesters* in their sinfull course, and buildeth up those *Abuses*, which the *Lawes* of our Land would pull downe.

I. B.

The Charge, you see, riseth, From a grosse failing in *Iudgement* to a fouler faulting in *Discretion*, if all that Mr. B. here auereth, be true. But whether my discourse doth, either *incourage Gamesters vnto any sinfull course*; (vnlesse to vse any

T. G.

^a Calumniatur, qui
quod defert, non
probat. Reg. Inr.

any *Lot in Game* be a *sinfull course*, which M^r. B. must not yet take for granted) or *build up* such *Abuses* as our *Lawes* would *pull downe*; I appeale to the *Booke* it selfe; let M^r. B. either shew so much out of it, or else his ^a *Charge* here is but a *meere Calumnie*.

But of this more hereafter.

I. B.

3. *In Charitie*: Because he *confuteth me by Name* (as I was certified) not having had any conference with me either by *speech*, or by *writing*, though I be his *Neighbour Minister*.

T. G.

^x Idèd imperitiam
confiteri solemus,
ut malitiæ suspi-
cionem vitemus. Hie-
ron. adv. error. Ioan.
Hierosol.

The heaviest *Charge* commeth last. A breach of *Charitie* at least. To faile in *Iudgement* or *Discretion*, may argue some weaknesse of braine; to faile in *Charitie* argueth ^x much more, an euill minde. But let M^r. B^s. words here and else-where be well weighed, and peradventure they will giue ouer-much ground of suspicion of some want of that in him, that he chargeth me here to haue failed in. M^r. G. saith he, *failed in Charitie*, because he *confuteth me by Name*, as I was certified; having had no conference with me by *speech* or *writing*, though I be his *neighbour Minister*. Not to insist much on by-matters; that M^r. B. is *my neighbour Minister*, is more than euer I heard before: that he is ^y *my neighbour* and a *Minister*, it may well be; yet it is more than I knew, when I dealt in this point; nor doe I yet know, where his place of abode is, saue that himselfe of late hath told me, that I

^y A diuisis ad con-
iuncta nulla est con-
secutio. Aristot.
soph. elench. l. 2. c. 3.

goe

goe oft by his doore; and so he may be termed *my neighbour*, yet in no very strict sense, as any other *Inhabitant in the Borough of Southwarke* may. But to let that passe, if Mr. B. his meaning be that I *confuted him by name in the Pulpit*, as he charged me at first, and which I vtterly denie; how will it stand with *Charitie or Conscience* vpon a bare report, which he saith else-where *he dareth not relie on*, and that after better information acknowledged to haue beene giuen him, yet still so oft, and so peremptorily to charge me therewith, and with *breach of Charitie* therein? If his meaning be that I haue since that confuted, and doe (the * letter of my Booke still abiding) by name confute him, not *in the Pulpit*, but *in print*, because he saith in the present tense, *he confuteth me by name*, I denie it not, nor doe I hold it any *breach of Charitie* so to doe. His Booke is abroad vnder his *Name*, as well as mine is vnder mine: Nor is it any more a *breach of Charitie* for me by *Name* so to confute him in the one, than it was in him by *Name* to controll and oppose *Peter Martyr* in the other. But neither could this be any ground for Mr. B. then to indge me guilty of vncharitablenesse, when as yet it was not; nor could any certifie him then of it, vnlesse they knew more of my minde then, than I my selfe did; nor was it done before I had dealt with Mr. B. by writing, as himselfe in the next passage freely acknowledgeth. Mr. B's words therefore hang but vnhandsonly together, when he

C

saith,

* *Vox audita perit: litera scripta manet.*

M. B. his Preface,

^a Illic mihi aliud
dictabat animus,
aliud scribebat ca-
lamus. Erasmi. epist.
ad Ludov. Viu. lib.
19.

saith, he thought I failed in Charitie, because I con-
fute him by Name, as he was certified, &c. His
minde and his pen, or both, and the knowne
truth, it may be feared, ^a had some struggling to-
gether, when he wrote thus.

I. B.

Well; Mr. G. sent me his Answer to my Dia-
logue. I acknowledge it with hearty thanks. But
why haue I not replied in so many yeeres? I an-
swer: Sat citò, si sat benè. To speake freely; I
thinke I should neuer haue replied, in hope that the
Question would haue died, had not Mr. G. consu-
ted my Dialogue in Print. But now, the rather, be-
ing prouoked by many learned Ministers and other,
who tell me, that seeing of all those whom Mr. G.
confuteth, viz. Peter Martyr, Zwinglius, Cart-
wright, Danæus, Perkins, Fenner, &c. I onely
liue, I ought to reply, lest my silence should giue
way to impious iniquitie; I am ready to performe
my promise in replying. Which indeed I could not
haue done so conueniently before, because the an-
swer, which Mr. G. sent me, had not the positive
grounds of his Opinion, which the printed booke
hath.

T. G.

True it is, I was not daintie to deliuer Mr. B.
an Answer to the whole Substance of his Dia-
logue, but vpon promise returned me first from
Mr. B. that in defence of his owne Arguments
he would reply thereupon. Which himselfe
also, after long delay, being vrged either to doe
or t redeliue r it, did by word of mouth to my
selfe

selfe againe oblige himselfe either to doe or to yeeld the truth; for so his words both times were. But after a yeere or twoes stay longer, when nothing would be returned, and I was by diuers informed, how I was in meetings oft traduced and backbited, mine *intentions* scanned, my *positions* taxed, some as *senslesse*, some as *impious*, diuers *assertions* fastned on me, that I neuer deliuered, diuers of those ^b depraued that were deliuered, and that M^r. B. himselfe among others was not sparing herein: I condescended at length to the importunitie of those (yet hauing had the whole worke viewed and reviewed first by diuers, as well *religious* as *iudicious* *Diuines*, and hauing by writing dealt with diuers others of contrary Iudgement,) that had pressed me to the printing of it.

^b - nihil est, Quin
malè narrando pos-
sit deprauarier. Tot.
Phorm. 4. 4.

Now why M^r. B. did not all that while reply vpon mine *Answer*, which he was so instant to haue, he rendreth two *Reasons*; in my minde very weake ones.

1. *He hoped, it would haue died.* And how was that likely, when his *Challenge* had reuiued it; and that bruited abroad, a *Replie* was expected. But his former *Dialogue* belike was enough to dash all that either had beene or could be said without further *Reply*.

2. *The writing I sent him, had not my positive grounds.* As if his owne *Arguments*, had they beene effectually, could not without them haue beene sufficiently defended.

Why now at length he doth it, he hath two

M. B. his Preface,

Grounds likewise, but those suggested to him from others, as the former were from himselfe.

c Mr. G. maintaineth no more concerning Cards and Tables, than *Peter Martyr, Danaus, and Perkins* doe.

1. Because he *onely liueth of all those whom Mr. G. refuteth*. Where in the *Catalogue* of those whom he saith I refute, he reckoneth some, as *Zwinglius*, whom I refute not at all, as not knowing certainly what they held, some that himselfe refuteth as well as I doe, and that allow *Cards* and *Tables* as not simply vnlawfull, as *Peter Martyr, Danaus, and Perkins*; that so both I might seeme vtterly to dissent from them concerning the lawfulness of those *Games*, whereas * I maintaine no more concerning the lawfulness of them in themselves than they doe, (though in our *grounds*, I confesse, wee differ) and that himselfe might seeme, as the last man aliue amongst them, to stand vp in the defence of them, when as indeed he opposeth and impugneth them, and these *Games*, by them not vtterly disallowed.

2. *Lest by his silence he should giue way to impious iniquitie*. Here is againe terrible imputations. They were before in the *prinate*; *Want of Iudgement, want of Discretion, want of Charitie*; in the *manner* of my dealing. They come now in the *positive*: *Impious Iniquitie*; Not *Iniquitie* alone, but *Impietie* and *Iniquitie*, the breach of both *Tables*, combined in one: where, thinke we, but in the *matter* of my discourse? Surely, if such *impious Iniquitie* be maintained by me in this *Argument*, I beshrew Mr. B. for sparing

sparing his pen, when he might by discoverie of it in his reply haue preuented the printing of it: And little cause I haue to thanke those my friends before spoken of, that hauing had many the view of it before it came forth, would not any of them doe me the fauour to aduertise me thereof. But ^d affection peraduenture might ouersway iudgements in them. And ^e an Adversarie many times is sharper-sighted then a Friend. Meane while remember, I pray thee, good Reader, that there is ^f nothing easier than to charge and accuse: all the skill is, which Mr. B. must looke to, to make good.

^d αἰδῶν. Plut. de util. inim. Πολλὰ μᾶλλον αἰδῶν ὁ ἔχθρος τῷ φίλῳ. Ibid. ^e Si accusasse sufficere, quis innocens erit? Iulianus Delphidius apud Ammianum hist. l. 18.

^d Επὶ φιλῶν τοῖς φίλοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλογία. Plato apud Plut. de adul. & de util. ex inim. Amantium cœca sunt iudicia. Hieron. ad Ioan. Hierosol. Αἱ πατὴρ τοῖς φίλοις. Greg. Naz. ep. 13. & 27. & 9. rat. de Eccl. Naz. Fallit affectus. Plin. ep. 44. l. 4.

^e Παρ' ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις οἱ ἔχθροι ἀντιλογούνται. Ibid. ^f Si

Before I proceed, I protest before God, that I esteeme Mr. G. as a learned, painfull, and faithfull Minister, and a right honest man; and therefore pray thee (Christian Reader) that whatsoeuer I write may be considered as concerning the Question betweene vs, and not in any wise applied to the least preiudice of so reuerend a Brother, or to any of his excellent parts.

I. B.

If Mr. B. purpose were to deale onely with the Question in controuersie, why runneth he out into ^g such by-matters, as make nothing at all thereunto? Why doth he labour so much to cast such aspersions, to procure

T. G.

^g Καλύπτει οἱ νόμοι ἑξωτὴν ὡς ἀντιλογίαν λέγειν. Aristot. rhet. l. 1. c. 1.

M. B. his Preface,

ἢ Ταῦτα γὰρ ἔ
 σὲν οὐ παρὰ γυμνα-
 σίον, ἀλλὰ οὐ παρὰ
 δίκην. Ἀλλ' ἔ
 σὲν δίκην δια-
 κρίσιν. ὁμοίον
 γὰρ καὶ εἰ τις, ὃ
 μέλει χεῖρ κα-
 τὰ, τὸ τοιοῦτον
 σφελὲς. Arist. ib.

I. B.

preiudice, as well vpon my manner of my dea-
 ling, as on the matter that I deale in? Or what
 is this but as if one should cast filth and dirt
 openly in a mans face, and yet beare the stan-
 ders by in hand, that he did it not to disgrace
 him? But proceed we.

*So excellent that I wonder what moued him to
 publish his Opinion in print; and the more because
 of many passages in his Booke.*

T. G.

i Videas pramitti
 alia suspicia, sicque
 quadam cum gra-
 uitate & tarditate
 maesto vultu, demis-
 sis supercilijs, &
 voce plangente gre-
 di maledictionem,
 & quidem tanto
 plausibiliore, quanto
 creditur ab his qui
 audiunt, corde in-
 vito & condolentis
 affectu proferri. Do-
 leo, inquit, vehe-
 menter de eo, quia
 diligo illum satis.
 Grande damnum:
 nam alias quidem
 in pluribus valet:
 ceterū in hac par-
 te excusari non po-
 test. Bern. in Cant.
 24.

Me thinks I heare some of those here, that
 Bernard speaketh of, who when they desire
 most to disgrace a man, begin first to tell of his
 good parts, and how much it grieueth them that
 one otherwise so well qualified, should be so
 far over-scene. But to let that passe.

Mr. B. here wondreth what should moue me to
 put mine opinion (not relating what it is) in print.
 As if some new opinion were now broached by
 me that either had neuer beene heard of, or ne-
 uer published before. Whereas he cannot be
 ignorant, that both the Opinion held by me con-
 cerning the lawfulnessse of a lufurious Lot in ge-
 nerall, is, and hath euer beene (for ought that
 can be shewed to the contrary) more generally
 receiued than that that he holdeth, and hath
 beene in print maintained by others before me;
 yea concerning Cards and Tables, (which I deale
 with principally, in regard of the Lot in them,
 defending them onely as not in that regard
 unlawfull) that they were in print defended by
 some

* Some of those that himselfe mentioneth, before I was borne, or he either.

* Peter Martyr, at least; if not Damian too.

I might wonder rather that M^r. B. should thinke either himselfe or any other now adayes so priuiledged, that they might take libertie to themselves to publish *new conceits in Print*, contrary to what is and hath beene generally receiued, and yet thinke much that any other in *Print* should oppose them.

But many passages in my Booke shew that I ought not so to haue done.

First, He taketh knowledge of many enormous Crimes, which accompanie Dice, Cards, &c. p. 193. and in the quotations.

I. B.

Secondly, He giueth this Rule, That that, which is no necessarie dutie, but a thing indifferent onely otherwise, may not be done, where is strong presumption upon good ground, that it shall spiritually endanger a mans selfe, or others, by giuing occasion of sin vnto the one or the other, p. 107, 108, 109.

If many and grieuous sins attend Dice, Cards, &c. If those games be too too commonly abused, as he confesseth, p. 194. and if an indifferent thing may not be done which giueth occasion of sinne: I wonder why M^r. G. writeth in defence of Dice, &c. And the more, because he granteth, that where the use and abuse of a thing are so enwrapped and entangled together, that they cannot easily be seuered the one from the other, then the use of the thing it selfe (if it be vnnesessarie otherwise) would be wholly abandoned, p. 262, 263.

Here

T. G.

Here is the summe of Mr. B's Argument.

Mr. G. taketh notice that many enormous Crimes oft (for so I say onely) accompanie Cards and Dice: and they are by many too commonly abused: and he granteth further, that things indifferent may not be done when they giue occasion of euill: and that where the use of a thing and the abuse of it are so entangled together, that they cannot easily be seuered, the thing being vnneccessarie, would wholly be abandoned. Therefore Mr. G. ought not to haue deliuered his Opinion, that a Lot used in game is not simply unlawfull; and that it is not the Lot either in these games or in any other (for it is vsed in many besides these) but such abuses attending them, when they are not, or cannot well be seuered from them, that makes them euill or unlawfull. For this is my maine opinion giuen of them. Or rather, if you will haue the truth of it; Therefore Mr. G. ought not to haue contradicted M. B. his opinion, that no Lot in game is lawfull.

¹ Tu id quod boni est, excerpis, dicis quod mali est. Ter. Phorm. 4. 4.

^m Istiusmodi ludi nō ita prorsus dam- narentur a nobis, si in eorum usu, quod licet, locum haberet. Calvin. epist. 374.

Hee might haue added, what ¹ I adde, that those euils attend other Games wherein no Lot is, as well as those wherein it is: And that it is not the Lot therefore from whence they arise: and that the use and the abuse may easily be seuered by those that be well affected, as well in these Games as in any other. And I might adde, that Martyr, Damascus, yea and ^m Calvin himself, though they saw all that he saith I say, yet durst not passe such a sentence on them as Mr. B. hath done. But what force is in the Consequence, let any indiffer-
rent man iudge.

Thirdly,

I. B.

Thirdly, He sheweth in many pages, how severely Tables, but especially Dice, be condemned by Lawes Ciuill, Canonick, and Municipall, that is, our English Statutes, as he sheweth at large, Lib. 8. S. 5. 8. He wisheth the Lawes were yet more severe, and put in better execution, p. 206. He saith, that our common dicers may be marshalled among the flocke of the Devils followers, p. 217. He affirmeth most rifelings and Lotteries to be little better than unlawfull Games, p. 120. And he teacheth that by these Games we must not give offence to the Lawes under which we live, p. 251. Now I wonder that so good a man is not afraid to offend our Law by allowing forbidden Games, even Dice, as well as Cards &c. which consist not only of Lotterie.

To all this, that is indeed nothing but a deale of dust and smoke raised to daffe mens eyes, that they may not discern what the point in Controuersie is, I haue already in my Discourse of Lots answered at large. And it is a friuolous course for M^r. B. to produce it here, passing dry-foot by the Answer that is thereunto there given.

Thither therefore I might iustly send M^r. B. for an answer. But I answer here againe in few words.

I. Our Lawes doe not simply or generally condemne or forbid Cards or Dice, but to some onely, vsed in some manner, and at some times.

T. G.

n Of Lots, chap. 8. sect. 8.

2. It is not in regard of any such *superstitious conceits* of the *unlawfulness* of a *Lot* in them, as Mr. B. maintaineth, that either ours or any other *Lawes* condemne or inhibit them.

3. It is a grosse fallshood that I offend our *Lawes* by allowing any *Games* that are thereby forbidden, so far forth as the *Law* forbideth them. Mine owne words by Mr. B. himselfe produced cleare me thereof: And it is too palpable a *Calumnie* to charge me therewith. If a man should defend the lawfulness in themselves of *bowling, coiting and logeting* against some fantasti-
call spirit that should question the same, (as
° there is nothing almost so *absurd* but some or other have held) would any man, thinke we, be either so malicious or so senselesse, as to tax him for the same as offending our *Lawes*, because in the same *Lawes* these are also prohibited, though there be no *Lot* in them, even as strictly as those other are? Or were he a *justifier* therefore of the *abuses* accompanying the same, that should defend them as in themselves not *unlawfull*?

• Nihil tam absurdum est, quod non ab aliquo etiam Philosophorum dictum sit. Postremo nemo egrotus quicquam somniat Tam infandum, quod non aliquis dicat Philosophus. Varro Eumenid. Anaxagoras nivem esse nigram dixit. Xenophanes Lunam habitari, eamque terram esse multarum urbium & montium. Cic. Lucull. Terram moveri, cœlum consistere, Philolaus, Cleantes, alij. Laert. Philol. Plut. Num. Cic. Lucul. Sen. nat. quest. 17. c. 2. iam Heretici quorū illi

Patriarche, ut sicut Textull. præscript. que portentosa dogmata protulerunt? Nec nuptias contrahere, nec corpus vestire Adamitæ; nec vinū gustare, Scythiani & Encratitæ; nec carnibus vesci, Saturniani, & Ebionitæ; nec panem frangere, aut olus scindere Manichei; nec iudicia exercere Tertullianistæ; nec gladio uti, bellare, jurare, magistratum gerere, porcina, sanguine, suffocato vesci Anabaptistæ; nec nisi precibus duntaxat vacare Mesaliani, &c. licitum censuerunt. V. dendi Epiphani. Aug. Theodor. Dana. de Hæres. Iudei vero quam in hoc genere facundi? nec quo spina è pede evellat, nummūve lapsum attollat, corā imagine incurvare felicitum; nec potandi causa simulatio labia admove, cuius per os aqua profuscat; nec ornamentis causa humanā effigiem, Solisve aut Lunæ imaginē sculptā habere; nec mulieri ethnicæ obstrictari; nec per sabbatum super herbam ambulare, nec pomū assare, nec manus lavare, nec lucernam extinguere, nec superfluum incendio subtrahere, &c. Vide Præcept. Mos. negat.

4. I will not answer M^r. B. here as the *Philosopher* did one, that telling idle stories, was still asking, *Is it not a wonder?* *It is a wonder*, quoth he, *rather that any man can endure to heare thee thus trifle.* But I wonder that M^r. B. since he deemeth it so fearefull a thing to be faulty herein, is not afraid himselfe *to offend our Lawes*, I might say, by fastning vpon them or the makers of them such *superstitious conceits* concerning the use of a Lot, as I verily thinke M^r. B. himselfe cannot imagine, euer entred into their braines; as supposing that these *Lawes* were framed vpon such *Grounds* as his *Booke* is built vpon: but I say rather, by condemning that that they allow and approue of, and that not in the meaner sort, but in those of best fashion, that should be examples vnto others, and I might adde, at such times, when, if at one time more than other, they ought to be most religious of any. M^r. B. therefore if he doe well remember himselfe, may turne his wonderment here from me to himselfe.

Lastly, though I grant that *common Diccers* may well be ranked among the *Deuils followers*, yet followeth it not that all use of a Die is therefore to be condemned; no more than it will follow that because *Tauerne-haunters* may well goe in the same rank with such, therefore all resort to any *Tauerne* on any occasion whatsoever is to be vtterly disallowed.

Here I haue occasion to thinke, that I may haue

ῥ οὐ θαυμαδόν,
Αειδοῦντες;
ῥ οὐ γὰρ τοῦ θαυ-
μαδόν· ἀλλ' εἰ πε-
πιδωκε ἔχον φλυ-
αργία· οὐ γὰρ αἰ-
ρεσι. *Aristot. apud*
Plut. de garrul.

M. B. his Preface,

some more comfort in mine opinion, than M^r. G. can haue in his. For he nameth famous, learned and godly men concurring with me in Opinion. But in the multitude of his quotations, I finde none approving Dice in play. And whereas some learned Divines, in some sort, allow Games consisting of Lot and wit, but altogether condemne Dice, M^r. G. defendeth mine Opinion, disapproving a mixt, as well as a meere Lot, because, as he saith, a true Lot is in neither, p. 126. and he deemeth them to be amisse, who allow Lots in Game, and yet adde for a Caution, that religiousnesse be used in the action, in regard that holy things must be done in holy manner.

T. G.

1. How any man may haue sound comfort in any error, be it what it will, is more than I am aware of: since that euery error is vnfound and contrary to truth: nor can I see therefore how that should minister any sound or true comfort, that hath no soundnesse nor truth it selfe. Some excuse there may be for it, but small comfort in it, when a man together with some great ones goeth out of the way. M^r. B. therefore must first be assured of the truth of what he holdeth, before he can from his company haue any true comfort of it. The rather since that by his owne confession, ^a he ought not to teach an vntruth, though it were to Gods glory: and what comfort can he haue of doing that, that ought not by him to be done?

* Hinc Plin. ep. 5.
l. 3. Ab illis, quibus
notum est, quos
quotosque autores
sequar, facile impe-
trari posse confido,
ut errare me cum
illis ferant.

¶ Mr. B. dedicat.
epist to Dialog.

2. The Reason produced by him (supposing
all

all he saith) is a very weake one, and such as I doubt not but he himselfe would haue waiued, had he beene of the first that had questioned some things yet in controuersie with vs.

3. *Many famous, learned and godly concurring with M^r. B.* I name not, because I know not many; howbeit indeed all I know, I name. And for those that concurre with me in the iustification of a *Lot* vsed in *Game*; I made no speciall or particular relation of them, not because none such were, for there are diuers, but because I was not so much to deale with them that concurred, as with those that either did indeed, or might seeme to oppose. Of which number I was religious not to misse or omit any one that I could light vpon, whom I found ought in to that effect.

4. Albeit it be not much materiall what humane Authorities are on either side: since that neither the *Faith of Christ*, nor the *Truth of God* are to be held with respect of persons: Yet since that M^r. B. would seeme herein at least to relie somewhat thereupon, and would make what I maintaine odious, or suspicious at least, by the nakednesse of it, and the want of *famous, learned and godly* concurring in it, such as he glorieth here to haue concurring with him: let me a little, good Reader, intreat thy patience, which M^r. B. enforceth me, I might well say, to abuse, I must needs say, to detaine with *impertinent discourse* all this while much against mine owne will, while, to remoue this imputation,

Iam. 2. 1. Nec personarum, sed rerum pondere unumquodque indicanda est. Hieron. ad Pamm. & Ocean.

Ὡς οἱ χρηματίζο-
μενοι τὰς πλῆστον
πύρας ἢ δάμνους
ἐπλαμβάνουσ.
Greg. Naz. de pa-
ce 3.

tion, I runne out a little further in relating the *Opinions* of others on either side, and in clearing the state of the *Question in Controversie*, which M^r. B. to procure the more distaste to his opponents, (as the manner is of those that maintaine a weake cause, & willing rather to fasten vpon any by-matter, that may breed some ieaousie of the aduerse partie, than to keepe close to the point it selfe) propoundeth still in *hypothesi*, in one particular that he knoweth to be much abused, when the *Question* indeed is a great deale more generall.

The *Question* therefore is not betweene M^r. B. and me, whether *Dice-play*, which so oft he hath vp, that he might traduce mee as a maintainer of it, as it is ouer-frequently vsed or abused rather, is allowable or no; but whether any *Lot* at all in the largest sense taken, vsed in game, or to speake as himselfe doth in the very *Title* of his *Booke*, whether any *Game* at all consisting in chance, be allowable. So that Mr. B. if hee please, may put the *Question* as well of *Euen and Od.* or of *Best by trust*, or of *Heads and Points*, or of *Crosse and Pile*, as of *Dice*; and of *Shuffling of Arrowes blind-fold* or *behind a mans backe*, or of *Casting Bowles together out of some one mans lap* or *armes* to decide or sort who shall side, as of *Cards & Tables*, which come here into disquisition only, in regard that a *Lot* either is, or is deemed to be in them. And I maruell why M^r. B. as he peremptorily cōdemneth *Cards & Tables*, & requireth an vtter necessary abolition of them, doth

doth not withall also very seriously and severely enioine all *Parents* to restraine and vtterly inhibit their *Children* from playing at *Cockall*, and *Crosse and Pile*, and *Euen and Od*, and *Heads & Points*, considering that these are *Lottories* likewise or *Games* consisting of chance as well as those are; and there is *impious iniquity* therefore (to vse M^r. B. tragicall tearmes) by his *Grounds*, as well in the one as in the other. But it wou'd peraduenture haue beene somewhat too ridiculous if he should so haue done.

But to leaue that, in their iudgement concerning such *Games*, there is the more seeming difference among *Diuines* and others, because^a they doe not generally agree about the *Definition* of a *Lot*, in regard whereof also it is oftentimes vncertaine whether they doe allow a *Lot* in *Game* or no, taken in that large extent of signification that M^r. B. and I vnderstand it.

Whereas therefore the *Games* controuerted are of two sorts, some depending wholly vpon *Casualty*, and some but in part onely;^b some hold a *Lot* in both, and therefore vtterly condemne either; ^c some hold a *Lot* in the former, but not in the latter, and therefore allow those, but disallow these, some ^d hold a *Lot* in neither, and therefore allow either; ^e some hold a *Lot* in both, and yet allow either. Now in the generall *Conclusion* thus laid downe, it is true that M^r. B. goeth with the first, and I with the last; but in application of the *Iudgements* of the middle sort to the *Games* in question, I con-

curre

^a See my booke of *Lots*. ch. 6. sect. 3. p. 126.

^b Fennor of recreation. cap. 4. Bamford Dialog.

^c Dane. de ludo aleæ. Babington on Decalog. Perkins Cases of Conscience. lib. 3. cap. 4.

^d Iacob. Rex Stag. lib. 3.

^e B. King in 107. left. 9.

M. B. his Preface,

concurr in part with the former, wholly and fully with the latter, whereas M. B. dissenteth wholly and fully from both.

There concur therefore with me in allowance of the Games of both sorts, First. Our most high and mightie *Souveraigne* himselfe ^f *King James*, for his singular learning and iudgement admired as well abroad as at home, and whose voice therefore may well in a far greater controverſie beare weight. Secondly, the right *Reverend* the late ^g *Lord Bishop of London*: yea and thirdly ^h *M. Calvine* himselfe, who would not he saith, utterly condemne Cards and Dice, were it not for the ordinary abuse of them.

In allowance of the latter there concur againe with me, ⁱ *Bishop Babington*, ^k *Peter Martyr*, ^l *Daneus*, ^m *Perkins*. All whom, as well the latter as the former, yea the latter more specially, M^r. B. opposeth: M^r. Fenner only, M^r. B. teacher, (for so ⁿ himselfe acknowledgeth him) for ought I know, (nor doe I name any other, howsoever M. B. say *I name famous, learned and godly men, concurring with him in opinion*) therein cleerely or directly passing sentence on his side.

Nor helpeth it M^r. B. that I grant, willing ingenuously to imbrace and acknowledge whatsoever light of truth I can from any side discern to discover it selfe, that the grounds that some of them haue laid being duly considered, fight as well against the one sort of Games, which yet they defend, as against the other, which

^f *Iacob. Rex ubi sup.*

^g *B. King on Ion.*

^h *Calvin. ep. 374.*

ⁱ *Babingt. on Command 8.*

^k *P. Martyr. on Iudg. 14.*

^l *Daneus de ludo aleæ. c. 6.*

^m *Perk. Cases of Conscience, l. 3. c. 4. s. 3. q. 2.*

ⁿ *M^r. B. answer to Argum. 5. and defence of Arg. 4.*

• *Undecunque effulserit Lux neuliquam spernanda reuertatur.*

which they disallow. For their *Judgement* is to be framed by what they conceived and apprehended, and doe themselves directly declare and deliuer vnto vs, not by what may be by vs deduced, though neuer so necessarily it follow (being more than they saw or were aware of,) from any other *position* or *conclusion* of theirs.

Schoolemen or other such writers of former times I name not now, though I might many, and haue done some *obiter* in my *P. Booke*; because M^r. B. would peraduenture except against them. As for the *Ancients* indeed little is to be found of this *Controuersie* in them; because the *exception* taken against them for the *dependance* upon *casualtie* is in truth but a *new conceit*, neuer heard of till of late. And for *Diuines* among vs, I doubt not but a far greater number of our *Reuerend Brethren* in the *Ministerie* abiding here about the *Citie*, to goe no further abroad, yea euen of those that M^r. B. himselfe cannot but esteeme reuerently of, doe dissent from M^r. B. than concurre in *Judgement* with him, in the condemning of all *Lotterie* whatsoever vsed in *disport*; or, because some of them may vnderstand *Lotterie* otherwise than he and I doe, in condemning all *light* and *lufurious* actions that either *meerely* or *mixtly* depend upon *Casualty*.

P Chap. 3. sect.
1, 2.

Fourthly, He granteth that Prayer specially applied to the Lot may be conctined, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of some consequence,

I. B.

E

quence,

quence, p. 91. And yet he holdeth, that the lesse weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111. The reason why I wonder at this passage, shall be given in my Reply.

T. G.

Mr. B. should haue done well then to haue forborne to trouble both himselfe and vs with telling vs of this his wonderment, till he meant to giue vs a reason of it. For I suppose hardly any man living beside himselfe can guesse what the, And yet, here should intimate, till he further explaine himselfe.

I. B.

The last passage now to be obserued as matter of my wondring, is this. Notwithstanding, he confidently affirmeth that we may not doe ought without warrant, p. 301. sufficiently confirmeth the same; because such an act is not done of Faith, and therefore not free from sinne, Rom. 14. 23. but is a meere presumption, and tempting of God, pag. 313. & quot. ^a. & ^b. and earnestly reproveth one kinde of Lotterie (why not all against which the same reason is of like validitie?) because not found revealed in any word of God, but brought in either by Satan, or by some of his Instruments, who are addicted to vanitie, p. 315. & 316. and yet he auoucheth, That it is a sufficient warrant for the use of Lots, in that the oppugners, being learned, can say nothing against them, but what hath beene, or may be sufficiently answered, pag. 235. May I not wonder that so iudicious a Scholler doth not observe this discrepance? Lotterie is unlawfull, if not warranted

warranted by the word; which position supposeth the word to be perfect, as is the Author thereof; and secondly Lotterie is lawfull, if learned men can say nothing out of the word against it. Which position supposeth two things, viz. that the word is like the Lawes of Men, that is, imperfect, as be the Authors thereof: and, that learned men cannot so faile in diligence of reading, clearenesse of understanding, and firmnesse of memorie, but that, if there were in the word any thing against Lotterie, they could not but see it.

1. I feare there will not want those that will strongly suspect that some speeches of M^r. B. here proceed rather from spleane and gall against M^r. G. than from loue to any truth supposed to be opposed by him; and that with much better colour, than M^r. B. can deduce that which he here chargeth me with from any words of mine here alledged. For what one title of all that M^r. B. alledgeth here out of my Booke, intimateth any such thing as is here by M^r. B. thence deduced, to wit, that the word of God is imperfect. As if that which there is nothing in Gods word against it, were not warranted by the word: or the word must needs be imperfect if this be held sufficient warrant for an action, that there is nothing in Gods word against it. For thence must this hainous Charge be inferred; if from any part of my Position at all. Which Position, or whatsoeuer else M^r. B. pleaseth to stile it, (for it is propounded by me only, as matter

T. G.

⁹ Index bonus esse nemo potest, qui suspicione certa non morietur. Cic. in Verr. 5.

M. B. his Preface,

of consideration, not as a peremptory position, he should haue done well to haue related all out in mine owne words, which are these; *It may be thought a sufficient warrant for the use of these Loos, in that the oppugners of them being men so learned, and so well read in Gods word, can say nothing against them, but what either hath beene or may be sufficiently answered by others.* Which words are there spoken, not as presupposing that learned men cannot faile in reading, vnderstanding, and remembrance, but as very probably presuming that men learned & well read in the word, bending their mindes and studies that way, might and should at length finde out such a *speciall institution and consecration of Letterie in generall to be a diuine sentence and an holy Orade*, that might not lightly therefore be dealt with, if it were any where to be found. And that the contrary issue of their diligent search and industrious opposition producing nothing but what had beene or might easily be answered, might seeme sufficient to produce such a *morall certainty as in ciuill Actions the Casuists doe ordinarily require.* But I referre my selfe and M^r. B^r. dealing herein to the iudgement of any vnpartiall partie vpon due view of the place it selfe. *Howbeit to stay M^r. B^r. wonderment somewhat, that he may not make me an Owle sitting alone in an iuie bush by my selfe: at least to let him vp another to wonder at as well as my selfe; one that it seemeth he would not, for*

else

else he could not but see, when he found him sitting together in the same *bush* with mee. Mr. Bradshaw (a man well knowne to M. B. while he liued, and one that it would be no disparagement to Mr. B. I suppose, if I should say he were as iudicious a man as himselfe,) in his Answer to Johnson the Separatist, vseth these words, * *This is a sufficient iustification of our Ministerie, that such malicious Adversaries thereof, who would seeme so expert in the Scripture, are no better able by Scriptura to proue their unchristian accusation.* Here is ^f a more peremptorie assertion than mine is by much, and that in a matter, I wisse, of much more weight. *It is sufficient,* saith he; *it may be thought so,* say I: *that men that would seeme so expert in the Scripture,* saith he; *that men so well read in Gods word,* say I. Now I will request Mr. B. to looke a while off me, and turning his speech to him tell him, that he wondreth that Mr. B. though he doe confidently avow (as he need not doubt but hee would haue done) that wee may not doe ought without warrant; yet doth withall avouch, that this is sufficient iustification of our Ministerie, that men so expert in Scripture cannot make good ought against it: and that so iudicious a Scholler doth not obserue this discrepance; and how hereby Gods law is made, like humane lawes, imperfect. And let him imagine but what Mr. Br. would in all likelihood haue answered him, or Mr. Johnson, if he should in that manner haue replied vpon him. Meane while he need not wonder, that

* W. Bradshaw vnreasonableness of the Separation, Reas. 3. an. 1.

^f Quod ille pronunciat, ego dubito: quod ille definit, ego sciscitor. Hiero. apolog. pro lib. adv. Io. vin.

M. B. his Preface,

I see not this discrepance, when one far more iudicious than my selfe could not see it, either in my worke, (for he had the viewing of it ere it came out, and was a chiefe instigator of me to the setting of it out,) or in his owne.

^r Of Lots, chap.
11. sect. 7.

2. What by the way he alledgeth out of my booke by me there produced against *Diminative Lots*, though mangled in citation, as the former, after his manner, that therefore they are to be condemned, because ^c they are not found revealed in any word of God, nor were ever deliuered by any Prophet of God, nor are grounded on any principles of reason and nature, or were learned by any course of naturall and ordinarie obseruation; but were brought in either directly by Satan, or by some lims and instruments of Satan, &c. persons addicted wholly to vanitie and to vngodly curiositie. And hereupon asketh, *Why, if this reason be good against one kinde of Lotterie, it should not be of like validitie against all.* I make no doubt but the consequence is firme and good. It remaineth for him to proue all kinde of Lotterie to be such, and he shall haue my suffrage for the condemning of all. Meane while I desire a little more faire dealing at M^r. B^s. hands in allegation of mine assertions.

I. B.

Well: it may be scene shortly, how M^r. G^s. diligence, understanding and memorie haue serued him in defending lufurious Lots.

T. G.

It is very likely, that they haue all oft times failed

failed mee. " There is no man but they may;
my selfe much more the meanest of so many.

^a Εἴτι πῶς αὐτοῖς
ταῖς ἀδρανείας
ὄντας. Greg. Naz.
ἰσχυρὸς Θεὸς. Idem

de pac. 1. Τοῦ δὲ μὴδὲν αὐτῶν ταῖς ὄντας ἀδρανείας, ἡ μὴδὲν Θεὸς. Idem
de plag. grand.

In the meane while sufficiencie of his answer-
ring is but upon the Triall, and not yet adiudged.

I. B.

And of Mr. Bs. reply the like.

T. G.

All these passages well reviewed by Mr. G. I
should thinke he cannot wonder that a man of
64 yeeres compleat (and therefore his wits may
faile) doth wonder, that so godly, wise and learned
a man, the faculties of whose minde are at the best,
did not say to himselfe before he preached, much
more before he penned this lufurious Doctrine,

I. B.

^a Let Baal plead for himselfe; and, These game-
sters shall without any incouragement from
me, ^b draw on their iniquitie with their cords
of vanitie; and the rather, because he acknowl-
edgeth that accompt is to be giuen unto God of ga-
ming, p. 261. If of the act, much more of iusti-
fying it. From which accompt good Lord deliuer
me. For I feare that in iustifying lufurious Lots,
I should put false spectacles on a gamesters nose,
whereby the bridge seemeth broader than it is, and
so he falleth in without feare; to use Mr. Gs. simi-
litude, p. 264.

^a Iudg. 6. 31, 32.

^b Esai. 5. 18.

Surely either Mr. G. is a wonderfull strange
man, or else Mr. B. is very prone to wonder at
things

T. G.

καὶ ὅμ' ἡ ἐμπειρία ἔχει τὴν δειξάμεν ἴσιν σφοδρότερον. Eurip. Phæniss. Ο' γὰρ
 ῥέβηθ' ἰδίαγμα ποικιλοτάτον. Idem Belleroph. - non omnia grandior aetate
 quæ fu-
 giamus habet: seris veniit usus ab annis. Ovid. met. l. 6. Ἰνῆας ἰδιδάσκει πάντα, καὶ ῥέβηθ'
 τειλέη. Sophocl. Oedip.

things that are *not very wonderfull*. For here is nothing with him but *wondering*, and *wonder upon wonder*. He telleth his Reader againe and againe that *he doth wonder*: he demandeth of him whether *he may not wonder*: he would not haue me, nay he thinketh, *I cannot wonder*, that *he doth thus wonder*. Some Heathen wisemen haue held it ^c *a point of the highest wisdom* for a man *to wonder at nothing*. I am not of their mindes. Yet as another saith, that ^d it is as well reproveable in a man for him ^e *to trust euery one*, as ^f *not to trust any*: so I hold it an vnwise part in any man, as well ^g *to wonder at euery thing*, as *to wonder at nothing*; as well to wonder where iust cause of such wonderment is not, as not to wonder where it is. Now all that hath by Mr. B. beene said being well considered, I leaue it to others to iudge what iust cause of so much wonderment he hath produced hither-to out of my writings.

2. But let vs heare what further matter M^r. B. hath here found, for this his wondring humor to worke vpon: for the former passages haue already beene examined. That a *man of 64. yeeres complete* should see more than one some *fourteene or fifteene yeeres younger* than himselfe, as Mr. B. perswadeth himselfe that hee doth, it is no wonder. ^b Knowledge gathered by experience and continuance of studie, is

F

being

o Paget against
Ainsworth, and
others.

being consecrated vnto Baal? Or doe they plead for Baal, ° that maintaine against the Separatists, that our Churches are not now Idol-Temples, being rid of those abominations, that before they were defiled with? What incouragement I giue Gamesters, M^r. B. himselfe hath in part before shewed, and my Booke it selfe may further shew.

3. Account if I should not looke to giue to God for whatsoever I teach, it were strange indeed, when I teach that ^p account is to be giuen euen of our lightest imployments. But let M^r. B. remember also, that account must be giuen of ^a wrongfull charging and ^r graundlesse censuring of our brethren; and that an heauy one too, if ^s S. James be beleeued.

4. As he feareth, which I hope not, that I haue failed one way; so let him take heed lest he faile the other way in the same place spoken of: Remembring that as well it is a sinne ^t to adde to Gods word, as to detract from it, and ^a as heauy a iudgement denounced against the one as the other: And that, as one saith well, though I remember not well who, ^x We must not wick Gods measure an inch to some, because others will thereupon take an ell more than they should.

I. B.

But M^r. G. beleeueth that he hath written the truth, (Preface to the Reader) and is confident that truth is to be knowne, especially concerning matters of common practise, p. 263. and giueth foure reasons by which he was moued to defend lusurious Lots, p. 264.

The

^p Tam otij quam
negotij reddendam
rationē: tam silen-
tij quam sermonis.

^a Psal. 50. 20, 21.

^r Matth. 7. 1.

^s Iam. 3. 1.

^t Deut. 4. 2. & 12.

32. Prov. 30. 6.

^x Τὸ ἀπερὶ τὸ
ἐσθίου, καὶ τὸ
ἐσθίου λυμναίνε-
σθαι καὶ τὸ κα-
τὰ τὸν νόμον
ὡς δέοις ἢ
ὡς οὐκ οὐκ. Greg.
Naz. de eutax.

^a Apoc. 22. 18, 19.

^v Ve tam adicienti-
bus quam detra-
hentibus destinati.

Tertull. contr. Her-
mog.

^x M. Edgerton, if
I mistake not.

*The first is to draw men from superstition, in restraining themselves, when God doth not re-
strain them. This begetteth the Question, as, I
hope, will appeare in the Reply.*

These words are not mine. Neither are they found in the place quoted; nor would I haue spoken in that manner. Yet that I there imply a *superstitious conceit* in the contrary Opinion, it is true. Neither is it to be taxed as a begging of the *Question*, being not produced there as any *prooffe* of the point in controuersie, but as my *Iudgement* of them, whereupon I was induced the rather to deale with them. As for the thing it selfe, let it appeare in the *Reply*; and it will come yet time enough.

T. G.

*A second Motiue is, because Arguments against
lusurious Lots haue made many stagger in the
necessarie Vse of serious Ciuill Lots. It may be so,
some failing in their Iudgement. But it may be
also, that many more will be made to stagger by rea-
ding M^r. G^s. exceptions against Arguments for, &
Cautions in those serious Ciuill Lots, cap. 5. and by
his Maxime, The lesse weighty the matter is, where-
in a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111.*

I. B.

1. My second motiue M^r. B. here omitteth, and so also doe I therefore. This that he saith is part of the third; part, I say; because I say more than so, and yet no more than I can make good neither, that *those Arguments, the chiefe*

T. G.

M. B. his Preface,

of them, this are brought against the one kinde, will, if they be sound, necessarily overthrow also the other.

^a Τὸ μέλλον ἀ-
εστος. Isocr. ad De-
mon. De futuris
contingentibus non
est determinata ve-
ritas. Aristot. de in-
terpret. 6. 10.

2. What mine *Exceptions* may chance to doe, is a matter meerely contingent; and ^a there is of it therefore no certainty. But of the other that they haue made many stagger, I am very certaine; nor see I which way Mr. B. keeping to his owne grounds will euer be able to settle them. If my *Exceptions* be such, as is here implied, it had beene a good worke to haue remo-ued them, for their sakes, that might chance else to stumble at them.

3. That *Maxime*, as Mr. B. termeth it, was once before nibbled at. But the time of the triall of it, belike, is not as yet. What staggering it should cause in the use of a Lot, vnlesse to those that wilfully put themselues vpon hazard of apparent inconuenience, I cannot as yet conceiue.

I. B.

A third Motiue is to take away much heart-burning; Nay rather this iustifying lufurious Lots, will not only cause more heart-burning; but incourage also Gamesters to over-crow such as are scrupulous. For, if many well-affected haue beene constrained, in regard of scruple in this kinde to straine themselues to some inconueniences by refusall of those games, when by those, whom they had dependance vpon or familiaritie withall, they haue beene urged occasionally thereunto: (which to preuent hereafter is a fourth cause of his writing.) How will

will these supporters, and familiars insult upon the scrupulous, now they have so learned a patron of their gaming? Some haue strained themselves to some inconueniences for not pledging drunken Healths, being drinke-offerings to Bacchus. To preuent which hereafter should M^r. G. doe well vnto edification to preach and write in iustification of these Healths?

1. M^r. B. snappeth still at many things; but dealeth not entirely with any. One short shred he snatcheth out of my *fourth Motiue*, or as he stileth it, the *third*; and another somewhat longer out of the *second*, which he here calleth the *fourth*; letting the rest goe; for what reasons himselfe best knoweth. But if the inconueniences there mentioned, many more than M^r. B. here relateth, may (as it is no question but that they may, if the truth be found and cleared to be on this side) be thereby remedied, it is an effect of some consequence, and such as may well recompence the trauell therein taken.

2. But it will rather proue cleane contrary, if M^r. B. may be beleued. For it will encourage Gamesters to ouer-crow such as are scrupulous; (and how can it doe so, if those scrupulous ones shall haue receiued satisfaction, and so shall haue deposed their scruple?) *hauing gotten so learned a patron of their gaming?* A pretty nip; of the same stampe with some other before: as if others more than one or two, whose learning I doubt not but M^r. B. deemeth deseruedly

T. G.

M. B. his Preface,

mine to come farre short of, had not before mee in Print defended *the use of a Lot in disport.*

3. For *drunken healths*, if Mr. B. can shew that a *lusorie Lot* and they are of the like nature, hee saith somewhat: till that, his instance may stand by for a stale. But suppose that in detestation of these *drunken healths*, Mr. B. should publish a *Booke*, endeavouring therein by diuers *Arguments* to proue that it is vtterly *unlawfull* for one friend to drinke to, or to pledge, another at Table, and much more to drinke at Table to, or to pledge (as we say) any that are then *absent*; and many weake ones should thereupon make scruple of such *common curtesies*; and both they and the *profession of pietie* should thereby be exposed to *derision*, and iust imputation of *superstition*, I thinke it would not be deemed labour amisse bestowed (for those weake ones sake at least) for some learned man to take paines to confute such a conceit. And this instance, if Mr. B. please to apply to the present controuerisie, I suppose that it will proue somewhat more pertinent than that he produceth; it will in part at least cleare the meaning of one of my *motines*.

I. B.

The Summe of his Causes (as he expresseth himselfe in his Preface to the Reader) is, To set at libertie the intangled Consciences of Godly-disposed persons. Indeed; If any Consciences, simply for playing with Lots, should seeke his satisfaction in private,

private, then if Mr. G. quieted him by his grounds (supposed true) it were not amisse. But is every Doctrine, though true, to be insisted upon both by Preaching and Printing, and that affirming matter in Question, and of no necessarie use?

Here is the Summe indeed, it seemeth, of that that Mr. B. would haue. He must haue libertie, (by what rule I know not) to preach and print (for ^a what he hath printed, he saith himselfe that he had preached) what he will; but his doctrine must not be contradicted either in Pulpit or by Presse. He may insnare and intangle Christian Consciences in publike; but Mr. G. must not quiet them againe but in private. Especially so long as his doctrine runneth in the Negatiue, ^b Touch not, taste not, handle not: (it is a Text not vnfitly ^c applied to the present purpose, by one sometime of another iudgement, but vpon better consideration now concurring in iustification of the luforie Lot;) as if ^d the Apostles had neuer affirmatiuely preached Christian liberty, or ^e opposed publikely the courses of those that sought to limit and restraine it, and that in things ^f not absolutely necessary neither, but such as might well haue beene forborne.

That is therefore to little purpose, that Mr. B. addeth;

I say, Affirming, remembering the holy wisdom of the Apostles and Elders, who decreed touching offensive

T. G.

^a Epistle dedicatorie before his Dialogue.

^b Coloss. 2. 21.

^c M. Yates Modell of Diuinitie, edit. 2. cap. 16. quest. 1. error. 4.

^d Rom. 14. 14, 17.

1 Cor. 6. 12. & 7.

1, 2, 9, 28, 36, 39.

& 10. 23, 25.

^e Gal. 2. 4, 5. & 5.

1, 10.

Col. 2. 20, 21.

^f Rom. 14. 2, 6.

1 Cor. 10. 27, 28.

I. B.

Act. 15. 28, 29.

M. B. his Preface,

offensive things (yet some of them lawfull, if conveniently used) onely negatively; and deemeth it not necessarie to decree affirmatiuely things that were then, and might be in use for a time.

T. G.

^g See the places
about cited.

^h See Calvin. in-
stitut. lib. 3. cap. 19.
sect. 10, 15, 16.

For neither is it equall that some one particular act should for all circumstances be a generall rule to all others: the practise of the Apostles themselves, and by name of ^g S. Paul being at other times in points of the very same kinde to the contrary that M^r. B. here vrgeth: ^h Neither is there the same reason of Dogmaticall Divinitie, by grounds of faith informing the Conscience concerning the true Nature of the things themselves, and of Ecclesiasticall Discipline by Canons and Constitutions restraining not Christian Libertie, but the outward Use of it for Order sake, and the benefit of our Brethren.

ⁱ 1 Cor. 9. 14, 15.
² Cor. 11. 8, 9.

^k Act. 18. 3. & 20.

¹ 1 Thess. 2. 9.

² 1 Thess. 3. 8.

It is as if one should thus Reason. ¹ The Apostle tooke no stipend of the Church of Corinth: therefore no Minister of the Gospell may take stipend of his people. Or, ^k S. Paul wrought with his hands for his lining: Therefore all Ministers of the Gospell ought so also to doe. For such is M^r. B. Argument, or else it is none at all; The Apostles and Elders determined negatively only of some things offensive: therefore no man may presume to deale in the affirmative of such.

I. B.

Many (I feare, too many) learned Divines approve Usurie in their Iudgement, though condemned by Law. Yet none that I know ever insisted upon

with Answer to it.

41

upon the iustification thereof by Preaching and Printing.

Whether *many Divines* among vs be of that minde or no, is more than I know. Nor list I to take notice what hath beene either *preached* or *published* of that *Argument* by any. This I am sure of, that ¹ *our Law*, though it condemneth *Vsurie*, it alloweth *Lotterie*; and therefore the instance is not euen in that regard as it ought, and is intended here to be.

T. G.

¹ Those very Lawes allow Cards and Tables.

Againe, Was there euer any so troubled with playing with Lots? I doubt it. But without doubt thousands will now more boldly use Lusurious Lots, without regard of the Cautions, in these licentious times. As Vsurers regard not the Cautions which Divines set downe. For it is enough to them that some godly Divines affirme Vsurie to be lawfull.

I. B.

1. What M^r. B. meaneth by *so troubled with Lots*, I know not: But that many are by meanes of the *Doctrine* by M^r. B. and others maintained, superstitiously conceited of them, I am sure; and that diuers so conceited haue thereupon sometime strained to sinne against conscience, as themselues haue confessed, to their disquiet afterward, and sometime haue beene constrained to vndergoe no small inconuenience for the auoiding of the like againe.

T. G.

2. But *thousands now*, saith M^r. B. (as if the
G use

use of such Lots had neuer beene defended, or were neuer heard of till now) will now more boldly use Lusurious Lots without regard of the Cautions. Mr. B. speaketh very peremptorily; and yet I take him for no Prophet; and his prediction therefore yet may faile. But if any be emboldned by my Booke vpon better information to use a Lusorie Lot in due manner, where it is otherwise not vnlawfull, I haue no cause to be sorry for it. If any be emboldned to abuse it, not regarding the Cautions, it will be their owne fault, not mine, who deliuer nothing that tendeth to the emboldning of them thereunto. Not to adde, that the Cautions concerne not a Lot vsed in sport as it is a Lot, but Game rather and Recreation in generall; which neither Mr. B. nor any other sound Diuine disalloweth, many by writing defend, and yet doe they not thereby giue incouragement to any to use Game or Recreation in vndue manner: nor are they held guilty therefore of the sinne of those that regarding not the Cautions by them annexed to the Doctrine of it, use it otherwise than they ought.*

* Aug. de Musc.
l. 2. citante Mart.
tyre. Petr. Mart. in
Iud. 14. Thom. A.
quin sum. part. 2. 2.
q. 168. Perkins Ca-
ses of Consc. l. 3. c. 4.
q. 3. Fennor of re-
creat. &c.

I. B.

Oh that Mr. G. had considered what he writeth, p. 107. before cited; and what he writeth, p. 103. & 104. viz. Where inconueniences, that (shall necessarily, or in good probabilitie appeare to accompanie the thing questioned, or ensue vpon the doing thereof, shall be such, and so great as the Conueniences, which stand on the other side, shall not be able to counteruaile; there that action is worthily

worthily disallowed as inconuenient, and a Lot consequently unlawfull: what he writeth in his Spirituall Watch, p. 27. viz. The riser any euill is in those places, or ages we liue in, the more carefull should we be to shun and auoid such a sinne. No doubt he would haue taken heed how by writing he make way to the sinne of, or by Lusurious Lots.

1. I am much beholden to M^r. B. for his good wishes. The Considerations that he wisheth I had taken into thought, are indeed good and needfull; but vnlesse he can assume, and make good his Assumption, that the penning and publishing of my Discourse is such and so inconuenient as is therein specified, he hath little reason to perswade himselfe, that it must needs doubtlesse haue preuailed with me to the staying and suppressing of my Booke. Which yet had it appeared in probabilitie and likelihood to haue beene, I should not haue failed to be as chary of the publishing of it, as M^r. B. himselfe would haue had me to be.

2. Nor doe I doubt, but as I writ, that^m euils the riser they are, the more carefull wee should be to shun and auoid them. But that by defending of the lawfulnessse of a Lusurious Lot in it selfe, I make way to sinne in the vse, or rather in the abuse of it, I denie; and my deniall standeth good, vntill the point it felte be disproued. I doe no more make way to the one by defending the other: than some of the Ancient Fathers made way to the abuse of

T. G.

^m Ephes. 5. 15, 16.
Τὸν ὅριον ὃς
ἐν τῇ ἀγῶνι
μακρῶν, τὸ τὰ νο-
στον χαλεπὰ φυ-
λάττει, ἢ ἀεὶ
χαλεπὸν μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ
ἐνέμενον ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς. Plut. de laud.
sui.

ⁿ Epiphani. de hæ-
res. & August. de
morib. Manich. l. 2.
c. 16.

o *Vinum fel principis tenebrarū dicebant.*

p *Calvin. Martyr.
Bucer. Aretius.
Bucan. Piscat.
Perkins, &c.*

q *Quis est oro, praeter paucos, qui non ad hoc semper Christi nomen in ore habeat ut pejeret? In id penitus deducta est res, ut Christi nomen jam non sacramentum esse videatur sed sermo. Pluresq; invenias qui saepius perjurent, quam qui omnino non jurent. Salvian. de provid. l. 4. c. 10.*

Wine either by Drunkenesse or otherwise, when they defended against the ° Manichees, Tatiani, Encratite, and others, that Wine was Gods good Creature, and men might lawfully drinke of it. Or than so many of our p late writers, as defend the lawfulness of an Oath lawfully vsed, against the Anabaptists, that vtterly condemne all vse of it, doe thereby make way for the iustification of that ordinarie vaine swearing, that is q as rife, yea far rifer, than any abuse of Dice or Lot-play either is or can be.

I. B.

Many Diuines and intelligent men, though of Opinion that lufurious mixed Lots may be vsed lawfully, yet wish that Mr. G. had neuer published his Booke. For a running Horse, say they, needeth no spurring.

T. G.

And many Diuines and intelligent men pressed the publishing of it, and that more of them, and with more importunitie many of them than is fit for me here to relate: I may truly adde, that some euen of contrary iudgement aduised it.

Nor doe I spurre any running Horse in my Booke: but endeouour only to vngirt some, that Mr. B. and some others had girt in more than was meet, or than they had any good warrant so to girt in out of Gods word: and to ease such as might thereby be not girt onely, but galled too.

with Answer to it.

For my part, I wish, that Mr. G. had beene affected in writing, as he professeth himselfe to be in the use of lusurious Lots, p. 266.

Nor can I blame Mr. B. (though his wishes be vnequall) that he witheth so oft that I had not by writing contradicted the subiect matter of his *Dialogistical Discourse*; which yet hee himselfe by a peremptorie *Challenge* incited me first vnto; and by his after-demeanure (in a manner) inforced me further to publish.

But methinks, if Mr. B. were so desirous to be informed if he erre herein, as * else-where he professeth, and to haue ^t the *Truth tried* and cleared, as he would seeme else-where also to intimate; yea, or if he were not loth to haue his opinion herein scanned or discussed, or were not somewhat suspicious of it that it would not endure light, he should not be so vnwilling to haue it dealt with by others, he should not take it so euill as he doth, that he is contradicted in it; nor would he cast so much impertinent by-matter here in the way, that may rather hinder than further the pursuit of the truth with that *Christian affection* that in such cases ought to be held; but proceed rather directly to the making good of his owne *Arguments*, as in my writing giuen him, I came to the *Answer* of them directly. If hee would gladly vnderstand from others whether he be in an error, why excepteth he so much against me for doing no more than himselfe saith he would gladly haue done? If

* My desire is either informatiō, if I erre, &c. But whether I erre or no; which yet I would gladly vnderstand; for I ought not to teach an vntruth though to Gods glory. M.B. epist. dedicat. before Dialog. 1 *Thess.* 5. 21. Try all things, &c. In the Frontispico.

he mislike that it is *by writing* and *publikely* done, he may well blame himselfe for either; nor see I with what equitie he can require to be refuted onely *in priuate*, when his errors are in *Print* abroad. But let vs heare him yet once further, and so an end with his Preface.

I. B.

Well, whatsoener M^r. G. writeth dogmatically, he wisheth thee, good Reader, to imitate him in his practise, to wit, that albeit in iudgement thou art rightly informed of the truth concerning the lawfulnessse of these Games in themselves; yet in godly discretion thou wouldest rather abandon them, considering the too too common and ordinarie abuse of them; and that many, it may be, among whom thou livest, may remaine vnresolved and vnatisfied touching the lawfulnessse of them, p. 267.

I desire the same, and therewith a suspending thy iudgement untill thou haue well considered my Dialogue, M^r. G^s. Answers, and my Reply, together with mine Answer to his positive grounds.

† Act. 20. 32.

¶ 2 Tim. 2. 7.

Here I promise (with M^r. G. p. 128.) to raze what I haue reared, if my Reply and Answers be proued insufficient, and so ^c commend thee to God, and to the word of his Grace, which is able to build further. Onely, ^u consider what I say, and the Lord giue thee understanding in all things.

T. G.

× 1 Cor. 7. 7, 8, 9,
27, 28,

I wish indeed, as M^r. B. saith; but without preiudice to any that use those games no otherwise than they ought: as ^x the Apostle wished others
in

in another kinde *as himselfe*; yet withall acknowledging the libertie that *Gods word* and *Spirit* had giuen in that *point*, and not censuring others that therein did not as he did.

For the rest; I require of thee, good Reader, the same for this my *Reiinder*, that Mr. B. doth for his *Reply*; and of Mr. B. the performance only of what here he promiseth: And so requesting Gods grace for vs all, that both in this and in all other points in these queasie times controuersed, we may *without all partialitie* and by-respects bend our selues to the discouery of the *Truth*, and without *pertinacitie*, and endeavour by silly shifts to elude it, yeeld our selues to it where it is discouered vnto vs, not considering *by whom* it is either deliuered or discouered, but by what force and strength of *Argument* we are conuincied of it; I proceed in the next place, after one rub more remoued, from this tedious, needlesse and impertinent *Preface*, to the maine body of Mr. B. *Booke*.

γ Non quis dicat, attendendum; sed quid dicatur. Ne verum fiat quod vulgò dicitur, Idem duo cum faciunt, non est idem. Ter. Adelph. 5. 3. Et imitandum. Arcopagitas, Οἱ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ ἀγρόουσιν, ὡς καὶ ἐς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι ἐς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποσλέπειν. Lucian. de sectis.

ANSWER

ANSWER TO Mr. B's. POST-SCRIPT.

After the PREFACE is this
Post-script added.

I. B. TO THE READER.

THAT I may doe Mr. G. no wrong, I am to let thee know, that the 14. of March 1622. Stil. Ang. Mr. G. denied naming me, when he confuted mine Arguments in Pulpit: yet confessing that hee named me in Pulpit with others diuersly dissenting from him in Iudgement touching Lusurious Lots, when he entred into the Question of playing with Lots.

T. G. And that thou maist, good Reader, vnderstand the full truth; Be pleased, I pray thee, to spend yet a little more idle time with vs, while I relate, as briefly as I well may, as well vpon what occasion, as what it was, that I spake to Mr. B. at that time that here he mentioneth. Being informed that it was giuen out by some of Mr. B's acquaintance; that (vpon the offering of this his Discourse to be licenced for the Presse, and complaint made by him of supposed wrong that I had done him *in confuting him* in

Answer to M^r. B^s. Post-script.

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in open Pulpit by Name) it was by that Reuerend Doctor that licenced my Booke, acknowledged that I had indeed done M^r. B. wrong, and that I should therefore gine him satisfaction in private, but that M^r. B. would not therewith be satisfied, but would haue it done in publike, since the wrong was such; and that the same Reuerend Doctor should say, that if my Treatise of Lots were againe to be licenced, he would not haue licenced it: (all which was vtterly vntrue) and supposing that this could come from none but M^r. B. himselfe, I desired meeting him neere Pauls Church, to haue a few words with him. Which granted, I related vnto him, what I had heard, & named the party said to haue made such report; demanded of him whether either any such report came frō him, or the things reported themselues were true. M^r. B. denying both to be the Author of the report, and the truth of the things reported; for that I there rested. But I further told him, that I vnderstood that he had offered a Discourse for the Presse against part of my Booke, which I wished with all mine heart might come forth; * the truth, I hoped, would thereby the better be cleared, and I should willingly be informed of ought that I erred in; to which purpose I told him, that I had also dealt earnestly as well with D^r. Westfield, (who I know well, will testifie as much) when it was tendred to him some three yeeres agoe; as also since with D^r. Featly, the party before mentioned, (which M^r. B. also acknowledged to haue vnderstood from him)

* Ex mutuo conflictu, velut ignis & filice, veritas elicitur & emicat.

H

that

that they would be pleased at my request to allow it for the Presse. Which why they refused to doe, is needlesse here to relate. I told him further, that I was informed of two things in it; the one, that I was accused therein *to have confuted him in the Pulpit by name*; the other, (which much more neerely touched me) that I was charged *to maintaine in that my Treatise some Assertions that were blasphemous*. The former he affirmed that he had heard by many. I told him, those many (if there were such) were very much to blame: And withall by solemne protestation, as in Gods presence, denied that I had *by name in Pulpit refuted* either him or any other that I dealt with in this Argument. How I named him or his Booke rather, and so him with it, I told him: to wit, that hauing propounded the *Question* concerning the *light vse of a Lot*, I recited those *Authors* that had written of this *Subiect*, viz. B. King upon *Ionas*, B. Babington on the *Decalogue*, Peter Martyr on *Iudges*, *Danaus of Lot-play*, Perkins *Cases of Conscience*, Fennor of *lawfull Recreations*, Easty *historie of the Gospell*, Bamford *Dialogue of Games consisting in Chance*: whereof some were of one minde, some of another; and if I should dissent in decision of the *Question* from any of them, I desired it might be without offence, adding that *promise* that Mr. B. hath before related. After which hauing deliuered mine owne *Iudgement*, & propounded and prosecuted the *Reasons* that I had for it; I then answered the *Obiectiōs* on the other side,

Δεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
μετὰ τὰς αὐτῶν
δράμας καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις
ἀναισθητοῖς. Aristot.
ethic. lib. 1. cap. 6.
Pisique ac prudentis
cujusque illud est,
Πόλιν ὁδοποιῆσαι
καὶ ἄλλοις ἢ ὁρᾶν
καὶ ἄλλοις. Lucian, asi-
no.

vnto him, that if he would doe but as much for me, as I had before done for him, (and I supposed in way of requitall I might haue required it) to deliuer me his *Discourse* or a *Copie* of it, I would vndertake within short time either to returne it with due answer, or to make publike acknowledgment of mine error, if I were thereby conuincd thereof. Or if he would none of that, (as he would in no wise heare of it) that he would yet informe me what those *blasphemous assertions* were that in my *Booke* I had broached, and shew me (which I as yet saw not) wherein they were such. That which in *Charitie* I held him bound vnto; ^f seeing me to wander so fouly out of the way, to lend mee his hand and helpe, especially crauing the same so instantly, for the bringing of me backe againe. But other answer to this request of mine from Mr. B. I could haue none, but that he had put that terme of *blasphemie* now out of his *Booke*. I replied againe hereunto: that that was but a silly satisfaction, hauing charged his *Brother* and *fellow-Minister* with *blasphemie* to more than a few, to say that he had now put that word out of his *Booke*. I might in his owne words haue told him, had I then beene acquainted with them; that I held he failed in *Charitie* in that not hauing had any conference with me either by speech or by writing, though I be (as he saith) his neighbour *Minister*; he offered to accuse me of *Blasphemie* by Name publikely in Print. But I required him, as he would answer one day for the neglect of
such

^f Exod. 23. 4.

Deut. 22. 1.

Nedum fratrem ipsum errantem despicias. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 4. Quid enim tam malignum, quam nolle prodesse, cum possis. ibid. l. 1.

Answer to M^r. B^s. Post-script.

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such a duty, to shew me mine error, that I might not continue in so foule and dangerous an offence; or to referre it to any one or more of our *Reuerend Brethren of the Ministry* about the *City*, such as himsele should make choise of, whether that which I required of him were equall and reasonable, and whether he in *Charitie* might refuse it. But *I sung to a deafe man*. I could get from M^r. B. no other answer but this, that *He would be iudged by none but by the whole Church of God*. And so wee parted. Now, since M^r. B. will so haue it, *Let the whole Church of God indge*, or so many at least, to whose hands this *Discourse* shall come, on whose side *the breach of Charitie* (if any be) hath beene. And this is more by much than I would euer haue troubled my Reader withall, had it not beene for M^r. B^s. *Post-script*.

*Surdo cecini, ut
Ter. beant. 2.1. vel
vanis auribus, ut
Liv. hist. l. 40.*

H 3 THE



THE SECOND PART.

Mr. BALMFORDS

Answer to Mr GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulness of a
Lusorious Lot.

Together with

Mr. G's. Reply in defence of his
owne Arguments, which are word
for word also here related.

T.G. of Lots,
Cap. 4. Sect. 4.



THE former grounds laid concerning the Nature of Lots in generall, the Reasons that induce me to allow Lots of this kinde as not euill in themselves, among others are these.

I. B.
Answer.

*This Tenent seemeth more fearefull than besee-
meth a learned man, who after the turning ouer a
wonderfull number of bookes to compile his Histo-
ricall and Theologicall Treatise of the Nature and
Use of Lots, setteth downe his Iudgement: Allow-
ing lusorious Lots only as not euill in them-
selves; whereas he affirmeth them to be lawfull
in themselves, p. 266. So that if these games be
used*

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments.

55

used with due observation of all his cautions, why is he fearefull to allow them as good in themselves? How then may a scrupulous man, who remembreth not only his wicked wayes, but his deeds also that are not good, build upon such quagmirie grounds? Ezek. 36. 11.

Againe; Allowing these games onely as not euill in themselves, doth not manifest that Love of God, which (I doubt not) is in Mr. G's heart. For where as God is glorified by good works, and these games be too too common, and accompanied with many crying sinnes, whereby God is euery where and daily much dishonoured, the Love of God would haue constrained him, if doing truth, to haue brought these games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. Matth. 5. 16.

Lastly, By this Tenent he sheweth not due Charitie to his Neighbour. For now it is enough for Gamesters to plead; A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not euill in it selfe. Therefore they will not seeke further to know whether it be good in it selfe, forgetting that it is written; The Axe is put to the root of the trees, therefore euery tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewen downe, and cast into the fire. Is not then hereby his neighbours spirituall danger occasioned? Iohn 3. 21.

1. I might demand here, why Mr. B. dealeth onely with my Tenent, but taketh no notice at all of the * Grounds fore-laid; contrary to * his owne assertion, and my course with him, Matth. 3. 10.

T. G.
Reply.

* Of Lois, chap. 2.
* In his Preface.

who

who deale with and discusse as well his *Grounds* as his *Arguments*. But that I let passe.

2. Requesting him^b to forbear^c his *titles*, which I neither desire nor deserue, of *learned*, and *very learned*, so oft both here and else-where inculcated^d to no very good purpose, as before I haue shewed: and passing by his gird of *turning ouer such a wonderfull number of Books*; (for Mr. B. is not, it seemeth, out of his wondring vaine yet) I would faine know of him why he calleth my *conclusion*, a *more fearefull tenent than becometh a learned man*. For if by *fearefull* hee meane *hideous and horrible*, as he may well, if it be as he afterward chargeth it to be, *contrary to the Love both of God and Man*, that must first be shewed of him; and how soundly hee hath shewed it, shall in the discussion of his charge appeare. If by *fearefull* he meane *timorous*, as may seeme the rather by the *trembling* that hereafter he chargeth me with, ^e I confesse my selfe indeed to be naturally of a *timorous* disposition. And yet I suppose it no *timiditie*, but ^f *discretion* rather for a man to speake ^g warily. Nor is ^h he necessarily fearefull that doth not by and by cry out as Mr. B. doth of *impious iniquitie*, when ought is allowed that he disliketh: or that doth not by and by commend euery thing as exceeding good and godly that he iustificieth and alloweth as lawfull. But to speake

^b Τὸ δὲ δὴ, μὴ καὶ
μὲν δὲ αὐτῶν. *Vlysses*
Homericus. Neque
enim ijs sumus, quos
vituperare nec mi-
mici quidem possunt,
nisi ut simul lau-
dent. *Plin. ep. 12. l. 3.*

^c Honorifica contumelia. *Hieron. ad Pamm. & Ocean.*

^d Quomodo lucian-
tes antagonistas al-
tius attollunt, quo
vehementius illi-
dant. *Cypr. epist. 2. lib. 2. Vti contra Plut. de adulat. Oἱ παλαιὸν τὸ σῶμα πικρὸν τε πενὸν, ἔπος ἐπὶ πρὸς ἄλλων.*

^e Εγὼ δειλοτέρους
ἑμῶν. *ὁμολογῶ.*
Arian. Epist. lib. 2. c. 21.

^f Αἰμαδία δὲ
δραστής, λογιμαδὲς
ὃ ὄγχευ ἐξεί. *Plin. epist. 24. lib. 4.*
*Ex prouidentia ti-
mor, ex audacia te-
meritas prouenit.*
*Donat. ad Eunuch. 4. 6. Ego Plinio ac-
cedo ep. 17. l. 5. Ne-
scio quo pacto magis
in studijs homines
timor, quam fiducia
deceat.*

^g Haud infulsum est illud Martini Dumienf. de mor. c. 1. Lauda parce, vitupera parcius. Neque enim rebus ex illis est nimia laudatio, & immoderata vituperatio. & φορητότερον γὰρ πρὸς ἢ γὰρ αὐτῶν τοῦ ἐκείνου. *Zeno apud Laert. & Eustath. ad Odyss. 8.*

moderately

moderately belike is a fault and fearfulness with Mr. B. which I was not aware of before.

3. Examine we the ground of this prolix and fearefull Accusation, and we shall finde it to be but as they say of the sheering of Swine, much clamor and little wooll, * many words indeed, but little matter of any worth. The maine matter of the Charge is this, Mr. G. alloweth Lufurious Lots onely as not euill in themselves. Where the word, onely, is Mr. B's. insertion; which if he added for this end, as it seemeth he did, to make my words beare this sense, not euill onely, yet not lawfull, and warrantable neither, I disclaime it. Otherwise I confesse I conceiue my Conclusion in those termes to distinguish the Lufurious Lot it selfe from any abuse that may otherwise accompanie the Game wherein it is vsed, and so make it euill in that respect. But take the Tenent as it is, Lufurious Lots in themselves not euill. To omit the Distinction so cōmon in the Schooles, † of it selfe, and by accident; and the Phrase so frequent among Diuines and Writers of the best note, of things in themselves not euill, wicked, or unwarrantable. ^h The Art of Painting, saith Rhenanus, is not euill of it selfe. * To sweare, saith Chemnitius, is not of it self against the Moral Law. ⁱ It is not of it selfe vitious or condemnable, saith Calvin, for a man to provide for himselfe. Of some Ceremonies vsed in our Churches, saith Beza, ^k they are not things impious of themselves, nor such as a man should leaue his Ministerie for: and of other of them, ^l They are not of themselves ido-

* Verbis veget, rebus flaccet. Apul. apolog.

† Per se, & per accidens.

^h Pictoria ars ex se mala non est. Rhenā. in Tertul. ad Hermog.

* Iuramentum per se non pugnat cum lege Dei morali. Chemnit. harmon. c. 51.

ⁱ Per se vitiosum aut damnable non est, necessitatibus suis prospicere. Calvin. harmon. Evang. in Matth. 24. 38.

^k Quam non sint ex earum rerum genere, quæ per se impie sunt, non videri tanti momenti, ut propterea deferendum ministerium. Beza. epist. 12.

^l Per se non sunt idololatrica. Ibid.

^m Res media quæ
in sese nec bona, nec
male sunt. Bucan.
loc. commun. 33.
S. 13.

ⁿ In sylvam quid
lignaferam? quidve
in mare lymphas?

o 1 Cor. 7. 28.

p Ibid. 7. 36.

q 1 Cor. 10. 23.

r Morton in
1 Cor. 10.

s Perkins Cases
of Conscience,
lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3.
quest. 2.

latrois. And Bucanus, ^m Things indifferent are
such as are neither good nor euill of themselves,
&c. To passe by, I say, an infinite number of
such speeches, that in learned writers occurre
euery where. For to what end should I waste
time and loose labour, in ⁿ bringing wood to the
wood, and casting water into the sea? Doth
not the Apostle himselfe deliuer his tenents
sometime in like manner as I doe? ^o If thou ta-
kest a wife, thou sinnest not: and, if a virgin
marry, shee sinneth not. And, ^p Let him doe as he
will, he sinneth not; let them be married. And
now let Mr. B. tell not Mr. G. but S. Paul, that
such a tenent seemeth to him more timorous than
beseemeth so worthy an Apostle, &c. setting downe
his iudgement whether folke may marry or no, to
say, they sinne not in so doing. I might adde a
iudicious Diuines Comment on those words of
the same Apostle, ^q All things are lawfull; ^r that
is, they may be taken without sinne. As also that
Mr. Perkins in this very point concerning the
vse of mixt Games, such as Tables and Cards are,
passing his censure of them, saith, that they
are ^s not simply to be condemned. But of this
enough.

4. Yea but Mr. G. affirmeth them else-where to
be lawfull in themselves. And why is he fearefull
now to allow them as good in themselves? Though
such words of mine be not found in the place
pointed to: yet I feare not to owne them, and it
is like enough that else-where I may vse them.
Nor did I euer vnderstand till now, that these

two were not equiualent, *not to be euill, and to be lawfull*. Is there any *medium in morall actions* betweene *lawfull* and *unlawfull*? Or any difference betweene *unlawfull* and *euill*? If not, then euery thing that is *not euill* is *not unlawfull*; and euery thing consequently that is *not euill*, is *lawfull*. Yea I adde further, that euery thing that is *not euill*, is in some sense, and that a good sense too, *good*. The word, *good*, therefore in common acception is taken two wayes; sometime more strictly for some such *vertuous act*, as deserueth *a speciall note of commendation and praise*; and in this sense there is some *medium* betweene *good* and *bad*. For some actions there be, as for a man^a to make much of himselfe, to drinke when he is a dry, ^y to loue his owne, ^z to befriend his friend, to ^a make amends for what he hath done amisse, &c. which though they be allowable, yet are not greatly commendable; ^b neither deserue they much praise and commendation when they are done, nor without much sinne many times may they be omitted. Sometime the word is taken in a greater latitude of sense, for any action that is warrantable and allowable whatsoeuer, and so there is no *medium* at all betweene *good* and *bad*, euery particular *morall action* being either *warrantable* or *unwarrantable*, as ^c in my *Lots* I haue shew-

isse me, ut ille predicat, credo; sed tantum effugisse flagitium. ^a Hinc Mitio Terent. Adelph. 4. 3. Ego in hac re nihil reperio, quamobrem lauder tantopere: Meum officium facio: quod peccatum a nobis ortum est, corrigo. ^b Neglecta quedam offensam contrahunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur: & damnant praeuicatore, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de precept. & dispens. ^c Chap. 5. sect. 5.

† Et ois deo
n. Matth. 5. 45.

^a Gloriosa. Sen. ep.

83. Honeſta, & pulchritudine ſpectique eximia laudabilia. Cic. de fin. l. 2.

^x Psal. 49. 18. Quid magnifici eſt, ſe amare, ſibi parcere, ſibi acquirere? Sen. de benef. l. 4. c. 14.

^y Lament. 4. 3. Tit.

2. 4. Meus mihi, ſuus cuique charus eſt. Plaut. Capt. 2. 3. om̄i tuūm id n̄ quōs cōyit. Plut. de ſen. polit.

^z Matth. 5. 45, 46.

Si quid amici erga benefeci, aut conſului fideliter, Non video meruiſſe laudem, culpa caruiſſe arbitror. Plaut. Trinum. 5. 2. Hinc Plin. ep. 11. 13. Non ideo tamen eximiam gloriam meruiſſe.

* Contra quam
Tertull. ad uxor. l.

1. Non id è quid
bonum, qui malum
non est.

† 1 Cor. 7. 36.

‡ Ibid. 38.

§ In Domino.

Ibid. 39.

¶ Ecquandone vi-
disti flammam sti-
pula exortam, clavo
crepitu, largo ful-
gore, cito incremen-
to? Sedenim ma-
teria levi, caduco
incendio, nullis re-
liquis? Hem tibi
illa accusatio, iur-
gis inita, verbis
aucta, argumentis
defecta, nullis post
sententiã latã reli-
quis calumnie per-
mansura. Apul. in
apol.

h Ezek. 36. 31.

i Junius refert ad
Cap. 6. 9.

k The like phrase
is Psal. 36. 4. where
Piscator, in actioni-
bus malis: & Iuni-
us, viam ut quam-
que videt pessimam
pergit in ea. So
oft in the Pro-

verbs, To eat ouer much honey is not good, Chap. 25. 27. To respect persons in
iudgement is not good, Chap. 24. 23. False weights are no good thing, Chap. 20.
23. De quibus & similibus vise Drus. observ. l. 1. c. 22. & H. Steph. ad Corinth. de dial. 1.
l. Matth. 3. 10. m Matth. 7. 17, 18, 19. & 12. 33. Esai. 5. 4, 7. n Luk. 13. 7. Ezek. 15. 2, 3.
Sicut steriles arbores excidi solent. Calvin. harmon.

ed at large. And in this sense I say, that * *not euill*, and *good* are all one: as with the Apostle, *not to sinne*, and *to doe well* are all one. † *If he marry her, he sinneth not*; and afterward, ‡ *He that marrieth her doth well*. Where let M^r. B. againe demand of the Apostle (I dare not) why he was so fearefull to say, that *he that married did well*, at the first, especially obseruing the *Caution* that he there giueth, § *in the Lord*: And let him take heed, lest while he reiecteth these, as *quagmirie grounds*, he plunge many weake Christians into deepe *quagmires* indeed, where- in no firme footing can be found, to fix and rest their perplexed mindes and consciences on.

5. This considered, all that followeth is but ¶ *a meere flash*, that vanisheth so soone as it is fired, of it selfe. Nor will M^r. B. euer be able to proue, or to perswade any man, I beleeeue, not sworne to stand to his sentence, beside him- selfe, that those ^h *deeds not good* in the Prophet were any other than ⁱ *euill works*, such as the ^k Psalmist saith, wicked men addict themselues vnto: for who is bound *to repent* of ought that is *not euill*? Or that in ^l *Iohn* the Baptists speech, the opposition is betweene *fruit good*, and *fruit not euill*; and not rather (as all Diuines that euer I read, vnderstand it) betweene ^m *good fruit*, and *euill fruit*, or ⁿ *no fruit*; it being *euill*

also, as ° *Chrysostome* well obserueth, *not to doe well.*

6. For the crying finnes that Mr. B. saith accompanie these Games. Doe crying finnes accompanie euery *lusorie Lot*, the shuffling of arrowes, for the siding of shooters, or the drawing of pawnes for the leading at *Chesse*, &c? For the Question is of any *Lot* at all used in disport; not of *Cards* or *Dice* alone. Or doe those crying finnes arise from the *Lot* it selfe vsed in them? or not accompanie other Games, as *bowles*, and *nine pins*, &c. wherein no *Lot* is? Or must all *Lots* be necessarily banished from all Game, because some *Lot-games* are with many attended with such finnes? But Mr. B. hath no minde at all to keepe to the Question, or to come directly to that that he should deale with.

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The first Argument.

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Malum est non fecisse bonum. Κα-
κόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ το-
τὸ μὴ ποιῆν ἀγα-
θόν. Chrysost. in
Matth. lō. & tom.
9. apantism. 6. siue
serm. de virt. &
vii.

I. B.

T. G.

T.G. of Lots,
Cap. 4. Sect. 4.
Argument. 1.

* Contra quam
Tertull. ad ux. l. 1.
1. Non id. d. quid
bonum, quia malum
non est.

d 1 Cor. 7. 36.

e Ibid. 38.

f In Domino.

Ibid. 39.

g Equandone vi-
disti flammam sti-
pula exortam, clavo
crepitu, largo ful-
gore, cito incremen-
to? Sedenim ma-
teria levi, caduco
incendio, nullis re-
liquiis? Hem tibi
illa accusatio, iur-
gis inila, verbis
aucta, argumentis
defecta, nullis post
sententiā lata reli-
quiis calumnie per-
mansura. Apul. in
apol.

h Ezek. 36. 31.

i Junius refert ad
Cap. 6. 9.

k The like phrase
is Psal. 36. 4. where
Piscator, in actioni-
bus malis: & Iuni-
us, viam ut quam-
que videt pessimam
pergit in ea. So
oft in the Pro-

verbs, To eat ouer much honey is not good, Chap. 25. 27. To respect persons in
iudgement is not good, Chap. 24. 23. False weights are no good thing, Chap. 20.
23. De quibus & similibus vise Drus. observ. l. 1. c. 22. & H. Steph. ad Corinth. de dialect.
1 Matth. 3. 10. m Matth. 7. 17, 18, 19. & 12. 33. Esai. 5. 4, 7. n Luk. 13. 7. Ezek. 15. 2, 3.
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T. G.

T. G. of *Lots*,
Cap. 4. Sect. 4.
Argument. 1.

u Prov. 18. 18.

* מרינים
five מרינים
a רון vel רון
iudicare.

x Prov. 6. 14. 19.

⊕ 10. 12. ⊕ 15.

18. ⊕ 16. 28. ⊕

17. 14. ⊕ 18. 19.

⊕ 19. 13. ⊕ 21. 9.

19. ⊕ 22. 10. ⊕

23. 29. ⊕ 25. 24.

⊕ 26. 20. 21. ⊕

27. 15. ⊕ 28. 25.

⊕ 29. 22.

y Levit. 27. 32. ⊕

Iun. in annot.

z Psalm. 84. 10.

חסתרם ad

limen residere. Leo

Iud. Limen frequē-

tare. Iun. abjectus

Vulg. ad locū com-

muniem & ignobi-

lem rejici. Calvin.

be a doore-kee-

per. Angl. constant.

Serum esse perpetu-

us, post affixus, ut

Exod. 21. 6. i. vilis-

simā conditione ibi

agere, מרר

quā alibi liberē a-

gentem commorari.

Inde enim מרר

libertas. Leyfield.

* 1 Paral. 26. 13,

14. &c.

recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, as, by the expresse ^u authoritie of Gods spirit speaking by *Salomon*, for the ending of contentions, and matters in suit or strife, be they weightier or of lesse weight: For the words in the text are indefinite, neither is there ought to restrain the ordinarie vse of them in that kinde either there or else-where. The word vsed there, though in its originall propriety it signifie * *Law-suits*; yet in the ordinarie ^x vse of it, it extendeth it selfe to *contentions* of all kindes. And the practise of Gods people recorded in Scripture sheweth that euen meane matters haue beene decided and determined vsually by Lot: as in matter of Tithe, though it were not much material, which Lambe the *Leuite* had, so that he had one of ten, two of twenty, &c. yet was it decided ^y by Lot. It was a matter of no great weight what gate of the Temple such or such *Leuites* should wait at; I say not, that it was a meane matter to be a Porter in Gods house, (though ^z it seeme to be mentioned as one of the meanest places of imployment there;) but whether companie should wait at this gate, and whether at that other gate, (as who should stand at the North doore of the Church, and who at the South, to receiue peoples beneuolence, vpon occasion of some collection) was no matter of great moment, and yet was that also decided ^{*} by Lot. Neither was it greatly materiall which of the Priests offered Incense, or which dressed the Lamps,

Lamps, &c. so it were done by some one of them : yet that also went ^a by Lot. Since that Lots therefore may lawfully be vsed in other ordinary affaires, Gods word indefinitely warranting it, the same else-where not restraining it, and the practise of the godly, carrying it euen to meane matters (for ^b the offices themselues were not put by them to Lot, but the distribution of particular duties or stations among those of the same office) I see not what should banish them out of our disports, more than out of other our (though serious, yet) ciuill affaires.

^a Luk. 1. 9.

^b Parum ilaque
caute Martyr ad
1 Sam. c. 10. sor-
tibus designaban-
tur Sacerdotes.

The Argument collected with all faithfulnessse (as the rest, and his answers be) is this.

I. B.
Answer.

That which may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires. Therefore I see not what should banish it out of our disports, more than of other (though serious, yet) ciuill affaires.

How faithfully Mr. B. hath related mine Argument, any eye that compareth this his relation and it, may soone see. I say, A Lot may be vsed ordinarily in other ciuill affaires, be they weighty or of lesse weight, as my Proposition required that I should, and Mr. B. dealing as ^a the Deuill did with Scripture, when he tempted our Saniour, clippeth away those last words (for what

T. G.
Reply.

^a Matth. 4. 6.

what purpose (shall after appeare) and relateth thus mine *Assumption*, But a Lot may be ordinarily used in other Ciuill affaires. If this be all faithfulnessse, I know not what faithfulnessse is. Here is but a bad beginning againe, I am sure; and ^b the worse, because the contrary is so solemnly and so seriously professed. But let vs heare his *Answer*.

^b Grauius enim
sub pietatis professi-
one peccatur. Salu.
de provid. l. 4. c. 8.

I. B.

Is not this a fearefull conclusion like the Tenent?

T. G.

How timorous the Tenent is, hath before been discussed. And if the Conclusion here be no more timorous, it mattereth not much.

I. B.

Why doth not Mr. G. conclude positively thus? Therefore a Lot may be used for matter of recreation and delight.

T. G.

It is enough if the premises necessarily inferre the Conclusion. Which, what had it mattered, if it had wholly beene omitted? as ^c it is sometime with our Saviour himselve in his disputes. But it is ^d the part of a bad pleader, as the Hea-then man well obserueth, to leane the maine matter, and trifle thus about termes.

^c Matth. 22. 32.
^d Πῖπρος παύλις
καὶ παραλαβὴν
καὶ εἰπὴν ὡς
ἐλθόντων, καὶ ἀδελφῶν
φωνῆς αἰνῶσαι.
Plus. de adulat.

I. B.

He, forsooth, seeth not. Can a blind man goe stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) Mr. G. seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia.

against Mr. B's Reply.

65

T. G.

A little over-flowing of the gall, I feare, troubled Mr. B. when he was about this imployment. But what I see not, I hope, he will shew me, that seeth better than I doe in this businesse.

• *Namque homo, qui errantis comititur ostendit viam, Quasi lumen de accenderit. Ennius.*

suo lumine accendit, facit: Nihil ut minus ipsi luceat, cum illi
Cic. offic. l. 1.

For if God had opened his eyes, he might haue scene plainly, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Ciuill affaires; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be used in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set purpose to imploy God but as it may stand with his pleasure.

I. B.

1. I maruell then why many others sharper sighted than Mr. G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as Mr. B's, doe not see it.

T. G.

2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argument? vnlesse the denying of the Conclusion be a legall kinde of Answer.

Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in further answer to this Argument, I denie the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily used in other Ciuill matters, yet not for matter of recreation. Whereof also more hereafter.

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K

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c Matih. 22. 32.
d Πῖπρος φαύλος
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K

Here

ⁱ Plutarch. in
Theseo.

Defence of Mr. G's. Arguments,

Here Mr. B. sheweth why he curtailed and cut off part of mine *Assumption* before, as ^f *Procrustes* did those that were too long for his bed; It was too long to serue his turne, and that being cut off, he thought no more was said of a *Lot* in it, than might well be said of an *Oath*. Now therefore for *further Answer* (hauing giuen none at all before) either *he denieth*, not my *Proposition*, but an other of his owne forging correspondent to the *Assumption* that before he had framed; or else he bringeth an *instance* nothing at all to the purpose. My *Proposition* is this as himselfe relateth it, *That which may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight.* This thus conceiued Mr. B. denieth, and that he may seeme to haue some shew of reason for this his deniall, he addeth, that an *Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for recreation.* To let passe a large liberty giuen here for *Oaths*, which if it had in such termes slipt Mr. G's. pen, he should soone haue heard of it with a witnesse, as a *patron of*, and a *pleader for ordinarie swearers*; as if those places ^e of our *Sauour* and ^h *S. Iames* well knowne, did not precisely condemne ⁱ *ordinarie swearing.* To let that passe, hoping that Mr. B. meant not amisse, howsoeuer his words seeme to sound. Vnlesse he put in, *be those ciuill affaires weighty or lesse weighty, wherein he saith an oath may be vsed*, he saith nothing at all that concerneth my *Proposition*: If he doe, he directly

^e Matth. 5. 34.

^h Iam. 5. 12.

ⁱ Sit sermo vester,
Matth. 5. 37. i. sermo
familiaris & quo-
tidianus, Piscat. ser-
mo cōmuni. Chem-
nit.

directly crosseth ¹ the doctrine of our Saviour; and his owne assertions else-where. Neither doe I beleue that M^r.B. can giue instance of any one particular that may be vsed ordinarily in Ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, that may not be vsed also in disport. It he or any other can produce any, I will relinquish this Argument.

sum in quotidianis & communibus colloquijs, negotijs & commercijs, &c. vult omnino non esse nomen Dei ad iuramentum assumendum: utpote quod tam sacro-sanctum nobis esse debeat, ut illud non nisi in re gravissima in testimonium adhibeamus. Nam in re leui ne magni quidem virum in testem vocare auderemus.

i Quod recte sic expressit Chemonit. harmon.c.51. Pharisaeorum traditio erat, in quibusvis casibus, in familiari sermone, & in communibus negotijs, recte & sine peccato posse nomen Dei ad iuramentum assumi. Contra Chri-

The second Argument.

SEcondly, if we consider aright the nature of a Lot, and the great vncertaintie of it, we shall finde it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and ^c not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make vse of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be materiall which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left vnto it: so where it may be materiall and of some consequence whether it goe the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquitie of others may inforce a man vnto, a lesse inconuenience is allowable for the auoiding of a greater;) there

T. G. of Lots,
Chap. 4. Sect.
5. Argum. 2.

c Sors est incertissima qua res graves quaelibet non possunt definiti. Baro in 1. on. c. 1. Non licet uti in causis judicialibus aut criminalibus, vel in obcuris negotijs mercatorij. vel bellicis. Ibid. Nec immerito notat^r a Tiberio Senator Rom. quod uxorem pridie sortitione datam post die repudiasset. Suet. Tiber. c. 35.

α ἔτι δὲ χρῆσθαι
 οὐκ ἀνεπιθυμῶν μὲν
 τῶν ἰσοτήτων ἀμ-
 φοῖν, ὡς δ' ὅτι μά-
 λιστα ἐπ' ὀλιγι-
 σοῖς τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τῇ
 ἑ' πύχης διαμείβῃ.
 Plato de leg. lib. 6.
 Vise & que supra
 c. 5. § 5, 6. Κυβερ-
 νήτη μάλιστα θέλειν καχεῖσθαι κυμαίνοντι, μὴ δὲ τέκτονι, μὴ δὲ αὐλητῇ. Socr.
 apud Xenoph. ἀπομνημ. α.

α will no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the vncertaine hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

I. B.
 Answer.

Now I proceed to the second reason, which is set downe in two shapes.

The former is this:

That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto. But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot. Therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

The proposition he proneth thus. Great is the vncertainie of a Lot. Therefore not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire.

T. G.
 Reply.

The former Argument was propounded vnfaihtfully; this both vnfaihtfully and negligently. Vnfaihtfully, because diuers enforcements of some branches are omitted, as by comparing mine and his may appeare: Negligently, because the prooffe of the Assumption is here said to be the prooffe of the Proposition. Otherwise I acknowledge it indeed to containe for the maine substance the matter of my principall Argument.

Mr. B's. answer followeth.

against Mr. B's Reply.

69

A Lot is taken sometimes for the instrument of purpose disposed unto Casualtie, as [The Lot is cast into the Lap.] and sometime for the event, as [Giue a perfect Lot.] Which howsoeuer it be casuall in relation to the former, yet falleth out certainly this or that, by Gods whole disposing the former. *Prou. 16. 33.*

I. B.

*Prou. 16. 33.
1 Sam. 14. 41.*

I therefore denie both the Proposition and Assumption, perswaded that Mr. G. would neuer haue set downe this supposed reason, if a Lot in the former acception had not drawne his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lot in the latter acception.

Mr. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratiuely not for the casuall event applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein used. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense.

T. G.

For his deniall he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembered well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption.

The Proposition is this, as himselte also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto. Will any man that hath common sense, beside Mr. B. denie this Proposition, or require a prooffe of it? If any doe, I will for my part

^a *Contra principia
negantem non est
ulterius disputan-
dum.*

deale no more further with such an one, than
^a with one that denieth principles.

The *Assumption* is this, *The lightest matters
best sort with the nature of a Lot.*

This Mr. B. denieth too, and by denying it
therefore, it seemeth his deniall is grounded
vpon his former distinction; which yet he seem-
eth to apply not to the *Proposition* it selfe de-
nied, but to the antecedent of the prooffe, to wit,
that a *Lot* is a matter of great vncertainie. To
which he answereth, that a *Lot* in relation to the
Creature vsed in it is casuall; in relation to Gods
whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which
place will come to be examined hereafter in
his due place) is certaine. If his meaning be this,
that it is vncertaine in regard of the *Creature*
either vsing it or vsed in it, but certaine in regard
of God in his providence disposing it, who ei-
ther doubteth of the one, or denieth the other?
or what is said more of a *Lot* herein than is true
of any contingent Act, whether casuall or other?
But if his meaning be that God doth certainly
euer dispose euery *Lot* according to the nature
of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the
better part in a diuision vnequally made, shall
goe with him that hath the better right, the
office in an election, with him that is fittest for
it: or againe, so that in the same case it shall
euer fall out the same still certainly, as if in di-
uiding of commodities bought in common,
when for the parting of them the *Lot* hath beene
cast once, and the one party shall remaine vnfa-
tisfied,

^b See my Booke
of Lots, Chap. 2.
Sect. 7.

tisfied, suspecting or pretending that some fraud was vsed in it, that vpon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly goe the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it selfe will soone confute him; and as to him therefore that denieth *the fire to be hot*, I will with him onely *to thrust his finger into the flame*, so to him that shall denie a *Lot to be of vncertaine euent*, I will with him onely to make triall of it.

So that I maruell much, that he findeth a Lot to be not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discovering Achán, Iosh. 14. Chusing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforcements before spoken of brought for the strengthening of mine Antecedent, which hee should rather haue dealt withall; nor denying the Consequence, which he giueth therefore as granted; Mr. B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the Consequent; or in plainer termes, the Conclusion of mine Enthymem or imperfect Syllogisme: And by another Enthymem grounded on foure instances, endenoureth to

I. B.

T. G.

• Τὸ οὐκ ὄντι ὅτι
ὁ γὰρ πῶς ἔστι
μα. Plato.
Qui tacet, consen-
tire videtur. Bonif.
8. in 6. de Reg. Iur.
c. 43.

Defence of Mr. G^s. Arguments,

^a *contra principia
negantem non est
ulterius disputan-
dum.*

deale no more further with such an one, than
^a with one that denieth principles.

The *Assumption* is this, *The lightest matters
best sort with the nature of a Lot.*

This Mr. B. denieth too, and by denying it
therefore, it seemeth his *deniall* is grounded
vpon his former *distinction*; which yet he seem-
eth to apply not to the *Proposition* it selfe de-
nied, but to the *antecedent* of the *proofe*, to wit,
that a *Lot* is a matter of great *uncertaintie*. To
which he answereth, that a *Lot* in relation to the
Creature used in it is *casuall*; in relation to Gods
whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which
place will come to be examined hereafter in
his due place) is *certaine*. If his meaning be this,
that it is *uncertaine* in regard of the *Creature*
either using it or used in it, but *certaine* in regard
of God in his *providence* disposing it, who ei-
ther doubteth of the one, or denieth the other?
or what is said more of a *Lot* herein than is true
of any *contingent Act*, whether *casuall* or other?
But if his meaning be that God doth certainly
euer dispose euey *Lot* according to the nature
of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the
better part in a diuision vnequally made, shall
goe with him that hath the better right, the
office in an election, with him that is fittest for
it: or againe, so that in the same case it shall
euer fall out the same still certainly, as if in di-
uiding of commodities bought in common,
when for the parting of them the *Lot* hath beene
cast once, and the one party shall remaine vnfa-
tisfied,

^b See my Booke
of Lots, Chap. 2.
Sect. 7.

tified, suspecting or pretending that some fraud was used in it, that vpon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly goe the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it selfe will soone confute him; and as to him therefore that denieth *the fire to be hot*, I will wish him onely *to thrust his finger into the flame*, so to him that shall denie a *Lot to be of vncertaine event*, I will wish him only to make triall of it.

So that I marvel much, that he findeth a *Lot to be not fit to be used in any weighty affaire*. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discovering Achan, Iosh. 14. Chusing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premises considered, a *Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affaires*.

I. B.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforcements before spoken of brought for the strengthening of mine *Antecedent*, which hee should rather haue dealt withall; nor denying the *Consequence*, which he giueth therefore as granted; Mr. B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the *Consequent*; or in plainet termes, the *Conclusion* of mine *Enthymem* or *imperfect Syllogisme*: And by another *Enthymem* grounded on foure instances, endenoureth to

T. G.

ἢ τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐ
συγχέοντες ἡγού-
μεθα. Plato.
Qui tacet, consen-
tire videtur. Bonif.
8. in 6. de Reg. iur.
c. 43.

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

to proue the direct contrary to it. His Argument is this:

The diuision of the land of promise, the disconerie of Achan, the chusing of a King, and an Apostle, all done by Lot, were weighty affaires.

Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affaires, than about affaires of lesse weight.

d Of Lots, Chap.
4. Sect. 10. pag.
67, 68.

For the Antecedent, I might well question one branch of it concerning *the diuision of the Land of Promise by Lot*, of which also I haue spoken ^d else-where at large, and to auoid prolixitie referre thither my Reader. Onely thus much for the present. Whether that *Lot* were *ordinarie* and now imitable or no, may be questioned. If it were done with respect to a former propheticie, and with expectation that the seats of the seuerall Tribes should by vertue of the *Lot* fall out answerably thereunto, it was *extraordinarie*, and not imitable now of any without the like speciall ground. If it were done onely to determine which share each Tribe should haue of the Land as equally as could be diuided; though the businesse it selfe, to wit, the diuiding of the Land was weighty, yet that which the Lot was to doe in this businesse was it selfe of no great weight; for it was not much materiall which part *this* or *that* Tribe had, when little difference was betweene part and part; yea the lesse difference there was, the lesse inequality there could be; the lesse inequality there could be, the lesse weighty it was
how

how the Lot went; againe, the lesse danger of inequalitye, the lawfuller the Lot, and consequently the lesse weighty the euent, the lawfuller still the Lot. So that this instance either is of the same stampe with the other three, and must receiue then the same answer with them; or if it be of another kinde, yet it confirmeth not the consequent, because neither was that of much weight that the Lot was to doe therein, nor will it follow, *A Lot was used once* (yea say more than once) *in a weighty affaire; therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affaires, than it may about those that are of lesse weight.*

This premised for that branch of the *Antecedent*; I denie now Mr. B's. not *Consequent*, but *Consequence*. And that for two causes: 1. Because though it were granted that the *instances* were to purpose, yet the *Consequent* will not necessarily flow from thence; *In such three cases and upon such occasions a Lot was used in weighty affaires: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before.* All that will follow; all granted that Mr. B. himselfe requireth; is but this, *Therefore in weighty affaires sometimes a Lot is not unlawfull; or* (for I had almost forgotten my selfe) *the use of a Lot is lawfull.*

2. Because the *instances* are nothing to purpose, being of such *Lots* as were *extraordinarie*, and are not now imitable, as may appeare by Mr. B's. owne grants in the very next words to these. The *Question* is about the lawfull use

Defence of Mr. Gs. Arguments,

of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may lawfully vse Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully vse, the lesse weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disproue mine Affirmatiue herein, or to proue the contrary thereunto, Mr. B. produceth three Instances of Lots vled in such cases, as none lawfully now may vse them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinarie providence bin certainly directed, the euent was in hazard to haue beene of foule and fearefull consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some unfit person designed to a place of the highest moment. That these examples are such, I haue shewed evidently * else-where, which Mr. B. ought to haue taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senselesse, as to imagine, that to finde out a theefe or a murtherer, or the like, a Lot may now be vled, or that in choise of a King, where the place is electiue, a Lot may be cast vpon the bodie of the State without exception of any, as in Sauls case it was, for the setting of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did ^b with the Iewes, when they cast Lots for an High-Priest, the Lot lighting vpon ^c a most silly ignorant Ass. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Saniour * Christ opened ones eyes with clay, matter fitter to put out than to open a mans eyes. Therefore such matter as will rather put out than open a mans eye is fitter to be vled in the like case than any other. Or, A Lot was sometime vled by Gods speciall

* Of Lots, chap.
10. sect. 3. & 5.

^b Joseph. capt. l. 4.
c. 12.

^c Αὐτὸς ὁ ἰσχυρὸς
καὶ ὁ ἀνίκητος, καὶ ὁ
ἐκτελέων τὰς ἐπιταγὰς
αὐτοῦ, ὁ ὡς ἐκεῖνος
οὐκ ἐδέχθη.

* Iohn 9. 6, 11.

speciall appointment in some weighty affaires wherein we may not now lawfully use it: Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used of vs in weighty affaires, than it may be in those that be of lesse weight.

But will you heare Mr. B. controlling himselfe, and ouerthrowing what he here buildeth? Read me but his next words.

But indeed, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lot may be used about it, provided it be with Gods allowance. For want whereof both Diuinatorie and Lusurious Lots be equally unlawfull.

I. B.

1. Had Mr. B. before put in as much as here he doth, *whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty*, he had neither wronged mine Argument, and hee might easily haue discovered much difference in this very point betweene the use of a Lot, and the use of an Oath.

T. G.

2. *Are all Diuinatorie Lots unlawfull?* then are all those three examples before alledged of Lots vnto vs at least wholly unlawfull. For they were all Diuinatorie, ayming at the disco- uerie of that which no wit or skill of man was able by any meanes to reach to: and by Mr. B's. owne ground and grant therefore not now allowable. As for *lusorie Lots*, *sub indice lis est*; it is the Question, which Mr. B. too oft beggerth.

T.G. of Lots,
ubi supra.

Or more particularly for the present businessse: A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully either doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of another, or to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in game (or the vsing of it in any businessse, be it serious or lusurious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent, to wit, who shall ioyne or stand out, who shall lead or follow, who shall ouercome or yeeld to the other side, &c. which are matters meerely indifferent, such as may without sinne be either done or forborne, either done the one way or the other. The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot, is not euill simply in it selfe.

I. B.
Answer.

The other shape of his Reason, more particularly as he saith, for the present businessse is this.

A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature, whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in Game is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Therefore the putting

against Mr. B's Reply.

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ting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not euill simply in it selfe.

Mr. B. cannot (it seemeth) for his life relate any Argument of mine as he ought. For

T. G.
Reply.

1. Here in the *Assumption* he leaueth out that that ought not to haue beene omitted, to wit, *of a Lot qualified and cautioned as before*, without which mine *Assumption* were indeed very false.

2. He mangleth my *Conclusion*, leauing out the very principall part of it, to wit, *Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, &c.* that he might finde some matter of exception against it.

But his exceptions to it follow.

What a trembling Argument is this?

I. B.

I see, a man must be very peremptorie that dealeth with Mr. B. or else he shall be nothing worth. But I shall desire him to pardon me, if I be not so peremptorie, as hee and some other are.

T. G.

But wherein, thinke we, doth this *trembling* and *timorousnesse* discouer it selfe?

In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lot in the former acception. In the Assumption, of a Lot in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himselfe.

I. B.

What *trembling* argued this, if I did so? as indeed I doe not. And Mr. B's eye-sight, it seemeth,

T. G.

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

seemeth, failed him when he made this exception. For how can I *in the Proposition* take a *Lot* either in this or that acception, when there is no word at all of a *Lot* in it? as euen Mr. B. himselte relateth it. In the *Assumption* I speake of a *Lot* as it is ordinarily taken, and as himselte out of *Lyra* in effect defineth it, for ^a a *variable euent* (or a *casuall* rather) *applied vnto the deciding of some doubt*, which that it hath any *speciall relation to the Creator*, more than any other ordinarie ciuill Actions haue, is denied.

^a Mr. B. Dialog.

I. B.

In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulness: but concludeth onely, as not euill simply in themselues.

T. G.

^b Δὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν
δαρτῶ. Occidit
miseros crumbe re-
petita legentes. Lu-
ven. sat. 7.

These ^b *twise sod Coleworts* wee had more than once serued in before: nor deserue they any answer.

I. B.

Indeed the Conclusion is to follow the worse part. But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is generall.

T. G.

The *Assumption* is, But the *using* of a *Lot* in game, or in any other businesse serious or lufurious, qualified and cautioned as before, is, &c. And the Conclusion, *The use therefore of a Lot in such cases is, &c.* And where were Mr. B's. wits (thinke we) then, when he writ this?

I. B.

What? Is Mr. G. afraid to put (The using of a Lot in game) into the Conclusion?

Mr. G.

against Mr. B's Reply.

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T. G.

Mr. G. is not afraid to put it in; for he doth it in effect. But Mr. B. (who *with all faithfulness*, if you will beleue him, *relates* Mr. G's Arguments) cutteth it out himselfe in the relating of it, and then asketh Mr. G. why he putteth it not in. If this be not childish, I know not what is. It is like the *Papists* dealing with vs, that clip the tongue of antiquitie, and then aske vs why we doe not or dare not alledge it.

Is not the Minor to be the Subiect, and the Maior to be the Pradicate of the Conclusion? I will not question the figure of this pretended Argument, if Sub, pra, prima, will serue the turne. And though I finde it in no mood, yet will I answer the two fore-peecees thereof.

I. B.

That part of the *Minor* and *Maior* is to be so, I grant; and that I suppose Mr. B. meant. And that it is so in mine Argument would haue easily appeared, if Mr. B. had related the *Conclusion* aright.

T. G.

The Argument thus standeth.

To put a matter of meere indifferencie to be done or not done to the hazard of the uncertaine motion of any creature whether it shall be done or left undone, is lawfull.

But the using of a Lot in any businesse, be it serious or inforious, so qualified and cautioned as before, is no other than the putting of a matter of such meere indifferencie to the hazard of the creatures uncertaine motion.

Therefore

Defence of M^r. G^s. Arguments,

Therefore the use of a Lot in such cases, be the businesse serious or lufurious, is not euill of it selfe, or, if M^r. B. will admit no other termes, is lawfull.

Thus is the Argument it selfe cleared against M^r. B^s. exceptions; let vs heare his further Answer to the two fore-peecees of it.

I. B.

The former is not true, except M^r. G. understand a matter of meere indifferencie controuerted. For though such a matter may be the Subiect matter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controuerted is the onely subiect matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as M^r. G. truly writeth euen in this case, p. 167. If M^r. G. so understand, then there is some necessitie of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then meere in the will of a man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it.

T. G.

That I say there is no Lot, where no Controuersie is, is vntrue. I say onely, Where no question or Controuersie is. For a question may be where a Controuersie is not. Since that a Controuersie is properly ^e a Question betweene two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But vnlesse some such controuersie be about the matter of indifferencie to be done or not done, my former fore-peece, saith M^r. B. is not true. If it be then, belike it is. What M^r. B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferencie so to the hazard

^e Controversia,
quando de re qua-
piam controverti-
tur, vel lis aliqua
instituitur.

hazard of an uncertaine event, in a matter of controuersie is lawfull. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controuersie, it is not lawfull. The reason hee giueth why it is lawfull in the former, is because there is some necessitie then of ending the controuersie put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then meere in the will of man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it. Where

1. Mr. B. is too busie with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that where-soeuer any Controuersie is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so vntrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other meanes also be decided. 3. Hee misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous event, whereas my words are plaine of the doing or not doing the thing it selfe, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be lawfull, that no way hurteth me.

The reason he rendreth why it is vnlawfull in the latter is, because such a matter vnlesse it be controuerted, cannot be the subiect matter of a Lot; which we haue nothing yet to doe withall. And the words therefore, as they are vntrue, nor doe I any where so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the present Proposition. Here is Mr. B's Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controuersie is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferencie to the hazard of some casuall event whether it shall be

done or not done, unlesse some controuersie be about it, is unlawfull. Both the Antecedent is vnttrue; and the Consequence vnsound. He might better haue said, Where no Controuersie is, no Lot can be: therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casuall euent, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is frivoulous for one to say, it is not lawfull for a man to doe that, which by his owne grounds and grants is impossible.

I. B.

In the other peece I obserue, that Mr. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason giuen to his former shaped Argument.

T. G.

& Dialog. ex Ly-
vano.

I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casuall, or as^a Mr. B. himselfe speaketh, a various euent, used for the deciding of some doubt. The using, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left vndone, is the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition following necessarily from it.

I. B.

Neither is it true that if in game, a controuersie (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of meere indifferencie is put to hazard.

T. G.

Whether a controuersie in game be by Lot euer decided,

cided, though there be oft, is not by me here questioned, nor doth the strength of mine Argument depend thereupon. But that a matter of indifferencie is put to the hazard of a Lot in every Lot so qualified, as I had before required, must needs be, when ^e one of the Cautions there required is that the matter put to the hazard and decision of a Lot be a thing indifferent. Yea it is against common sense to say that the matters put to the hazard of a Lot in Game vsually, (as who shall be on this side and who on that, who shall haue the precedencie at Tables or Chess, who shall haue these and who those cards to make his Game with, and the like) are not things meerely indifferent. If they be such, and there be controuersie there-about, then by M^r. B. owne grants, they may be put to the hazard of a various euent, that is in short, to a Lot, as himselfe defineth it. That they are such no man of reasonable vnderstanding will denie; nor that controuersie may be about them in Game. It is lawfull therefore by M^r. B. grounds to vse a Lot in Game about them.

^e Of Lots, chap. 5. sect. 4.

But more hereof in my third Reply. In meane while consider, whether this second shape be more particularly for the present businesse, so as to conclude the Question than the former.

I. B.

Indeed as M^r. B. had dismembred my Conclusion it was not: otherwise it is.

T. G.

And note, that in both these Shapes, onely lightnesse and indifferencie of matters put to Lotterie are pressed

I. B.

as causes most iustifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped Arguments Proposition, he positively affirmeth, that we shall finde a Lot not fit to be used in a weighty affaire. If so, then weightinesse and necessitie of matters controuerted make Lotterie lesse lawfull, if not altogether unlawfull. But of that also more in that Reply.

T. G.

Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightnesse of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the use of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirme the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be used in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my *margin* may there shew; nor doe I nakedly affirme it, but adde something to strengthen it: And M^r. B. though he haue oft againe and againe carped at it, yet neither offreth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirme now further, what M^r. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightinesse of the businesse, in regard of the euent, maketh Lotterie the lesse lawfull, nor to be condescended vnto without very great necessitie, and to be vsed with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needfull in it. And I say therefore the lesse lawfull in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so vsing it, or in those that vrge the vse of it, when in such case

it

it is condescended vnto. The reason is euident. For if the matter to be decided by *Lot* be weighty in regard of the euent of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the *Lot* falleth. If it be of great moment which way the *Lot* falleth, then as it may proue well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconuenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconuenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the euent. If it must needs then produce such inconuenience if it doe fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter vpon hazard of such inconuenience. But to put the matter vpon the hazard of a *Lot*, is to put it vpon hazard of falling that way, since that the *Lot* may fall out either way, for ought they know that make vse of it, or else it is no *Lot*; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a *Lot*, is to put it vpon hazard of much inconuenience. Which to doe (as some say of an *Oath* in some cases) ^f it either is euill, or it is of euill; it is euill in the party himselfe that voluntarily doth it, it is from euill in others, when a man is vrged thereunto. But for the further confirmation hereof, I refer the Reader to ^s that place, where I handle the *Cantion of Conuenience*.

For matter of *Indifferencie*, I wonder that Mr. B. dare except against it: And I auow here confidently, without trembling and fearefulness, (which Mr. B. so oft layeth in my dish) that nothing but what is indifferent may lawfully be put vnto the decision of a *Lot*. And I would know of Mr. B. whether he dare defend that any either necessarie dutie, or act euill in

^e Aut malum est, aut à malo. Matib. 5.37. Non ait, qui amplius facit, malus est; vel siquid fit amplius malum est: sed quod amplius est à malo est. sed quare cujus, & si non à malo iurantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine iusta causa offertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exigitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Iansen. com. ord. Euang. c. 40. Ex bonum vitijs oritur, quia simplicitatem non colunt. Calvin. harmon. Euang. 5. Of Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 6.

^h Of Lots, Chap.
5. Sect. 5.

it selfe, may lawfully be put to the decision of a Lot, whether it shall be done or no. If he dare not iustifie the putting of either to the decision of a Lot, he must needs grant that *indifferencie* (which here he sticketh so much at) is a *necessarie affection* of such things as may lawfully be put thereunto. But of this at large ^h in my first *Caution*; which Mr. B. ought to haue taken notice of, and to haue answered if he could.

ⁱ *Art.* 27. 18, 19,
38.
- Solet decidere ja-
ctu Navita cum
ventis; imitatus
Castora, qui se Eu-
nuchum ipse facit,
cupiens evadere
damno. Juvenal.
sat. 12.

For *Necessitie*, it is true, nor doe I denie it, but that it may make some *Lotteries* lawfull to some, that for them otherwise to condescend vnto were vtterly vnlawfull. As necessitie to prevent a greater mischiefe, may make a man yeeld to giue his purse to a theefe, ¹ or to cast his wares into the sea, which otherwise he ought not to doe: So necessitie to prevent a far greater inconuenience may inforce a man to put the losing of that to the hazard of a Lot which he hath very good right to, and but for the auoiding of such grievous inconuenience he might not lawfully depart with, or put the losse of it to the hazard of a Lot. Nor is the Lot therefore the more vnlawfull vnto him either in regard of the *Necessitie*, or of the *Inconuenience* that thereupon may accrue, being yeelded to to redeeme a greater. And yet well may the Lot it selfe in some sense be said truly, to be in regard thereof the more vnlawfull, than if no such either *necessitie* inforced, or *inconuenience* accompanied it, because the vse of it is not wholly free from iniquitie on some side. And this, I hope, will suffice, for the present, to stay the mindes of any impartiall from entertaining a preiudice concerning my *Judgement*

ment deliuered in this point ; (which Mr. B. is so oft
snatching at, as if it were a most *senslesse conceit*,
when indeed nothing is more eident, if it be well
weighed) vntill the time come that Mr. B. will
vouchsafe to deale indeed with it, as ^k he telleth vs
still and hath told vs oft that he will.

^k Sed, Non semper
seriet, quodcunque.
minabitur arcu d
Hor. art. poet. An
Threatned persons
we say, line long.

The third Argument.

THirdly, if the vse of Lots in game be of it selfe
euill, then must it needs be a sinne either against
Piety in the first Table, or against Charitie in the
second. For euery morall euill must needs be a
breach of Gods Law, the whole summe and sub-
stance whereof being comprised in those ^f ten
Edicts of those ^e two Tables, euery breach thereof
must of necessitie be brought within compasse of
the one of those twaine, and so consequently con-
uincd to be a branch either of Impiety against the
one, or of Iniquitie against the other.

T. G. of Lots,
Chap. 4. Sect.
6. Argum. 3.

^e ἀπορία νόμου.
1 Ioan. 3. 4.
vbius & 2. 2. 1. 1.
Rom. 4. 15.
^f Deut. 10. 4. decem
verba: siue decem
edicta. Sic enim
Est. 3. 15 & 4. 3. &
8. 14. &c. 727
8 Exod. 31. 18.
Deut. 9. 10 & 10. 1.

But the Vse of Lots in game is not in it selfe, or of
it selfe a sinne either against Piety, or against Cha-
ritie.

To spend time and words in prouing that the
vse of a Lot in game as it is a Lot, is not against
charitie, as that it is no breach of charitie for men
to draw Cuts or cast Arrowes, who shall bowle or
shoot first, were both superfluous and ridiculous;
superfluous, because it were to proue what no man
denieth; ridiculous, because it were to confute
what

what no wise man will auow. And yet to charge a luforious Lot with Impietie, hath as little ground as the other.

^h Ezek. 22. 4. 26.

For the manifesting hereof let thus much be considered, that all Impietie may be referred to these ^h two heads, either the prophaning of hallowed things, or the hallowing of things prophane: since it cannot be imagined how any Impiety should be committed but either by denying holy things their due respect, or by giuing the same where it is not due. But luforious Lots are not of themselves guilty in either of these kindes. In the latter kinde even their greatest aduersaries will cleare them, there being no colour to charge them with the hallowing of ought that is not otherwise holy. And in the former kinde they may be cleared also by the grounds of Gods Law, to wit, from the prophaning of ought that is holy. For the thing vsed in them is a Lot: and nothing can be prophaned by them but what is vsed in them: (by Lots, I meane simply as they are Lots, for to make Lots of holy things, as of parcels of Scripture, or of the Elements consecrate in the Sacrament, &c. is not any thing concerning the nature of a Lot, but an abuse cleauing to it in some particular mens practise of it, and such as is to be seuered therefore in this our discourse from it.) But a Lot is no holy thing, either of it selfe and in it owne nature, or by vertue of any diuine institution. For of these two sorts are all holy things whatsoeuer, either they are holy of themselves and in their owne nature, as ⁱ God himselfe, and ^k his titles and attributes are, or else they come to be such,

ⁱ Iosh. 24. 19.

^{Esai.} 6. 3.

^{Psal.} 99. 5. 9.

^k ^{Psal.} 111. 9.

⁶ 99. 3.

such, whereas in their owne nature they are not, by meanes of some speciall diuine institution sanctifying and seuering them to some holy vse, as ¹ the Arke, ^m the Tabernacle, ⁿ the Temple, ^o the seuenth day of the world before Christ, and ^p the first day of the weeke since Christ. Now in neither of these respects can a Lot be said to be holy, not of it selfe, or in it owne nature, for it is nothing else but any casuall euent applied to the determining or deciding of some doubt: Where the matter of it, a meere casualtie, as it is a casualtie hauing no holinesse at all in it of it selfe (for ^q then should all casualties in like manner be such) can much lesse gaine or procure any holinesse to it selfe by any mans application of it to any end whatsoever, much lesse by the applying of it to a prophane or common end, be it more or lesse weighty.

Neither is a Lot holy by any diuine institution; since euery such institution must haue warrant from some word; and there cannot be produced any word of institution, whereby Lots are specially sanctified and set apart to such vses as may bring them within the compasse of things holy and sacred. If any particular Lots haue at some time beene so vsed, that can no more impart holinesse to all Lots in generall, than the religious vse of ^r water in Baptisme, yea in the ^r Baptisme of our Saviour, and the sacred vse of ^r bread and wine in the Lords Supper can ^u make all water, of all bread and wine in generall to be holy, and so consequently debarre men of the ordinarie and common vse of those creatures either for the necessitie of nature or for lawfull delight.

N

Those

¹ Num. 4.5.15. &
7.89. Levit. 16.2.
^m Exod. 29. 42,
43, 44. & 30. 25,
26, 29.
ⁿ Psal. 5.7. & 11.4.
& 65.4. & 68.5.
^o Gen. 2.3. Exod.
20. 8, 11. & 31.
13, 14, 15, 16, 17.
^p Apoc. 1.10.
Ait. 20.7.
1 Cor. 16.2.

^q Quod conuenit
tali, quatenus tale,
conuenit omni tali.

^r Iohn 2. 26, 31.
Ephef. 5. 26.
^s Matth. 3. 16.
Luk. 3. 21.
^t Matth. 26. 26, 27,
28, 29. 1 Cor. 11.
23, 24, 25, 26, 27.
^u Vse Casaub. ad
Baron. annal. ann.
31. num. 19. contra
Gbrysti. homil. de
bapt. Chr. & Iacob.
de Vitiis. c. 54.

* Sancti. sancti.

Those therefore are amisse that allow Lots in game, and yet adde for a Caution, that *great reuerence and religiousnesse be vsed in the action*; in regard that * *Holy things must be done in holy manner*. For if Lots in generall, euen ciuill as well as sacred, be holy things, they may in no case with no Caution be made matter of sport and pastime, or of gamesome recreation; nor can the light vse of them be so corrected and qualified, but that it will haue deadly poyson euen in the heart and pith of it, not adhering or cleauing vnto the barke or outside of it only. But ciuill Lots are not such; and therefore the lufurious vse of them is not the prophaning of any holy thing. And if neither the vnhalloving of any thing hallowed, nor the halloving of any thing vnhalloved, then can it not be brought within compasse of impiety or sinne against the first Table. And if it be cleared from all sinne against the first Table, and be not charged by any with any sinne against the second Table; it must needs rest discharged of all sinne in generall, and consequently be iustified as agreeable to Gods word.

I. B.
Answer,

I proceed to his third Reason, p. 131. Which is this: If the vse of Lots in game be of it selfe euill, then must it needs be a sinne either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charitie in the second.

But the vse of Lots in game is not of it selfe a sinne against either Piety or Charitie.

Therefore it must be iustified as agreeable to Gods word.

The Assumption is proued thus:

No man auoweth the use of a Lot in Game (as it is a Lot) to be against Charitie: and a lufurious Lot is not the prophaning of any thing hallowed by any diuine Institution, from the word, to any holy use. Therefore not against Piety. Indeed if Lots be holy, they may in no case be made matter of sport.

I could wish that Mr. B. had dealt in this businesse as fairely with me, as I haue done with him: that he would haue giuen me leaue at least * to tell my tale in mine owne words. The best is, mine owne Text before related will helpe both to shew what mine Arguments are, and how maimedly by Mr. B. they are euer propounded. But to the point.

T. G.

Reply.

* *vt meis verbis sensum meum loquatur. Hieron. aduers. error. Ioan. Hieros.*

Here I obserue one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the second Reason, to wit, The Conclusion containeth more than the premises. For the Conclusion saith, A Lot in game is agreeable to Gods word, and then it must be good of it selfe, which is more than not euill of it selfe. For that is good of it selfe, for doing whereof there is either precept or permission in Gads word, p. 137.

I. B.

And, good Reader, be pleased to looke backe to what was before answered to this friuolous exception. For I am euen weary of these cole-worts serued in so oft. And take along with thee, I pray thee, also Mr. B's sawce that he setteth on with them, (if thou findest any more sauour than I can in it) to giue them the better rellish.

T. G.

I. B.

But to the Assumption and prooffe thereof I answer; That the use of a Lot in Game is of it selfe a sinne against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by divine institution from the word: as shall be manifested hereafter.

T. G.

Well, till that hereafter come then, mine Argument standeth good.

I. B.

Yet here I thinke fit briefly to shew two things. One is, That an Oath is hallowed to make an holy use of the testifying presence of God. So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy use of the determining presence of God. If Mr. G. denie a Lot to be holy, except it have a more remote holy use: I say, He may as well denie an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of this point in my second Reply.

T. G.

What Mr. B. meaneth by all this I doe not well vnderstand: saue that he beggeth the Question pitifully, and applieth nothing of all this at all to mine Argument, or any part of it. Yet a word or two to it.

^a Ἀποὶν αὐμὰ ζή-
την ἐπισήμω, καὶ
ἐξ ὅπου ἐπισήμω.
Aristot. metaphys.
l. 2. c. 3. οὐτε γὰρ
ζήτην ὅτι, πάλ-
λ' αὐτὸν.

^b Quomodo sancti-
ficetur quod per se
sanctum est? Hie-
ron. ad Sun. &
Fret. Sanctificatur
enim quod ex non
sancto sanctum fit.

1. The Question is, *utrum sit*, and Mr. B. telleth vs here *quorsum sit*. The Question is, *whether Lots be hallowed or no*: and Mr. B. telleth vs *to what end they be hallowed*; ^a presupposing that, that being in question is to be proued.

^c Ἀποὶν αὐτὸς τὸ εἶναι ὁ ὁμοῦ, καὶ ἐκ δὲ τῶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ. Cyril. Hieros. catech. mystag. Scitè itaque Aug. de spir. & lit. c. 26. Aliter dicimus, Deus sanctificat sanctos suos, & Sanctificetur nomen tuum, nam illud idè, quia ille facit ipsos esse sanctos, qui non erant sancti: hoc autem idè, ut quod semper apud se sanctum est, sanctum etiam ab hominibus habeatur.

2. He telleth vs that *an Oath is hallowed*: ^b What needs it? It is ^c *holy of it owne nature and in it*

selfe:

selfe: as the very definition of it it selfe will shew. And a man may as well say, that prayer is hallowed to make an holy use of the invocating of the name of God, as that an Oath is hallowed to make an holy use of the testifying presence of God; or rather of calling in the testifying presence of God; if wee regard the true nature of an Oath. But so is not a Lot: they are nothing therefore alike.

The other is, That use of a Lot is against Piety, which is (I say not [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the word. For it is without faith: therefore a sinne, yea impiety. So disputeth Mr. G. against a divinatorie Lot, pag. 313. and so doe I against a lufurious Lot.

I. B.

Here wee returne to our old cole-worts againe, which, I see, will still be thrust vpon vs, and we must not refuse, vnlesse we will seeme to say nothing to that that Mr. B. saith to little purpose so oft.

T. G.

1. Here is the distinction reuiued againe betweene not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let Mr. B. remember what he set vs on, when he serued in the same before in effect: *That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoever is good is warranted; whatsoever is permitted is good: whatsoever is not forbidden is permitted: whatsoever therefore is not forbidden, is warranted. But obserue what consequents will follow vpon this conceit of Mr. B's. to wit, that Some things that are not euill, (for nothing is euill,

* Contra quam Tertull. qui nulla ratione firma nixus negat, Bonum esse quicquid licet: Et licita esse asserit, quæ non sunt bona: exhort. ad castit. Et, Bonum, inquit, permitti non expectat. Ibid. Sed & idem ad Vxor. lib. 1. Quod permittitur, non est bonum.

that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by Gods word: Some things that are against no part of Gods Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are finnes; for whatsoever is not of faith is sinne; and whatsoever is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Diuinitie; and such it may be, as Mr. B. scarce dreamed of when he deliuered this: and yet follow they necessarily vpon the same.

Εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἀπομνηστεύει. Αἰσθησις. 1. 1. 6. 2. & 3. Vno dato absurdo cetera sequuntur.

2. Mr. B. passing by, as his manner is, the prooffe of mine Assumption before denied by him, disputeth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let vs heare his Argument:

That vse of a Lot is against Piety, that is not warranted by the word.

But the vse of a Lot in Game is not warranted by the word:

Therefore it is against piety.

The Assumption which he should proue especially, he proueth not at all.

The Proposition, which indeed is vnsound also, he proueth sorily thus:

Whatsoever is not of faith is sinne, yea impiety.

Whatsoever is not warranted by the word, is not of faith:

Whatsoever therefore is not warranted by the word, is against Piety.

The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charitie, the one comprehending the summe of the first Table distinct from the second, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without faith,

faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offences properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogisme granted nothing hurteth me.

3. How I dispute against a Disinatorie Lot, I have before shewed. Let Mr. B. proue his Assumption about of the one, as I have done of the other, and I will yeeld him the lawfulnessse of them alike.

If then a lawfull Lot be holy, it is, saith Mr. G. in no case to be made matter of sport.

I. B.

What meaneth this then here? can any man tell? Or how is this inferred vpon ought that went before? Or what if Mr. G. say so? What doth that anaile Mr. B. vnlesse he can proue it so to be?

T. G.

* A supposition, we say, giueth no being to ought. Let Mr. B. assume, and make good his Assumption; and all will soone be at an end.

* Hypothesis nihil ponit in esse.

Nay, I may make yet more aduantage. For I may say; That maintaining the use thereof in Gaming, as it is a Lot, by practise, much more by writing, is against Charitie, as well as against Piety. For so a weake brother is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against, that brother being occasioned, by error of iudgement, to stumble. I haue this reasoning from Mr. G. himselfe, p. 255.

I. B.

I Cor. 8. 11, 12.

Mr. B. I see, is halfe weary of his worke, that giueth still but a short snatch at it, and then starting

T. G.

^b In via lassus que-
rit diverticula.

Hieron. ad Latā.

^c Quod canis in
Ægypto, bibit, &
fugit: de Antonio
dictum Macrobi. sa-
turn. l. 2. c. 2. In illis
liquidem regionibus
constat canes raptu
crocodilorum exter-
ritos currere & bi-
bere. Macrobi.

^b Starting aside from it, ^c as the *Egyptian Dogs* use to doe, drinking in *Nilus*, runneth out into by-matters that nothing concerne it.

The *Question* is, whether a *Lot* used in game, as it is a *Lot*, be against *Charitie* or no. Mr. B. proueth it is, because some weake ones are thereby scandalized, as if the use of euerie *Lot* in Game, whether in priuate, or in presence of others, strong or weake, must needs of necessitie euer scandalize one or another; or as if the scandal, when such were either taken or giuen, did not arise either from the inconsiderate act of the one, or the erroneous conceit, caused it may bee by Mr. B. of the other, or from both, and not from the Nature of the *Lot* so used it selfe. By Mr. B^s. rule, to eat flesh as it is flesh (to speake as he speaketh) or to eat it upon such a day as it is such a day, shall be against *Charitie*, and of it selfe euill, because some, and not a few, are at some time scandalized thereat.

But I haue sinned against *Charitie* by writing my Booke. Mr. B. of all other should not charge mee therewith; for who seeth not, that in this Cause he will be deemed as ^d a partie? He writeth against the use of a *Lot* in Game, and thereby seeketh to possesse mens mindes with a superstitious conceit of it, which if another seeke to remoue and ease mens minds of, he condemneth them of breach of *Charitie*, sinning the meane while therein, though (I perswade my selfe) ignorantly, both against *Pietie* and *Charitie*, and ministring thereby the cause of the scandal himselfe. Yea, obserue, I pray you, Mr. B^s. dealing in this businesse. Hee seemeth in his *Epistle Dedicatorie* to be ^e doubtful whether he erre or no, & affirmeth

^d In lite iudex
quisque corruptus
sua est.

^e Whether I erre
or no; which yet
I would gladly
vnderstand. Epist.
dedic. to Dialog.

affirmeth that he would be glad to understand it, if he doe. And yet no sooner is any mans mouth open to debate the matter with him, but he crieth out by and by, that they sinne against Charitie, in offering to iustifie a luforie Lot.

If it be indeed a breach of Charitie to discover a grosse error, and to endeavour to remoue a scandall, by satisfying the mindes, and better informing the iudgements of those that are therefore scandalized because misinformed, I then confesse my selfe guilty herein. If not, let the blame lie on the heads of those that at first caused the scandall, and of those that will ^fcauslessly take scandall at those that seeke to remoue it.

^f Si de veritate scandalum sumitur, utilius scandalum nasci permittitur, quam veritas relinquitur. Aug. de lib. arb. Et Beda in decretal. de reg. iur. c. 3.

The fourth Argument.

A Fourth Argument may be taken from the benefit of Christian liberty, by vertue whereof euery Christian man hath ^y a free vse of all Gods good creatures to imploy them vnto such purposes as by any ^z naturall power they are inabled vnto, within the bounds aboue mentioned. But in these ordinarie, ciuill and diuiforie Lots, be they serious or luforious, the creature is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and * such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of

T. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect.

7. Argum. 4.

^y Libertatis Christiane pars tertia, ut nulla rerum externarum per se indifferentium religione coram Deo teneamur, quin eas nunc usui pare, nunc omittere indifferenter liceat: huius

cognitio si aberit, nulla conscientijs nostris quies, nullus superstitionum futurus est finis: eodem venietur, ut super festucam transversam incedere nefas ducatur. Calvin. instit. lib. 3. cap. 19 §. 7. ^z Ipse naturales rerum dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus frui liceat. Ibid. cap. 10. §. 2. * Sortibus uti licet in rebus potestati nostra subditi. Krayke in Ion. c. 1.

those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect. For it is in the naturall power of the creature vsed to moue or to be moued diuersly, and vncertainly in regard of those that make vse of it: and it is further in the power of it by their mutuall agreement to determine such matters as are ordinarily wont to be determined thereby. Which therefore * so long as the vse of it is kept otherwise free from superstition and impiety, or from iniustice and dishonestie, ought no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreations, than any other creature or ordinance whatsoeuer that hath any naturall power to delight and giue contentment in that kinde.

* *Sors non est mala nisi ex admixta irreligiositate, aut iniustitia, aut imprudentia. Cajet. sum. vii.*

I. B.
Answer.

Now then with some comfort I proceed to the fourth Argument, as Mr. G. calleth it, p. 134.

By vertue of Christian liberty, euery Christian man hath a free vse of all Gods good creatures, to imploy them vnto such purposes as by any naturall power they are inabled vnto.

But in lusorious Lots the creature is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect.

Therefore it is no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreation, than any other creature that hath any power to delight.

T. G.
Reply.

With this Argument Mr. B. dealeth iust as with the first. Hee leaueth out (that hee may by that meanes finde matter to worke vpon) those words
in

in the Proposition, within the bounds above-mentioned, that is, so that the same be *not* either against Piety, or Charitie, (which had beene in the former Argument insisted on;) or more particularly, as by way of further explication I adde after (which Mr. B. also omitteth) so that the same be kept free from superstition and impiety, (in regard of the first Table) and from iniustice and dishonestie (in regard of the second.) So that the maine ground of the Argument is this, that ^g Man being by God made Lord of the inferiour creatures; and that ^h his right and interest in them being restored againe to each Christian by his interest in Christ, ⁱ the heire of all things, ^k he hath free liberty to use any of Gods good creatures to such ends and purposes as by nature they are inabled vnto, the same being within compasse of the bounds before-mentioned.

True it is that Calvin from whom I take this Proposition, deliuereth it ^l more indefinitely, and somewhat after that manner as Mr. B. here propoundeth: as the Apostle also doth the like in some places, where he saith; ^m All things are lawfull: and, ⁿ To the pure all things are pure: and, ^o I know, and am assured that nothing of it selfe is uncleane, &c. But his meaning (P which ought to be regarded) is apparent to be the same with that that I say; and being so conceiued, it is sound and true, and of good vse for direction in the warrantable vse of the Creature. Neither doe I suppose that Mr. B. will be able to giue any other good reason, why he may lawfully vse starch for the stifning of his band, or a flint and a steele to strike fire withall, or a spit to roast his meat

^g Gen. 1. 28, 29. &

9. 2, 3.

Psal. 8. 6, 7.

^h 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22, 23.

ⁱ Hebr. 1. 2.

Apo. 21. 7.

^k 1 Cor. 10. 23, 25, 26.

^l Ipse naturales rerum dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus frui liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 2.

^m 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Vbi universales particule non sunt in infinitum extendende, quasi liceat furari, scortari, &c. sed ad materiam subjectam restringende. Chemnit. harmon. Euang. c. 51. Omnis omnium creaturarum usus lege Dei non prohibitus licite & sine peccato haberi potest. Morton. in 1 Cor. 6.

ⁿ Tit. 1. 15.

^o Rom. 14. 14.

^p Scriptum potius sequi, quam voluntatem scriptoris, calumnians est. Cic. pro Cæcin.

Defence of Mr. G's. Arguments,

with, or *cord* to girt his bed with, or *feathers* to lie on, or *arrowes* to shoot with, &c. saue this, that these Creatures haue a *naturall power* thereunto ; and God hath vouchsafed vs the *use of his Creatures* for such purposes as *by nature* they are enabled vnto, so that the same be conditioned as was before said. But let vs consider what Mr. B. objecteth against this.

I. B.

9 1 Pet. 2. 16.

So generall and eager is the pursuit after Libertie in this licentious age, that a godly and charitable Christian, much more being a Minister, ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any, much lesse too too many, to make liberty a cloake of naughtinesse.

T. G.

Such a godly, charitable, christian Minister as Mr. B. deciphereth here, was Mr. Calvin, and one, I doubt not, wary of straining *Christian liberty* beyond its due extent : and yet speaketh he no otherwise than Mr. G. here doth, or rather not so cautelously as Mr. G. doth ; as the *Margine* sheweth, where his owne words are alledged.

I. B.

But Mr. G. speaketh of Christian liberty, not of licentiousnesse. Then let vs consider what he saith. For both the premises of this Argument are flatly to be denied.

T. G.

When Mr. B. saith, *both the premises*, his meaning is, not of *mine Argument*, but of *this Argument*, that is, of his owne, for the one of them, to wit the *Proposition*, at least, as appeareth by the reason of his deniall annexed.

For

against Mr. B^s. Reply.

101

*For sundry good creatures have a naturall power to im-
poison. But Christian liberty giueth vs not free
vse thereof to poison at pleasure.*

I. B.

Nor doe I say, or M^r. Calvin meane that it doth.
It giueth liberty to vse such creatures for poisoning,
where that vse is free from such taint as was former-
ly mentioned; as for the poisoning, and (by im-
poisoning) destroying of vermine, &c. But how
doth this *instance* touch my *Proposition* at all? As
M^r. B. propoundeth it peradventure it may. As I
conceiue it my selfe, I am sure, it doth not. Neither
is my *Proposition* therefore denied, but an other of
M^r. B^s. owne put in the roome of it, nor any excep-
tion at all here taken to it. Let vs proceed to see
what to the *Assumption* he saith.

T. G.

*Neither is it true that any creature hath a naturall
power to be a Lot, no more than a stone hath a naturall
power to be caried vpward. For as a stone is caried vp-
ward by a power that is without it: so all creatures are
moued and applied to be Lots by a power without them.*

I. B.

Albeit this be nothing to that that I say, for I say
not, that the creature hath a naturall power to be a
Lot, but that the creature in such a Lot is vsed to no
other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power
vnto. Yet is it most vndoubtedly and vndeniably
true, that the creature that is vsed in a Lot hath a na-
turall power to be made matter of a Lot; as a stone
hath a naturall power to be driuen vpward: else
could not either of them by any Art or humane
power

T. G.

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

power be effected with either, nor without some supernaturall worke. So that to the *Assumption* also rightly vnderstood here is nothing at all said.

I. B. *God keepe me from teaching that Christian libertie warranteth the unlawfull use of any Creature, whatsoever naturall power it hath to that use.*

T. G. Nor is any such thing here taught, either by me, or Mr. Calvin either, if his words be rightly vnderstood.

I. B. *If any Creature haue any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be used vnto Lotterie, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such use thereof.*

T. G. This is but a deniall of the *Conclusion*; and a plaine begging of the point in *Question*: which is this, whether a Lot in game be (how, but by Gods word?) allowable.

I. B. *To the inforcing of the Conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, it is a begging of the Question. For though a Dog hauing a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation: yet ought a Lot-creature to be, for reasons giuen, and to be giuen, or rather defended hereafter.*

T. G. What reason hath beene already giuen, we haue seene; what will be, we shall further then see, when it is. But meane while I would gladly vnderstand from

from Mr. B. (since he hath pleased to propound this instance) what reason he can giue why a man may lawfully vse an *Hound* or *Spaniel* to hunt with, other than before of the like was rendred. As for the *supposed confirmation of the Assumption*, what he vnderstandeth thereby, I know not, vnlesse he meane the *illustration* of the *Conclusion*: which, by his instance, it seemeth, hee doth. For to that that is brought indeed for the *prooffe* of it, here is not a word. So that, neither is my *Proposition* touched, nor either the *Assumption* it selfe, or the *prooffe* of it dealt with: the *Conclusion* onely is denied; and the *illustration* of it propounded as a *confirmation* of the *Assumption*, which it hath nothing to doe with.

The fifth Argument.

A Fifth Argument may be drawne * from the grounds and grants euen of those that oppose in this point; and may be framed on this wise. Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing ^a indifferent: Lottery therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by their definition of recreation, to wit, ^b *Christian recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of body or minde.*

The Assumption, namely, that *Lottery is a thing in it owne nature indifferent*, is thus proued likewise by their definition of things in nature indifferent.

Indifferent

T. G. of Lots,
Chap. 4. Sect.
8. Argum. 5.

* à concessis.

^a Videtur sortium
usque inter adiapho-
ra constitui. Greg.
Tolos. syntagm. lib.
34. c. 5.

^b Fennor of re-
creat. rules spec.
§. 1.

c *Idem* *ibid.* §. 2.
rule 1.

d *Prov.* 18. 18.]

c Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to use it, but as we shall finde it in Christian wisdom beneficiall or hurtfull unto vs. But such is Lotterie, or the use of Lots; not simply commanded, (for ^d that of Salomon before alledged is rather a permission than a precept, or not so much a commandement as an aduice and counsell, commending that to vs as a wise and prudent course, not enioyning or imposing it as a duty necessary to be done, seeing by other courses beside it such controuersies may without sinne be composed as are there mentioned, and that effected oft by other meanes without a Lot, for which a Lot by Salomon is there allowed) nor againe any where forbidden or condemned as euill in it selfe: by the former definition therefore consequently indifferent, and so lawfull matter of Christian recreation and delight.

I. B.
Answer.

Now then to a fifth Argument à concessis, as Mr. G. termeth it, p. 135.

Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation. But Lottery is a thing indifferent. Lotterie therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport.

The Proposition is confirmed by the words of Mr. Fennor. Christian, saith he, recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of bodie or minde.

The Assumption is also proued by Mr. Fennor.

Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to use it. But such is Lotterie, saith Mr. G. Not simply commanded.

manded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept: or, Not so much a commandment, as an advice commending that as a prudent course. Nor any where forbidden as euill in it selfe.

This is indeed the effect and maine summe of mine Argument, though some inforcements of it be omitted. Let vs heare Mr. B's answer.

Mr. Fennors booke, from which these allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be vsed in sport, doth proue that lusurious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath Mr. G. from Mr. Fennors grants?

Much euery way. For a no testimonie is stronger than that that the aduerse party giueth against himselfe. If the grounds granted by him that holdeth and laboureth to proue a lusurious Lot unlawfull, be of sufficient validitie to proue them lawfull and allowable, it is a matter of no small moment. Else why doth Mr. B. himself in his Dialogue reason from Peter Martyrs grants against Peter Martyr?

And his owne prooves helpe him as little.

I need none, when mine Aduersarie speaketh enough for me.

For it is granted, that if Lotterie be either commanded or forbidden, it is not indifferent. To passe by the former: onely observing, that Mr. G. doth

P

nos

T. G.

Reply.

I. B.

T. G.

ἡ εὐχὴ ἡ ἀντιφ
ἐξ ὁποῦ ἀπορρέει
Isidor. Pel. l. 2. ep.
228. Τὸ γὰρ ἡνικα
ἐν τῷ νόμῳ
καταργεῖται. Cuius
ἡ εὐχὴ ἡ ἀντιφ
vixit. Greg. Naz.
de Spiritu Sancto.

I. B.

T. G.

I. B.

not absolutely denie it to be commanded, *Proverb.*
18. 18.

T. G.

^b An indifferent thing in nature, is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to use it, &c. *Fennor of Recreat. rules Spec. I.*

Though he doe not denie absolutely, that it is at all commanded, yet he doth denie, that it is simply and absolutely commanded. For that that we are advised to doe rather than some other thing, that we are not simply inioyned; which kinde of iniunction ^b M^r. Fennor seuereth from things indifferent. And that which among many other lawfull courses is commended vnto vs, as behouefull and vselfull, is not therefore either simply or absolutely inioyned, yea or at all, where such other may be had.

I. B.

I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appeare evidently, that a lusurious Lot is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent.

T. G.

* Μήπω μὲν εἰ-
πας, ὅτιν τέλως
ἀνδρῶν. Cic. ad
Attic. 4. ep. 8.

How * evidently this will there appeare, shall then appeare, when the Reply commeth to be discussed. Meane while M^r. B. here denieth onely the Conclusion of my Syllogisme. For the second branch of the Assumption, to wit, that a Lot is a thing simply forbidden, (which he would seeme to denie, and should denie and disproue if he did ought) he neither here opposeth, nor in his Dialogue or Reply, doth he either defend, much lesse make good, but maintaineth the contrary rather, that in some cases it is allowable, which it were not, if it were simply forbidden, and so absolutely euill. The Argument therefore from M^r. Fennor his Teachers

Teachers grounds standeth good, if his grounds at least be good.

I. B.

But to speake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by iust consequence, as that which is expressly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iust consequence, as that which is expressly permitted. Mr. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) denie the former. Againe, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoeuer it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expressly or by iust consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as have relation to God, ought to have some warrant from the word. If Mr. G. put me to proue this, I dare undertake to proue it demonstratiuely. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or euill, and shewing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor euill, he determineth the point thus. Neuerthelesse most true it is, That no particular morall action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why Mr. G. should say here, Lotterie

in game is not any where forbidden as euill of it selfe? That is good of it selfe which is either commanded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is euill of it selfe that is forbidden.

T. G.

α Δις κ' ης το
 καλόν. Plato Phil-
 leb. Δις τὸ γὰ κα-
 λὸν ῥηδὲν ἴδεν
 βλάπτει. Idem de
 leg. l. 6. Δις κ'
 ης φασὶν καλὸν
 εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λό-
 γον κ' ὁμοιομετρί-
 ας. Idem Gorgia.
 β Ταῦτα κ' ης
 παρὰ μὲν ἀπο-
 λῆν, ἀπορία τε-
 λείη, τίνοισιν
 ἄτε μαλ' ἀνάκα,
 Διὸς Κόρινθου.
 Pindar Nem. 7.

M^r. B. hauing no more to say to the substance of mine Argument, falleth to quarrell againe with some termes vsed in it. ^a A good thing, they say, may doe well twise or thrise. But ^b such friuolous exceptions so frequently inculcated, and so tediously prosecuted, cannot but tire the patientest Reader that is.

He maruelleth much (falling into his wonted veine of vaine wonderment againe) why I should here say, that *Lotterie in game is not simply forbidden as euill of it selfe*. I might well aske where I say it: not that I might not well so say, but because I no where here say it. But as I said at first, if M^r. B. might haue the framing of my Arguments, they should iudiciously be framed. The Minor should not be part of the Conclusion, as he speaketh elsewhere; but the whole Conclusion or the effect of it should be part of the Minor, or at least of the prooffe of it. I say therefore in mine Assumption, or rather in the prooffe of one part of it, not that *Lotterie in game is this or that*; (it belongeth to my Conclusion to tell what it is) but that *Lotterie in generall is not simply forbidden as euill of it selfe*. And my reason (which I rendred of the like before) why I speake so, is; because a thing though not euill simply of it selfe, yet may be sometime forbidden in regard of some abuse necessarily then annexed thereunto,

thereunto, or some other euill necessarily ensuing thereupon; and may therefore though not simply and absolutely, yet in that respect and in such case be forbidden. That is *good of it selfe*, that is *commanded or permitted*; and yet by circumstances or manner of doing may be marred. And that is *euill of it selfe* that is *simply forbidden*, so as by no manner of doing, it can be made good. But that is *not euill of it selfe*, that being *of it selfe good* is by *euill handling* of it marred. A man might well wonder that any *meane Christian*, much more a *grane Minister* should wonder to heare some things said to be *forbidden as euill of or in themselves*; or not be able to distinguish betweene things *simply euill of themselves*, and things *euill in regard of some consequence onely*. I might here make vse of that *Schoole distinction*, some things *prohibited because simply euill*, some things *euill onely because prohibited*. But of these things more than enough, vnllesse they were more to our purpose than they are.

^c Esai. I. II, 14.
Daus legem mea
dixerat, quæ vestra
nunc dicit. Hieron.
in Ezek. 5. Quia
secundum libidinem
suam, non sec. reli-
gionem celebrando,
sua j. in, non Dei se-
cerant. Tertull. ad
Marc. l. 2.

^d Prohibita quia
mala, mala quia
prohibita. Angel. de
Clav. sum. verb.
Alen, & alij.

*It grieneth my soule to see what a wide doore to
luscious Lotterie this doctrine will make. For now
Lot-mongers will chop Logick, and say, What if a lu-
sorious Lot be forbidden by iust consequence, yet they
are not forbidden as euill in themselves, and therefore
they are indifferent.*

I. B.

*And it grieneth my soule to see M^r. B. to trifle
so seriously or so sadly rather, and * to fight thus
with fearefull shadowes and fancies of his owne
framing. Where teach I any on this wise to argue?*

T. G.

* Συναγῆν.
Cum larvis & um-
bris digladiari.

* Οὐ γὰρ τῶν λέ-
γοντες μᾶλλον οἱ
λόγοι, ἢ τῶν λέγειν
Ἐναντιοφρον-
τες. Greg. Naz. de
Spiritu Sancto.

Or what difference ensueth from ought I say be-
tweene that which is *forbidden expressly*, and that
which *by iust consequence* is *forbidden*? That which
is *forbidden simply* * by iust consequence, is *simply*
euill; that which *respectiuely*, is so euill onely, and
not otherwise. But what if no *Gamester*, but some
honest and *good Christian* being reprov'd by Mr. B.
for holding *two pawnes* in his hands, and bidding
his *Aduersarie* chuse to determine who shall lead,
alledging all *Lot-games* by *iust consequence* to be
condemned in Gods word; should tell him, that
though *Lot-games* may in some case or in some
kinde by iust consequence be forbidden, yet they
are not forbidden simply or as euill in themselves,
and that they are therefore of themselves indiffe-
rent. I know not well, how Mr. B. will be able to
answer him. For to say that *whatsoever is by iust*
consequence out of Gods word in any sort forbidden is
simply and of it selfe euill, were senselesse. Since that
nothing can be in any sort euill, otherwise than as
it is forbidden.

The sixth Argument.

T. G. of Lots,
Chap. 4. Sect.
9. & 10. Ar-
gum. 6.

Sixtly and lastly, that the vse of Lots in Game is
not against Gods word, but hath sufficient war-
rant from it, may appeare by this Argument.
Where the wisdom of God in his word hath not
determined the matter, and the manner, or the other
circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there
they are left to mans discretion and wisdom. Else
should

should we hang euer in perpetuall suspence, hauing no rule at all to direct vs by in them. And where they are left thus to mans discretion and wisdom, there is warrant sufficient for any circumstance that man shall make choise of (the Magistrate publickly to inioyne, or priuate persons to practise) that shall not be against the generall rules of Gods word concerning the same.

For the better conceiuing of this point, it is to be considered, that for the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word: and a man must know that he hath warrant thence, because *Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne.* I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction; for the word is giuen vs in morall matters to supply the defects of it caused by our first Parents their fall; neither doth it abridge vs of the helpe and * vse of it for direction in such actions, but adde a further and fuller helpe thereunto.

First then for the act it selfe in generall; that is of it selfe good and lawfull, and allowable by Gods Law, for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission in Gods word, and that either direct and expresse, or collected by iust consequence: ^h if a precept, it is necessarie and must be done; ⁱ if permission onely, it is indifferent and may be done or not done, as shall seeme good to the party whom it concerneth.

Secondly, for the subiect matter, the manner of it, and other such circumstances, where they are by Gods

^c *Quum Scriptura generales legitimi vsus tradat regulas, secundum illas nobis limitandus est. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1.*

^f *Rom. 14. 23.*
^g *1 Cor. 9. 7, 8. & 11. 13, 14. Ad naturam Apostolus provocat. Tertull. de virg. vel. Nec differt Scriptura quid an ratione consistat. Idem cor. mil.*

^{*} *Rom. 2. 14, 15. Ipsa natura legis est instar ignorantibus legem. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 5.*

^h *Dent. 5. 29, 32, 33. & 12. 32. Quod precipitur, imperatur: quod imperatur, necesse est fieri. Tertull. ad uxor. l. 2. Vbi preceptum, necessitas est seruientis. Ibid.*

ⁱ *Dent. 12. 15, 20, 21, 22.*

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

Gods word determined, there such onely are lawfull as the word of God hath inioyned.

^k Concessum videtur quod non prohibetur. Accus. ad Cod. Inst. l. 10. t. 1. l. 4.

^l Matth. 12. 30. Omnia sunt prohibita, quæ non reperiuntur concessa. Gloss. ad Dig. l. 47. l. 23. l. 3.

^m Luk. 9. 50. Omnia per legem sunt permissa, quæ non inveniuntur prohibita. Gloss. ad D. l. 4. l. 6. l. 28.

ⁿ Dent. 12. 8, 9. Gen. 8. 20. & 12. 7. & 13. 18. & 20. 25. & 26. 25. & 33. 20. Exod. 17. 15. & 24. 4.

^o Dent. 12. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14.

^p Lev. 1. 2, 3. & 2. 1. Dent. 12. 5, 6, 26, 27.

^q Exod. 12. 6. Num. 9. 13.

^r Luk. 18. 1.

^s I Thess. 5. 17.

^t I Tim. 2. 1. 8.

^u Matth. 6. 9, 12. Act. 8. 12.

^v I Job. 1. 9.

Where they are not determined, there all such are lawfull as the same word ^k doth not forbid. In the former that rule holdeth, ^l *He that is not with me, is against me*: in the latter that other, ^m *He that is not against me, is with me*. Thus for sacrifice and the place of it, before it was determined, ⁿ it was lawfull in any place, because no certaine place was designed: but after it was once determined, ^o it was lawfull in no place but that alone, that God had expressly thereunto assigned. So for the Passeeouer and other offerings, and the time and season of either, the ordinary sacrifices (I meane the voluntarie or free-will offerings) ^p might be offered at any time, because for them was no time determined: but ^q the Passeeouer might be celebrated onely at one time, because the time of it was determined.

This would the rather be obserued for the readier answering of some friuolous obiections made by some Separatists; *What warrant, say they, haue you to vse this or that forme of prayer, or to pray vpon a booke?* I answer; It is warrant sufficient that ^r we are inioyned to vse praier, and ^s such kinde of praier, confession of sin, and supplication for pardon, &c. no set forme thereof determined; therefore any fit forme warrantable: this forme that we vse, not vnfit otherwise; this forme therefore allowable. And let a man demand of one of them when he praierth, what warrant he hath to vse that forme that he then vseth, he can answer no otherwise; or if in effect otherwise,

otherwise, he shall answer otherwise than well. So for a booke; the meanes of helpe are not determined; and this one among others; this therefore not vnwarrantable. And if one of them should be asked, how he proueth it warrantable to vse a printed booke to reade on in the Church; he shall not be able to make other answer than as before; for neither precept nor practise can be found in the word for the vse of a thing that was not knowne in those times wherein the word of God was written.

But to apply this to the present. First, Recreation in generall is granted by all to haue good warrant from Gods word, as a thing both allowed by permission, and inioyned by precept, if not directly and expresse, yet at least by iust consequence: and therefore I will not stand vpon the prooffe of it.

Secondly, for the matter and manner of it, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, there is nothing determined; any meanes therefore of recreation that are not against the generall Rules of * comelinesse and decencie, of * conueniencie and expedience, of religion and pietie, and the like, are by the word of God allowed, and haue from thence sufficient warrant. For example; If question be whether Boules or Chesse be lawfull or no: what can there be said in iustification of them more than this, that recreation in generall is by Gods word allowed; the matter of it in particular not determined: these games not prohibited: therefore lawfull and allowable. Now the very same may be said of Lots and Lotterie. Game in generall is

allowed:

Eccles. 3. 4.
Zech. 3. 10. & 8. 5.

* Certum est in di-
uinis literis nullam
de ludis aut regulam
aut formam pre-
scribi: quamuis in
eis multa ludorum
genera leguntur.

Martyr in Iud.
c. 14.
* Rom. 13. 13.
1 Cor. 14. 40.
* 1 Cor. 6. 14. &
10. 23.
Rom. 14. 21.
* 1 Cor. 10. 31.
Coloss. 3. 17.

allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such, and therefore allowable.

If any shall say, that the particular matter or manner of recreation is determined, ^ahe must shew where. Or if any shall say, that this particular by Lots is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise, he must shew which and how. Otherwise there is no civill action almost that shall be iustificable, as ^a going in doublet and hose, ^b wearing band and cuffs, ^c carrying a mans purse in his pocket, ^d sitting on a stoole at the Table, crossing the water in a Boat when one may goe about by the Bridge, ^e eating of Porke, ^f bloodings or ought strangled, and the like, if it shall be deemed enough to make an action vnwarrantable, either because there is no particular precept or precedent for it in Scripture, or because it is questioned or condemned by some without any reason or sufficient cause rendred why it should be questioned and condemned in that sort.

And so I conclude and leane this sixth and last reason; taken from the common grounds of other ordinary recreations not questioned; which must all with this either stand or fall, the selfe-same grounds supporting either; that this particular is not prohibited, nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise; which as in the former, so in this case must stand good, till the contrary can be proved.

^a Affirmanti incumbit probatio.

Paulus in Dig. lib.

22. tit. 3. leg. 2. Et

Vlpian. ibid. leg. 22.

^a Hebraeis & Asi-

aticis omnibus igno-

tum & inusitatum

id genus vestitus,

docent phrasex illa

lumbos accingendi,

Exo. 12. 10. & pe-

des contegendi, Iud.

3. 24. sed nec Ro-

manis in usu, quod

Casaub. notat ad

Suet. Iul.

^b Et haec illis olim,

& plerisque Orien-

talibus adhuc in-

usitata.

^c In zona siquidem

olim gestatur pe-

cunia, Matth. 10. 9.

Matth. 6. 8.

^d Accubitus priscus

convivium &

comedentium gest.

Matth. 26. 20.

ἐνέκοτο Marc. 14.

18. ἀνὰ κνήμους.

Luk. 22. 14. ἐνέ-

κοτοτο. Ioh. 13. 23.

ἀνὰ κνήμους.

τὸν Ἰησοῦ.

^e Olim vestitum.

Levit. 19. 7. Deut.

14. 8. ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλά-

σιν. 1. 4. 9. 5. ἀπὸ τῶν

ῥοβῶν. 1. 4. 9. 5. ἀπὸ

τῶν ῥοβῶν. 1. 4. 9. 5.

ἀπὸ τῶν ῥοβῶν. 1. 4.

9. 5. ἀπὸ τῶν ῥοβῶν.

1. 4. 9. 5. ἀπὸ τῶν

ῥοβῶν. 1. 4. 9. 5.

ἀπὸ τῶν ῥοβῶν. 1. 4.

9. 5. ἀπὸ τῶν ῥοβῶν.

^f Et hoc olim prohibitum, Lev. 7. 26. & 17. 10.

sed & ab Arianis nostratibus nuper reuocatum.

2

Now

against Mr. B's Reply.

Now to come to Mr. G's last Reason, which like an Orator he amplifieth, to leave a deepe impression behinde. But let it be well considered, as in it selfe, so whether it proue that the use of Lots in Game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, p. 136.

What Rhetoricall amplifications Mr. B. findeth in this Argument, those may well wonder, that know what Rhetoricall Amplifications are. But be it Logically or Rhetoricall, heare, I pray you, not it, but one that Mr. B. hath put into the roome of it.

It is this. Where the wisdom of God hath not determined the subiect Matter, the Manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there all such are lawfull as the word doth not forbid; and as no Circumstance that a man shall make choise of, shall be against the generall Rules of the word concerning the same.

But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the Subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall rules.

Therefore a Lot in Game is not prohibited, nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise.

He that should thus reason, were worthy either
^a to be sent to Bedlem, or ^{*} to be begged in the
 Cours of Wards. ^b Nor is mine this, nor is this

Perf. sat. 3.

^a Pr. curat. is legem a Prætoris dat. Hor. epist. 1. 1. ^b Quem recitat, meus est,
^c Fidentine, libellon: Sed magis dum recitas, incipit esse tuus. Martialis.

Q 2

mine,

MS

I. B.
 Answer.

T. G.
 Reply.

I. B.

T. G.

^a Ista siquidem,
 Non sani esse ho-
 minis non sanus ju-
 vet Orestes: ut
 Quem recitat, meus est,

mine, vnlesse I be out of my right wits. How they differ (not to be over-tedious) may appeare by my words, where hauing more largely discoursed of and discusled the seuerall parts of it, I thus briefly recollect it: *Game in generall is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable.* Where prefix Mr. B's proposition, onely so knit as it may hang a little more handsomely together, turning, and as, into, so as, (which so framed I owne) and you haue two entire Syllogismes, and the maine summe of mine Argument.

I. B.

The Proposition he confirmeth:

First, touching a thing lawfull in it selfe, by shewing that Act to be lawfull in it selfe, which in Gods word is either commanded or permitted expressly, or by iust consequence.

T. G.

This is an explication indeed of one terme vsed in it: no confirmation of the Proposition, nor so propounded.

I. B.

Secondly, touching the manner, &c. by prouing the rest of the Proposition, which he endeuoureth to performe,

1. By the authoritie of Caluini.
2. By Luk. 9. 56.
3. By a glosse.
4. By shewing that the circumstance of time for free-will offerings being not determined, they might haue beene offered at any time; and Sacrifices might haue beene

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beene in any place before a certaine place was determined.

Mr. B. here maketh me much more plentifull in prootes than I am: as shall appeare further in his Answer, and mine thereunto.

T. G.

Thirdly, touching the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing, that if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, then must warrant be had out of Gods word, because, *Whatsoever is not of faith is sin.* Which word is giuen vs in morall matters to supply the defect of it caused by our first Parents their fall. Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall reason for direction in such actions.

I. B.

c Rom. 14. 23.

This is indeed all alledged for the clearing of my Proposition, not for the prooofe of any part.

T. G.

The Assumption is thus proued. Recreation in generall is warranted from the word as permitted and inioyned, if not expresse yet by iust consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, there is nothing determined. Therefore any meanes that are not against the generall Rules of Comelinesse, and decencie, Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. of conueniencie and expediency, 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14. 21. of religion and piety, 1 Cor. 16. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. and the like, are by the word of God allowed.

I. B.

This prooofe and the Assumption by Mr. B. before assigned

T. G.

α Ἀντίπινος ἀρ-
μοσία λύρας καὶ
αὐτοῦ. Plut.

assigned me (to wit, But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules) hang together, as we say, like ^a harpe and harrow. He would make the world beleue, that Mr. G. is a strange man, that bringeth that to proue this.

But his Answer ensueth.

I. B.

I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordians knot with one chop, and say, The use of Lots in Game is forbidden in the word, referring my selfe to what I have and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answer more particularly, not doubting but that the Proverbe may now proue true, viz. ^c In many words there cannot want iniquitie.

^c Prov. 10. 19.

T. G.

Why doth Mr. B. vse so many words then ere he come to the matter? But the Iniquitie he meaneth is on my part: let vs see it. For here, it seemeth, is the ranke poison, the blasphemy that Mr. B. observed in my Booke.

I. B.

First, I observe fearefull shifiting, and then unsound arguing. The former thus appeareth: He supposeth the thing must be lawfull in it selfe, and disputeth onely about the subiect matter, &c.

T. G.

True, I presume Recreation to be lawfull in generall. Dare Mr. B. or any man denie it? And yet I presume it not without prooffe neither. But you must remember that Mr. B. here fighteth not with

me

me or mine Argument, but with a man of straw of his owne making. In his Assumption this is presumed of Lotterie: whereas I presume it of recreation, not of it.

sic tirores dimicabant, ut quasi presentem adversarium, sic pulum omni impetu, omni bellandi arte tentarent. Veget. de re milit. l. 1. c. 11. & l. 2. c. 13.

Quomodo apud Romanos contra pulum in terram defixum, inquam contra adversarium cum cruce & clava,

Againe in the introduction he saith; The use of Lots in game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position, That is against the word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it. But in the Proposition of the maine Argument his ground is, Such things are lawfull, which the word doth not forbid. Foure of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his Conclusion is answerable. Is not this a fearefull shifting course of reasoning?

I. B.

This then, it seemeth, is one point of that fearefull shifting that Mr. B. chargeth me with. Concerning which enough hath already beene said; for this is no new exception. And though the words be not thus generally propounded in my Proposition, as Mr. B. himselfe propoundeth it: Yet there is no contradiction betweene these two: since that

T. G.
& Omnia licent, i. omnis omnium creaturarum & rerum usus lege D. i. non prohibitus, licet & sine peccato haberi potest. Morion in 1 Cor. 6. 12. quorumvis creaturarum & rerum usus lege morali non prohibitus licet, i. sine peccato fieri potest. Inde in 1 Cor. 10. 23.

Touching the Proposition of his maine Argument, I marvel why Mr. G. avouching such subject matter

I. B.

ter

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

ter &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this Assertion with these words (of a thing lawfull in it selfe.) As if such a thing may warrant our richesnesse in and about the subiect matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, loue Aduerbs. An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe. Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect matter &c. be agreeable to the word of GOD?

T. G.

Why I insert those words into mine Assertion, may easily appeare to any that will not wilfully shut his eyes: because my dispute is concerning Recreation, a thing granted to be such, and the Question onely about the subiect matter of it. And so far are my words from implying any such matter, as Mr. B. here thence would inferre, that I say in expresse termes, that As well for the doing of euery act, as for the doing of it in this or that manner there must be warrant had out of Gods word^h.

^h *Ista itaque sunt
pali vulnera, ut
Iuvenal. sat. 6.*

I. B.

But I maruell much more at this ground, Such things are lawfull as the word doth not forbid. I set it downe thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted: and therefore the subiect matter &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I maruell, I say, because Mr. G. confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the word, either commanded, or permitted expressely, or by iust consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so cleare a truth, that (me thinks) Mr. G. cannot, but in proportion of reason, if he beleene the word to be perfect^k vniuersall euery good worke, hold all things

ⁱ *Psal. 19. 7.*

^k *2 Tim. 3. 15, 16,
17.*

to be unlawfull, which are not lawfull one of these two waies; and the rather because he peremptorily affirmeth, p. 95. All particular morall actions, be they never so indifferent, to be either conformable or disconformable to Gods word; and, by particular actions he meaneth Actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that Mr. G. would hold to this doctrine! Then should he thereby prouoke all who make conscience of their waies, and^l doe truth (that is, doe good works sincerely) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary, if he bring not disciples,^m to the Law and Testimonie, by doctrine according to the word; but writh from it, by teaching that to be lawfull, which is not forbidden; as therein this light faileth, so thereby he shall make men carelesse to seeke for their warrant, and wilfullⁿ to seeke after their owne heart and eyes, after which they goe a whoring.

^l Iohn 3. 21.

^m Isai. 8. 20.

ⁿ Num. 15. 39.

Here is a long and fore accusation; which might all well without any one word more be answered, onely by pointing the finger to what formerly was said. But because Mr. B. so much presseth me, I will intreat the Readers patience for a little further discussion of what is here objected. All I say here is this, that Where the circumstances of Actions in themselves lawfull are not determined in the word, all such are lawfull as are not in the same word forbidden, or as are not against the generall rules of the said word of God otherwise. And is it not strange that this Assertion should to Mr. B. seeme so strange? Or is this any writhing from the rule of Gods word?

T. G.

R

Yea

Yea but I crosse my selfe else-where in it. For I say else-where that *such things are lawfull as are in Gods word either commanded or permitted either expressly or by iust consequence*. I say so indeed: and what contradiction is there betweene these two? For is not that *by iust consequence permitted*, that is *not prohibited*? Yea, (since we are come to these precise termes) that is, *neither expressly nor by iust consequence prohibited*? For I am sure Mr. B. will not denie that to be *prohibited*, as well that is *by iust consequence prohibited*, as that is *prohibited in expresse termes*. Either Mr. B. then must giue vs some *medium* between *permission* and *non prohibition*, or else these two positions will haue very friendly agreement. Yea but Mr. G. himselfe may seeme to assigne some when he saith, that in *circumstances determined*, there is *no permission*, though *no prohibition* be of any other. I answer in a word, that the very *stinting of an action to those circumstances* is a *virtuall prohibition* of all other not expresse, albeit no *exclusive particle* in the *iniunction* be adioyned. For example, when God bid *Abraham* take *Isaak* and sacrifice him on *an hill that he should shew him*: it was as effectuell a prohibition of sacrificing him in any other place but on *an hill*, and on any other hill but *that hill*, as if God had said expressly (as he doth of the *Jewes* sacrificing, *in the place that I assigne and not else-where*) upon that hill, and upon no other: And the reason is apparent; because that commandement could not be fulfilled if any branch of it, whereof the precise place was one, were broken. This is that then that I say, that *where the circumstances of actions*

• Gen. 22. 2.

• Deut. 12. 13, 14.

ons are stinted, there those onely that are inioyned in speciall are lawfull: where they are not, any are permitted, that are conformable to the generall rules of direction giuen in Gods word. Against which in this whole heape of words Mr. B. bringeth nothing, but an other of mine owne assertions, which no whit crosseth it, his well wishes onely (ⁱ which might well haue beene spared) set apart.

Well, let vs examine his confirmations.

First Mr. Caluins testimonie in English is this. [When the Scripture delinereth generall rules of a lawfull vse, the vse is to be limited according to them.] From hence Mr. G. concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choise of, that is not against those rules. Mr. Calvin speaketh of an Vse, and of an Vse doe we dispute. Mr. G. concludeth a circumstance. Mr. Calvin saith, according. Mr. G. concludeth, not against. Is this sound arguing?

It is true that I quote a sentence of Mr. Caluins in the margine, as concurring with me in one clause against which it is quoted. And I might aske why Mr. B. did not take notice of him a little before as well as he here doth. But that I frame any Argument at all out of him, much lesse ground that I deliuer vpon his or any other mans authoritie, is vntrue. As for the differences betweene him and me herein by Mr. B. here imagined, they are very silly and friuolous. For first of all, doth not the vse of a thing consist in the circumstances of it, as in the manner of vsing, and the like? Or what doth Calvin meane by the limiting of the vse by those generall rules, but the assigning of it such circumstances as

ⁱ *Somnia enim sunt
hec Democriti op-
tantis, non docentis.*
Cic. Lucull.

I. B.

T. G.

^a Calvin. institut. l.
3. c. 10. §. 1.

^b Nec debere nec
posse conscientias
statu præcisique le-
gum formulis hic
alligari.

^c Necessaria præ-
sentis vite admini-
cula.

^d Calvin. ibid. cap.
19. §. 7.

^e Queris & in
serpente (soliti quod
dicere) nodum. Ex-
ninus apud Fest. Qui
inimicus est, etiam
in serpente nodum qua-
rit. Hieron. ad error.
Joan. Hieron.

those rules giue allowance of. ^a Many, saith he, take for granted, which yet I yeeld them not, that this our liberty is by no qualification to be restrained, but that it is to be left to euery mans conscience, to vsurpe so much of it as to himselfe seemeth lawfull. I confesse indeed that ^b mens consciences neither can nor ought to be tied herein to certaine precise formes of lawes: but since that the Scripture deliuereth generall Rules of the lawfull vse of them, according to those is it to be limited of vs. Where Mr. Calvin saith plainly, that for the vse of ^c the outward necessities of this life, (whereof recreation is one) there can no speciall precise rules be giuen out of Gods word, but it is sufficient for them that we be directed in the vse of them by such generall directions as the same word doth afford; which is all that I say. Yea he extendeth this ^d afterward to the very matter of our meat, drinke and apparell, where he falleth vpon the same point againe.

Yea but Calvin saith, according, and Mr. G. not against. Mr. B. is verie curious, that can ^e finde a knot in a bulrush. If those generall rules be not violated, are they not obserued? if there be nothing done against them, how are they violated? if nothing then be done against them, they are vndoubtedly obserued. It is all one therefore in effect to bee according to them, and not against them; and Mr. B's exception consequently idle.

I. B.

Is the second confirmation from Luk. 9. 50. much better? The words set downe by Mr. G. be these, [Hee that is not against me is with me.] This place (for sooth)

is a Rule holding in the Subject Matter, &c. determined. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against mee, Matth. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subject-matter, &c. determined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not Mr. Gs. conceit be the same touching things or actions? But let us see whether the conceit bee not a be-misted phantasie. In the former place Christs words are occasioned by his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Devils in Christs Name. Forbid him not, saith Christ, for, He that is not against me is with mee. In the latter place Christ spake those words upon occasion of the Pharisees their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions together, this indeed is the summe. All men are either with or against Christ, for there be no Neutrals. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat is a sheepe; and he that is not a sheepe is a goat. But Mr. Gs. argument is this: All men who are not against Christ are with him. Therefore circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawfull. Is this sound arguing?

And where, I pray you, doth Mr. G. argue on this manner? But Mr. B. frameth me Arguments at his pleasure: And then pleaseth himselfe in finding faults in them; as if their defects concerned me, and not rather himselfe, who either must father them, or I know none else that will. For his exposition of those places, to let passe what exception might well be taken thereunto, because it is not to the purpose. It is vnttrue, that I produce them for confirmation of ought that I had before deliuered. I imply onely that the distinction I deliuered (which may be

T.G.

Καὶ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς οἱ ἀ-
παρξαι, ὅτι ὁ ἀπὸ
ἐν τῷ ἀπαρξαι ἀ-
ποκρίνεται ὁ ἀπὸ
τῷ ἀπαρξαι ἀποκρί-
νεται. Plut de Isid & Osi-
rid. Nam quod cum
Vinius Crissus, Ego
vero ista non dico.
Quintil. instit. l. 5.
c. 13.

z Lord of Saint
Albans his confi-
derations.

h Rom. 10. 18.

i Psal. 19. 4.

k *Aliter in suis lo-
cis, aliter in suis
epistolis sonant. Vi-
demus exempla cap-
tiva: servi erant
tibi ad victoriam,
que suis in volumi-
nibus non dimicant.
Hieron. apolog. pro
libr. contr. Iovin.*

l *Two de lais de-
ar de nunc lei x-
p-
quatur Basil. Sel.*

extended also to *things or actions*, as well as their *circumstances*; but my dispute now was of these) might in those two *Rules or Sentences* be not vnfitly conceiued. And the truth is, I had a notion in my head then of somewhat to that purpose, that in a learned & *Noble-mans* writings I had sometime read; which yet because I was not verie certaine of, nor had I the *Booke* by me then, I forbare then to cite. The speeches are alledged as by him, so by me, not in way of *Confirmation*, but by way of *Illustration* and *Allusion*; as if I should haue said, *That rule which in another case our Sauiour giueth, holdeth well here*. A course not vnusuall, in the writings of the learnedst and most religious. I alledge them but as^h the *Apostle* doth thoseⁱ words of the *Psalmist*; *Their sound is gone thorow all the earth, and their words vnto the worlds ends*. Concerning which, I dare not say as *Ierome* doth ouer-boldly on another occasion, that^k the *Texts* alledged by the *Apostle* sound one way in their owne places, and another way in his *allegations of them*: because they are spoken of the^l dumbe creatures publishing Gods glorie in the one place, of the *Apostles* preaching Christs Gospel in the other. They agree well and make good harmonie, since that the *Apostle* only alledgeth them by way of *allusion*, for *illustration* of the matter that there he dealeth in, not by way of *illation* or inference, for the *confirmation* of ought there deliuered, or the concluding of ought from thence. The like doe I here. And Mr. B. may as well frame an *Argument* thus out of the *Apostles* words, The *Psalmist* saith, that the *heauens* preach Gods glory to all the earth: therefore the *Apostles* haue

haue preached to the whole world: as extract such an Argument as he doth here out of my words.

The third Confirmation is from a glosse. Here I remember an old saying, [A cursed glosse corrupteth the Text.] Now let vs see whether Mr. G. haue any blessing by this glosse. The words whereof in English bee these, [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note that it speaketh of things. Therefore it maketh as well for Actions, as for Circumstances. Is this Diuinitie? But what Law? If the ciuill Law, what is that to the point? Except Mr. G. can prone the Ciuill Law to bee a perfect Rule to vs; and whatsoever it permitteth to be allowed of God. Howsoeuer (I say) this course of fetching proofes from any other Law than Gods Law is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth vnwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize Traditions of men, then for one that feareth God to walke in his wayes. Is then this glossing sound arguing?

I. B.

Deut. 10. 12.

T. G.

* *Mera utilitatio,*
uti Cato olim. Plin.
præfat.

† Τί γὰρ καλὸν
ἢ σαρὴν σαρὴν
λέγειν; uti Ari-
stop. & Lucian.
Ioue Trag.

Or rather is all this any more than * *meere cauil-ling*? To let Mr. B's graue notes vpon this Glosse, and his serious inferences vpon the allegation of it passe, wherein hee maketh himselfe ¹ most ridiculous. All this adoe is, because in the *margin* of my Booke (which a Scholler may make vse of) I alledge out of the Glossers of the Ciuill Law, certaine Rules that in their Law concurre some with the one branch, some with the other of the distinction I there vse. It is but as if one handling some point of Diuinitie about lawfull and unlawfull silence should

ⁿ Qui tacet consentire videtur. Bonif. in 6. de reg. iur. c. 43.

^o Is qui tacet, non fatetur: sed neque utique negare videtur. Ibid. c. 44.

^p Affectus tantum puniuntur sicut effectus. Cod. ad leg. Corn. de Siciarijs.

^q Affectus non puniuntur, nisi sequatur effectus. Digest. de Pœnis.

should say, In some cases that *Rule* of the *Canon Law* holdeth, ⁿ *Silence is deemed as consent*: in other cases that other *Rule*, ^o *Silence is held no deniall, and yet no consent neither*: or determining how far forth the *desire* goeth for the *deed*, should say, In this case, that of the *Ciuill Law* holdeth, ^p *The Affection is punished, though it take not effect*: in that case it holdeth not, but that other rather, ^q *The affection is not held faulty, if no effect follow*. Which (forsooth) in Mr. B^s. conceit must needs therefore be one ground of the truth maintained, or else all is nothing worth. But he wanted better matter, it seemeth, to worke vpon.

I. B.

Hath the fourth Confirmation more validitie in it than the rest? The former three proofes speake not directly of Circumstances according to the Proposition; (so doth Mr. G. dispute *ad idem*) here he doth.

T. G.

How should I dispute *ad idem*, where I dispute not at all? And yet are those *ad idem*, for that whereunto they are alledged. But Mr. B. now commeth

* De semita in viam. Plant. Cas 3.5.

* out of the *Margine* into the *Text* againe, wherein himselfe saith I doe dispute to the purpose.

I. B.

Here then I enquire. If the circumstances of Time and Place, be at the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon, that the subiect matter and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessitie there must bee a time and place, when and where it may be done. Euen when and where there is iust occasion of the Act. It is to be obserued,

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ued, that as here, so in the Proposition is selfe Mr. G. slideth from the subiect matter, and manner, to circumstances onely. Is not this fainting?

Or rather is not this fopperie? Mr. G. slideth from the subiect matter and manner to circumstances onely, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning indeed the subiect matter, as Mr. B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words doe not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I ioyned that word with them; Are not the subiect matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and without the essence and substance of those things that they haue reference vnto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amisse, that referre the Place and the Subiect matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a circumstance, I know not what is.

T. G.

But if it be true of these, saith Mr. B. that they are at the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtlesse doth it; what reason can either Mr. B. or any other shew why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more flinted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawfull in it selfe? This is another of Mr. B's. spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to shew his skill in coniuring them downe againe.

** Materia in qua subiectum propriè dicitur adjuncta in se recipiens. Materia circa quam propriè Obiectum dicitur. i. subiectum adjuncta occupans. Dounam. in Ram. Dial. l. i. c. 6. Locus est subiectum rei locatæ. Ram. Dial. l. i. c. 10.*

Yea but Mr. B. can shew you some difference
S
betweene

betweene the one and the other. For, *If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done.* And must there not be *Subiect-matter and manner* too? Or must not a man haue *warrant* as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith Mr. B. for I hope he will not denie that. Well what *warrant* then? *It may be done when, and where there is iust occasion of that act:* and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is iust occasion thereof offered? So that Mr. B. denieth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some *Circumstances*; onely he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are *no Circumstances*. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that *warrant from the word* is required for the one as well and as much as for the other.

r *Aëoz. Salserv,*
1 Cor. 9. 26. *Hodie multi soli adversus aerem pugnant, armis, brachijs exercent se. Drus. proverb. 1. 3. 4.*

But I leaue this his friuolous *beating the aire*: hauing onely obserued, how Mr. B. that was so diligent to hooke in out of the *Margine* whatsoever he thought he might with any the least shew of colour, (though without any iust occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the *Text* it selfe that I presse, concerning the *infinite perplexities*, yea and *impossibilitie*, which by *instances* I shew, of making *particular actions* good, or iustifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue vpon the deniall hereof. Which I desire by the vnpartiall and iudicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for *confirmation*, that he saith I doe, and taketh occasion thereby to deale with, and rather than he will let it passe, he will step aside into the

Margine

Margine to fetch it into the *Text*: what I bring for *confirmation*, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not goe far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.

Let us now proceed to that, which Mr. G. writeth touching both the doing of every *Act*, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the word, if naturall reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearefull shifiting from the word is here? But why doth he ioyne the doing it selfe of an *Act* with the manner thereof? He tell you: euen to make a way to his *Assumption*. For if he sticke close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an *act* it selfe is lawfull in it selfe, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expressly or by iust consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his *Assumption*, that every *Lot* is not lawfull in it selfe. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of naturall reason, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reason either sufficient or insufficient.

I. B.

Mr. B. here beginneth to blesse himselfe; as if indeed some euill *Spirit* had appeared. This belike was the blasphemous matter that hee met with in my Booke. But hee must not thinke with such scar-bugs to carry it away. He hath not

T. G.

Μορμύραι τὰ
παιδεία. Xenoph.
Hellen. l. 4. τὰ
παιδία ἐν τα-
φῇ τῶν φεβή-
ων πῶτον. Chry-
sost. tom. 6. serm. 43.
Persona pueris de-
formis metum facit.
Sen. de constant. sap.
c. 4. Ἀνδρα το-
σούτου δ' ἐχέει ὡς
μορφῆς. Sed quæ
puelli formidant, vi-
dentur iri.
u Verum caveat, ne
dum aliud sinit
notare culpæ, ipse
notetur calumniæ.
Hieron. adv. error.
Ioan. Hieros.

babes and children onely to deale with. His iudi-
cious Readers will not be scared with such out-
cries, from scanning and discussing the things que-
stioned; howsoever some simple, or some partiall
ones may.

Before he commeth to exagitate *the blasphemous
Assertion*, to cast some dust in his *Readers* eyes, and
breed some preiudice of the aduerse party: hee
maketh Mr. G. no better than a *Jugler*, who fore-
seeing the weaknesse of some thing in the *Assump-
tion* or second part of his *Argument*, laboureth
with other by-matter to trouble the *Readers* head be-
fore-hand, that the same may not be discerned. And
this was the cause, (as Mr. B. peremptorily telleth
you, hauing discovered the mist that I cast before
my *Readers* eyes, and knowing my minde herein
much better than I did or doe my selfe) *why I ioy-
ned the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner there-
of*; and *why I tell him of a supposed direction of na-
turall reason*. Hee had need of a long clew, that
treadeth the maze of this wilde and intricate dis-
course. But that it may appeare in a word to the
Reader, how sincerely Mr. B. herein demeaneth
himselſe: What is it in mine *Assumption*, that I
made all this doe about, for feare my Reader should
discover the vnsoundnesse of it? Forsooth that *A
Lot is lawfull in it selfe*. Which *Proposition* (though
none of mine, and yet I denie it not neither) M. B.
to oppose telleth vs (in such language as I thinke no
learned man beside himselſe would vse) that *Enery
Lot is not lawfull in it selfe*. But let that *position*
be found in any part of mine *Assumption*, not as
Mr. B.

Mr. B. frameth it, but as it is in *my Booke*, and I will freely confesse the whole accusation, that to this very end I did it whatsoeuer it was that Mr. B. here saith I did; for I vnderstand not well what it is. If no such thing be in it, with what *Conscience* can Mr. B. say so peremptorily, that I did I know not what to keepe my Reader from discerning that, or the default of that in it, that indeed is not there at all? And thus hauing cleared my selfe from such finister intention, as Mr. B. here chargeth me with, and I not onely had not, but could not haue: let vs proceed now to the *point* it selfe.

But let vs with feare and trembling consider Mr. G's. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction.] Let vs consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is giuen vs, in morall matters to supplie the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction in morall matters from naturall reason, before wee consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times urged thus. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion he haue sufficient direction from naturall reason? Doth the Maxime of Gods Spirit, quoted here by Mr. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sinne,] intimate, that whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall reason is of faith? Became naturall reason onely defectiue,

I. B.

Rom. 14. 23.

Rom. 8.7.

defectiue, and not corrupted also by our first Parents their fall? O God haue mercy vpon vs! For I see that the wisdom of the flesh is enmitie against thee: for it is not subiect to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why doe I vex my soule with this fearefull doctrine, seeing Mr. G's heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For at last he commeth to say: Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authoritie (to wit, Of not abridging vs of the helpe, &c.) giuen to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge vs, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth giue vs leaue to vse the direction of naturall reason in morall matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margent.

T. G.

The strange and fearefull Position, as Mr. B. conceiueth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliuer it my selfe; For the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word.

If the difference betweene these two be demanded; I answer:

First, Mr. B's. Proposition may seeme to imply, that in any Act whatsoever sufficient direction may
by

by naturall Reason be afforded, (which I say not :) in mine onely, that in some kinde and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) Mr. B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater preiudice to that that I hold.

Againe, (wherein the most materiall difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to haue *warrant from Gods word*, (which I denie not but that every action ought to haue) and another thing to haue that *warrant* taken immediatly *out of it*; as shall afterward appeare. So that neither doth Mr. B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor doe I affirme what he here relateth.

Yet for the point, as Mr. B. here propoundeth it, sauing what he would seeme to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the enuie of; the *Proposition* it selfe containeth such an vndeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with common sense, but will acknowledge it. For if *Naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else*; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was euen so with *Adam* in his originall estate. If any truth vndeniable then be fearefull and strange, then this *position* peradventure may be such; but not else.

But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deale not) that *for the doing of euery act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word*. If the question be demanded, why I speake in this manner, I answer, because

because many things in this kinde are so cleare and euident euen to naturall reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may vnanswerably and necessarily be thereby concluded; for which therefore *a man need not further warrant out of the word*; not that *the warrant of Gods word* is in any wise needlesse; but that a man may thereby be well assured, that it hath *warrant in Gods word*. For what is *the word of God for morall things*, but *the perfection of true Reason*, and a *Summe or Body of that Law of Nature* at first imprinted in *mans soule*? So that either it must be held that there are some things in the *Law of God* not agreeable to *Reason*; or else it must needs follow, that ^x *whatsoever* is agreeable to the *rules and grounds of true Reason*, is agreeable likewise to the *Law of God*: since that *true Reason* cannot possibly crosse it selfe, nor swerue or disagree in ought from it selfe. To say therefore that *for the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall Reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word*: it is all one as to say, *In proning of points in controuersie betweene the Papists and vs by Authorities, if a man be not very sure that his memorie faile him not, he must haue recourse to his Bookes*. Which when a man saith, his meaning is not that he may alledge ought that is not in *the Bookes* whence he alledgeth it, but that if the *allegations* be so fresh and so firme in his memory, that he is well assured thereof, he need not make further search into his *Bookes* for it. Or to come neerer home, to say, *In morall things, as well for euery thing that*

x Gratia non destruit naturam, sed eam perficit. Nam subordinata nō pugnant. Nec est contra naturam, sed supra naturam. Etenim Deus est autor omnis boni in natura, siue sit secundum naturam, siue supra naturā. Deus autem sibi ipsi contrarius non est. Proinde nullus fidei articulus est contra rationem. Adeoque quod est Philosophicē verum, etiam verum est Theologicē, & contra: quia verum vero consonat. Alsted. system. Theolog. l. I. c. 3.

that a man doth, as for the manner of doing it, if the
word of God else-where afford not sufficient direction,
there must be warrant had out of the Decalogue.
Which speech should not argue that any action
may be done of vs, that we haue no ground for in
Gods Law: but that if we can finde ground for it
in any other part of Gods word, we may thereby be
sure that it hath vndoubted ground there. To the
Reason that I adioyne taken from the end of the
word, giuen in morall matters to supply the defect
of naturall Reason, &c. Mr. B. answereth nothing
at all; but asketh onely, if it be our best way to seeke
sufficient direction from naturall Reason, before we
consult with God in his word. No. Who saith it?
But yet sometimes naturall Reason affordeth
grounds more readily without seeking, than the word
doth. And it is a certaine truth, that a Reuerend
Diuine hath, that In euery action of common life (yea
in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or ques-
tion is made by any) to finde out some sentence
clearly and infallibly setting before our eyes what we
ought to doe, seeme we in Scripture neuer so expert,
would trouble vs more than we are aware.

Mr. Hooker of
Eccles. Politic, lib.
2. sect. 8.

To reflect vpon our former instance concerning
the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans
actions ought to be grounded vpon it, since that
they are all lawfull or vnlawfull so far forth as they
are either consonant vnto or dissonant from that
that is therein contained. Yet how many actions
are there, the lawfulness whereof may be demon-
strated much more readily from some other, either
proofes of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from
T any

Reade Mr. Perkins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Callings, &c.

any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft doethe ² best and religiousest Divines resolve Cases of Conscience concerning Civill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?

Yea but, saith Mr. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion hee haue sufficient direction from naturall Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it doe not, as it doth not, I might well returne it to Mr. B. and request him to returne an answer to it himselfe. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seeke further for it, saue for the further strengthening of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsly perswaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsly perswaded of sufficient direction either from naturall Reason, or the written word, * hee hath iust cause to looke further, though he be not aware of it.

2 Conscientia siquidem erronea non excusat.

But doth that Maxime, What is not of faith is sin, intimate, that whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from naturall Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor doe I, as Mr. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoever is so done is of faith: because whatsoever is so done, as before was shewed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.

Yea but naturall Reason is not defective onely, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so vtterly defaced that

that there is nothing left of it, that a man can haue any certainty at all of? ^b No Sect of Philosophers was euer held more absurd, than those that held that men had *no certaine knowledge of any thing*. For morall grounds it seemeth Mr. B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be vpheld. For if *naturall reason* be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence concluded concerning the lawfulnessse or vnlawfulnessse of ought, then it is *certaine* that there is *no certaine knowledge of ought* in that kinde; and *nothing is certaine* therein, but that all things are viterly and vniuersally *uncertaine*. That ^c *reuerend Diuine* before mentioned, hath not amisse obserued, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in mens mindes, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of mens lines, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordinarie and ciuill affaires, if this light be suppressed, and men should euer be constrained, though it burnt neuer so clearely, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solempne acceffe still vnto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I adde further; since that the most of mens particular actions, which they must haue ground for being infinite, are not expressly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore haue their warrant by consequences deducted from it, in which

^b Θεοί οἱ Ἀγ-
νομαῖοι, Μάδε-
τε παρ' ἡμεῶν, αἰ-
δρωτοί, ἐν ἑλί-
ει δέχεται μαθη-
ταις ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν ἐν
ἑλίει περὶ τοῦ Διὸς.
Τὰς αἰδέσεις τὰς
αὐτῶν ἀποδοῖν
ἢ ἀποτυλάσκει ἢ
δωῖανται, καὶ τοῦ
τάτο μάλιστα πα-
ταῖν ἐκπεδάκτες.
Ἀνδρῶν τὴ πα-
είς; Αὐτὸς αὐτῶν
ἐξελέγχεις καὶ
ἡμέραν, καὶ ἡμέρας
ἀφείρει τὰ, ἴ-
καὶ τῶν ἐπ-
χειρήματα; Πολύ,
τὴ Δία, μάλλον
τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἐλ-
πίει περὶ αὐ-
ταπεινῶν, ἢ τὸ
ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀπο-
κατωφωμένους καὶ
ἀποτυφλωμέ-
νους, ὅτι οὐδ' αὐ-
τὸς κακῶν. Epictet.
Arian. dissert. l. 2.
c. 20. Oculos hi no-
bis effodiunt. Si
Protagora credim^{us},
nihil in natura re-
rum est nisi dubi-
um. Si Nausiphani,
hoc unum certum
est nihil esse certi.
Non facile dixerim,
utrum magis iras-
car illis, qui nos

nihil scire voluerunt; an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire. Sen. epist. 38.
^c Hooker ecclies. polit. lib. 2. sect. 8.

^d So Mat. 22. 32.

Galat. 3. 15, 17.

1 Cor. 9. 9, 10.

Rom. 4. 3, 4. &

3. 10, 19, 20.

Hebr. 8. 13.

^e So Gal. 3. 11, 12.

Heb. 1. 4, 7, 8, 13,

14.

^f Vise Keckerman,

præcogn. Logic.

tract. 1. & in sy-

stem. Logic. lib. 2.

& 3. passim.

deduction, sometime ^a a naturall principle is ioyned with a testimonie of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though ^c two places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllogisticall forme ioyned together, may truly and infallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is ^f naturall Reason that must iudge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of iudicature from naturall Reason in such cases, and we shall haue no certainty left of the lawfulnessse of ought, that is not in expresse termes comprised in Scripture. I might well adde, that by this Mr. B's manner of reasoning, an vtter vncertainty might be concluded euen of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that doe not exactly vnderstand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Naturall Reason is in part defectiue and corrupted: and therefore it cannot certainly informe vs of ought: This must also of necessitie be allowed for a good Consequence; All Translations of Scripture are in part defectiue and corrupt: therefore nothing can certainly be learned out of them. Yea, Euery mans skill in the Originals is in part defectiue and corrupt; and therefore no man can certainly gather ought thence. Let Mr. B. therefore, who professeth to haue his soule so much vexed with the fearefull doctrine that I here deliuer, take heed lest by that that he here maintaineth, he vex the soule and perplex the conscience of many a scrupulous Christian, and ensnarle them thereby in such inextricable difficulties, as he shall neuer be able with all the skill he hath to vnwinde them out of againe.

But

against Mr. B's. Reply.

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But he findeth me at last *fainting and contradicting my selfe*: and therefore all is now almost well againe. And wherein? Forsooth, because I affirme *that the word doth not abridge vs of the helpe and use of naturall Reason for direction in such Actions.* And how doth this *contradict* (for I thought it had *confirmed*) that which before I had deliuered? Mr. B. will make it cleare vnto you.

For first *when I affirme that the word doth not abridge vs, I doe imply that it might abridge vs, of such helpe.* Is not this thinke you a strange Inference? As if when we say against ^sthe Stoicks, that ^hGrace doth not strip men of humane affections; nor make them stocks and stones; we doe thereby imply, that Grace might strip them of it, and make meere blocks of them: As much to say, as that it might worke against it selfe, and the word worke against that end for which it was giuen. But this is too too senselesse.

Secondly, *therefore our most warrantable way must then be to be well informed, when and how far the word giueth vs leaue to use it.* How followeth this vpon ought that I say, vnlesse this be a good consequence, Gods word doth not abridge vs; Therefore it is the best way to be well informed, when and how far it doth. But to omit, that to say, that *It is the warrantablest course to be well informed when and how far forth Gods word in matters concerning the Law of Nature, (for the ¹ Morall Law is no other) giueth vs liberty to make use of true reason:* Is as much as to say, that it is the warrantablest way to be well informed how far forth Gods word warranteth vs to use

^s Act. 17. 18.

^h Affectus gratia moderatur, non auferit. Stultique erant Stoici, qui in eo toti erant, ut affectus omnes perimerent. Pet. Martyr in 2. Sam. 13. Faceſſat ergo inhumana illa philosophia, que obtinere non potest, nisi hominem sensibus omnibus spoliatum in stuporem redegerit. Calvin. in ſu. l. 3. c. 10. Quia et tunc illa ubi nullus animu tangit affectus, stuporem immanem, qui nullo prorsus erigatur & excitetur, nullo ſecutatur atque inclinatur affectu, non omnibus vitijs iudicet esse peiorem? Aug. de ciuit. l. 14. c. 9.

ⁱ Rom. 2. 14, 15.

Logick in scanning of morall matters, or how farre forth it giueth vs leaue to be reasonable creatures. Let Mr. B. haue what he would: what followeth here-upon? Why? If that be so, then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, thinke we? Marke the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not vpon ought that I say :) It is the best way for vs to know how the word giueth liberty to vse this direction. Therefore there is no vse of it for direction at all in this kinde. Nay rather, therefore there is some vse euen in this kinde of it; or else to what end is it to labour to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Iudge, Reader.

But that which best is, Mr. B. hereby taketh occasion to ouer-slip whatsoever my *margin* here affordeth for the *confirmation* of mine opinion in this *Point*. How fitly, you shall see, if you obserue how it followeth. Mr. G. saith, *The word abbridgeth vs not of direction hereby: therefore it may abridge: and therefore it is best to be informed how it abridgeth: and therefore Mr. G's doctrine is contradicted: and therefore I need answer none of his Arguments.* Here are strange *Ergoes*. But where one hath no list to doe a thing, a small matter will serue to with-hold him. Mr. B. that was a little before so curious in this *Argument* to pull in by head and eares euery *marginall note*, though containing no matter of *prooffe*, and drawne out of the *Cinill Code*; is easily induced here to let passe the *marginall quotations*, where they containe matter of *confirmation*, though extracted out of *holy writ*. But yet by his leaue,
thou

thou shalt haue them; and iudge when thou hast them, whether Mr. B. had need to haue answered them or no.

First then, for the *Point* it selfe that I here hold; it is neither *new* nor *strange*. It is all one, saith^k Tertullian, whether a point be proued by Scripture or by Reason: thereby implying that what was allowable by the one, was warrantable also by the other.

^k Tertull. de coron. milit.

Secondly, for the *prooffe* of it, we haue it both from the *practise* and the *doctrine* of the Apostle Paul. First for his *practise*; ¹ The Apostle, saith Tertullian, appealeth vnto Nature. ^m Doth not Nature, saith he, teach you? speaking of some comely and vncomely habits: as^{*} by Nature both the comeliness, and consequently the warrantableness of the one being iustified; and the vncomeliness, and consequently also the unwarrantableness of the other by the same also sufficiently detected. And againe, pleading to the *Corinthians* for the maintenance of the Ministerie, ⁿ he vseth reasons drawne from the light of naturall reason in the first place; which yet it seemeth Mr. B. would controll him for, if any other should now doe.

¹ Idem de virg. vel. l. i.

^m 1 Cor. II. 13, 14.

^{*} Τα ὅς τε αὐτὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει αἰσθητὰ. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 26.

ⁿ 1 Cor. 9. 7, 8.

Againe, Nature it selfe, saith^o Tertullian, is in stead of the Law to those that are ignorant of it.

^o Tertull. adv. Marc. l. b. 5.

^p When the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, which haue not the Law, yet doe by Nature the things contained in the Law, they hauing not the Law are a Law to themselves. Which shew the effect of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witness, and their cogitations^q interchangeably excusing and accusing. And surely, if the Law of Nature written in mans heart

^p Rom. 2. 14, 15.

^q μετὰ ἑαυτὸν ἀλλήλων ἀντιθέμενοι. Vet. Inter sese. Quomodo Virg. Illi inter sese multa vi brachia tollunt. P. scit.

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

Logick in scanning of morall matters, or how farre forth it giueth vs leaue to be reasonable creatures. Let Mr. B. haue what he would: what followeth hereupon? Why? If that be so, then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, thinke we? Marke the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not vpon ought that I say :) it is the best way for vs to know how the word giueth liberty to vse this direction. Therefore there is no vse of it for direction at all in this kinde. Nay rather, therefore there is some vse euen in this kinde of it; or else to what end is it to labour to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Iudge, Reader.

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¹ Idem de virg. velud.

^m 1 Cor. II. 13, 14.

^{*} Ταυτα νομιμα εστι βασιλειαν ανθρωπων. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 26.

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^p Rom. 2. 14, 15.

^q utraque alterna. Vel. Inter sese. Quomodo Virg. Illi inter sese multa vi brachia tollunt. P. stat.

heart be the very same so far forth as it is yet vndefaced, with the *Law of God reuealed in the word*: Then whatsoeuer by *iust consequence of Reason* may be deduced from the grounds yet in *Nature* remaining of the one, may be certainly knowne to be agreeable also vnto the other.

And thus we haue at length got out of this intricate *Labyrinth* which Mr. B. hath drawne or rather withdrawne vs into. If the *Point* were so perilous, as he here pretendeth, and it vexed his soule in such manner as he here professeth, it had beene a charitable worke, I deeme, both to me and himselfe, to haue let me seene it before this, especially so instantly requiring the same, and so to haue freed his soule sooner from this grieuous vexation. But for the *Point* it selfe; ^r I adore, with *Tertullian*, the plenitude of Gods word, as much as Mr. B. or any other man doth. I acknowledge it with *Chrysostome*, and *Augustine*, to be ^r a most perfect and absolute Rule, ^r containing in it all things necessarie vnto faith and good life. I should grieue at the heart to haue vttered the least tittle that should tend to the derogation either of it, or ought in it. If ^a I may be shewed that I haue so done in ought, I will readily recant it. Concerning this *Point* in particular, (besides those that viewed the whole worke, & aduertised me what they wished to haue altered, which was not much, nor materiall) I had conference with ^a one not vnknowne to Mr. B. whom I haue before named in this Booke, as iudicious and as precise in his iudgement as the most; who not only concurred with me in it, making no doubt at all of it; but withall told

^r Adoro Scripturæ plenitudinem. Tertull. adv. Hermogē.

^r Ἀρξὶς ἐστὶν αἰνίου προτύπου καὶ κανόνος. Chrysost. in 2 Cor. bom. 13.

^r In his quæ aperte posita sunt in Scriptura inueniuntur illa omnia, quæ continent fidem morisque vivendi. Aug. de doct. Christ. l. 2. c. 9.

^a Reprehenses enim non audio; sequor magistros. Hieron. apolog. protib. in Iovin.

^x Mr. W. Bradshaw.

told how he was oft troubled to satisfie some in their *Cases* propounded vnto him, though he gaue them neuer so good reason for his resolution, because they would not therewith be satisfied, vnlesse he could produce some *place of Scripture* for euery particular. But let the wise and learned iudge: and if I may from them be informed that I haue herein erred, I will say as he did, *⁊ Erre I may, but an Heretike I will not be*; I will not be obstinate in mine error; I will retract it: which I may well, without the least preiudice to the *maine matter in Question*, which it nothing concerneth, and will stand therefore well enough without it. But *returne we to our taske.

⁊ Errare possum,
Hereticus esse
nolo.

* Ad pensum rede-
amus. Cic. de Orat.
l. 3.

So then I proceed to the *Assumption of the maine Argument*. In the former part whereof it is to be denied (as was said before) that euery *Lot* is a thing lawfull in it selfe. For as a *Diuinatorie* by him, Cap. 11. so a *lusorious Lot* by me and others is denied to be a thing lawfull in it selfe.

I. B.

To passe by the strange manner of speech, that *Euery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe*: which I suppose none but Mr. B. will vse. That a *Lot is a thing of it selfe indifferent*, and consequently lawfull in it selfe, was before shewed. But I haue nothing hereto say to it: for in mine *Assumption* there is no mention of it. Mr. B. must answer, if he will, for his owne *Argument*.

T. G.

More clearly to answer the other part. It is to be
V observed,

I. B.

Acts 15. 24.

observed, that in this large Argument, it cannot be gathered what Mr. G. meaneth by Subiect Matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, p. 230. I understand, hee meaneth the matter whereabout the Lottery is employed. If so, I affirme that the subiect matter of a Lot is determined by God, namely, A controversie to be ended thereby: and therefore I also affirme, lusurious businesse (to use Mr. G's owne word, p. 130.) to be a subiect matter of a Lot, no lesse against the generall Rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Ionas in Mr. G's iudgement, p. 278. If then a lusurious Lot be not a thing lawfull in it selfe, and if Lusurious businesse be a subiect matter of a Lot, that is against the generall Rules, then how can the manner and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the use of a lusurious Lot.

T. G.

Not to say, how fitly the place of Scripture in the Margine is here applied. For the simple Reader, if a man should stand to explaine euery Schoole terme, that, in such discourses and disputes as this, we are inforced oft to vse, it would be a very tedious taske both to Writer and Reader. Nor doth Mr. B. himselfe obserue that Rule that he would tie others to: For doth he not oft speake of *maior, minor, proposition, assumption, mood and figure; Sub. pr. a, prima, &c.* neuer informing his Reader what thereby is meant. But is it possible that so learned a man as Mr. B. should not vnderstand what so familiar and ordinary a Logicall terme as the Subiect Matter is, meaneth? But it is yet more strange that Mr. B. should

should not vnderstand what himselfe saith. For this *Assumption* he speaketh of, is not mine but his owne: nor doe I here speake any one word of the *Subiect Matter of Lottery*: it is himselfe onely that doth it. Which *Subiect Matter* whether it be, as he saith, *determined* to be such as he here saith, shall in his due place appeare. No more for the present, but that this *Assumption* I owne not, and therefore need take no care for it, whether it fall or stand, so far forth as it commeth here in question.

Let vs try the force of the *Assumptions* confirmation. It is true, that *Recreation* in generall, indefinitely vnderstood, is warranted by Gods Word. But I beleene Mr. G. will not affirm all recreations taken vp by men to be so warranted. Yes, (saith Mr. G.) we may recreate our selues with any thing, that is not against the generall rules; because touching things wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

I. B.

That which indeed was mine *Assumption*, Mr. B. hath now at length by good hap light vpon. But knowing not well how to bring it otherwise in, he maketh it the *Confirmation* of mine *Assumption*, that is the confirmation of it selfe. Or rather, according to Mr. B. *analysis* and resolution of mine *Argument*, (which was not yet so hard to be brought into forme) the *confirmation* not of mine, but of his owne *Assumption*: and so the *Argument* should thus stand;

T. G.

Defence of Mr. G'. Arguments,

Recreation in generall is warranted, and in particular manner of it prescribed, &c.

Therefore a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter and manner &c. are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules.

You need not marvel why Mr. B. denieth not this Consequence, albeit it be most senselesse. For if he should, he knoweth not any that would undertake to defend it, but turne it home to him the true father indeed of it.

But as he dealeth with me for mine Arguments; so he doth the like with his owne inferences. He doth not beleave, he saith, that I will defend all recreations taken up by men to be warrantable. And yet as controlling himselfe herein, he saith, Yes. What is that but as much as, he doth? Now how prooveth hee this grosse Calumnie? Thus forsooth, Mr. G. saith, we may recreate our selves with any thing that is not against the generall Rules. And doth he that saith so, defend that All recreations taken up by men are allowable? This is* so palpable, that a man though starke blinde, yet might feelee it with fingers.

* Καὶ πρὸς ἡ-
λδρ. Plato de rep.
l. 8. & Euseb. adv.
Hierocl. Vel caco
appareat. Liv. hist.
l. 31.

I. B.

Of this evasion, [Not against] I need not speake at this instant.

T. G.

No: we have had more than enough of it already too oft.

I. B.

But touching things not determined, so much inculcated,

red, I aske whether things must be determined particularly, or by name, or else if not so forbidden, they are lawfull. If so, why doth Mr. G. (speaking of diners particulars) as of a Key and a Booke, of a paire of sheeres, and a siene, and such like, so earnestly aske, Are they any where found revealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind than here, arguing thus: Not found there commanded or permitted; therefore unlawfull. If it be said, not so found there, to find out a thiefe. I then say, Neither are Lots so found there for recreation.

What I mean by determined, may easily appear by the instances given of ^a the Pascheover tied to a certaine time, and the ^b sacrifices restrained to some one certaine place; to wit, stinted to some one or more particular matter, manner, time, place, &c. as on the other side, by not determined, such as are left free without such speciall restraint, as the free-will offerings, wives, &c.

^a Exod. 12. 6.

^b Deut. 12. 8, 9.

For the Objection here brought, we had it once before, and there it was answered. Neither doth Mr. B. cite my words there vfed sincerely, but as he is want. And the place it selfe, had he not clipt the tongue of it, would without further helpe have afforded him an answer: to wit, that such Lots determinatorie must have some speciall institution, because that is required of them, which by no naturall power that either is in them, or man can adde to them, they are able to effect. Let Mr. B. prooue as much by the sporting Lot; and there an end.

T. G.

I. B.

But if, by not determined, he means, Things where-

with we may recreate, are not determined in the Word, either expressly, or by iust consequence, then, whosoever saith so, if he be wise, will adde [so far as I doe remember and know.] For who can remember all the sentences of holy Scriptures, and know all iust Consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde, then his Negation is of no validity; but he himselfe is too bold in denying, upon presumption, that another remembreth and knoweth no more than he.

T.G.

Here Mr. B. thinketh he hath got me on the hip. And either he will condemne me of great presumption and want of much wisdom, or else overthrow the maine strength of mine Argument. That concerning recreation therefore there are no speciall rules prescribed in Scripture, whereby it is stinced to this or that particular matter, and is therefore (as from Calvin before was well and truly affirmed) to be directed by the generals; it that which I affirme, and Peter Martyr with me; as by my Margine (which Mr. B. had no list, it seemeth, to take notice of) may appeare.

^a Quinque spuria illa Sacramenta cum omnibus suis ritibus & ceremonijs, sine verbo Dei addita. Confess. Scotie. Verbo Dei destituti. Calvin. instit. l. 4. c. 19. §. 3.

^b Per Scripturam sanctam convinci non potest Petrum fuisse Romanum Episcopum, aut unquam Rome fuisse. Mart. Patav. defens. pac. part. 2. c. 10.

Yea but no man without presumption, saith Mr. B. may so affirme, vnlesse he put in this exception, so far as I know or I remember: Besides that Peter Martyr then was too presumptuous in this very particular: Our Divines that deale with the Papists are very far ouer-seene; with whom these assertions are so frequent and vsuall, ^a That Matrimonie is a Sacrament, there is no Scripture for it; That Penance, or Orders, or extreame Vnction, is a Sacrament, cannot out of Gods word be proued: ^b That Peter was euer at

Rome,

Rome, or was Bishop there, or that he had a superiority of power and authoritie above the rest of the Apostles; or that the Pope succeedeth him either in his seate or in such right, cannot be made good out of Gods word. And againe, for a man to repaire to the Sacrament unshrinen; to eat flesh in Lent, &c. are not against any word of God. Yea this is a generall plea with them against most of the Popish superstitions,^d that there is no ground for them in Gods word. Whereas if they had consulted with Mr. B. before-hand, they should haue beene better aduised, and haue added alwaies this exception; So far as I know or remember: and so giuen their Aduersaries iust cause to haue laught at them for their labour. Where obserue we withall, what aduantage Mr. B. here giueth to the Aduersarie, when he shall be pressed with ought in this kinde. For tell we one of them, that for a man to refuse Shrist is not against ought in Gods word: After aduice had with Mr. B. hee may soone shape you an answer, that you are very presumptuous so to say: for can you, or any man else, remember all the sentences in Scripture, or know all in it consequences that may be made from them? Which if it be a sound and sufficient answer, surely for many points of Popery, as some of their new Sacraments, &c. we must lay our hands vpon our mouthes, and let them alone with them, for ought that I see. As if the Scripture were so waste and diffused a peece of worke, that a man could not without he had such an infinite memorie and an vniuersall understanding, tell what were of some particular subjects deliuered in each part of it. Yea what a miserable perplexitie doth

Mr. B.

^c No place of Scripture can be shewed, where Christ or his Apostles hath bound vs to it. *White way to Church, digress.*

33. *Non est Dei verbo prescriptum.* Calvin. *inst. lib. 3. c. 4. §. 8. Non habet Scripture testimonium.* *Ex Scriptura probari non potest.* Chemnit. *exam. Conc. Trid. part. 2.*

^d The most and greatest points of their religion, euen well nigh all wherein they dissent from vs, haue no foundation in the Scriptures. *White ibid. sect. 5. num. 8.*

Mr. B. by this meanes plung *Christian mens Consci-
ences* into, the more scrupulous sort especially, when
for particular *ciuill actions of ordinarie vse*, their
scrupulous hearts causlesly mouing doubt of them,
hauiug searched to and fro in *Gods Booke*, though
they can finde nothing at all that may controll
them in the vse of them, yet they shall still be per-
plexed, because Mr. B. hath here informed them, that
there may yet be somewhat in Gods word against
them, neither can they, doe they what they can,
haue any assurance of the contrary, vnlesse they had
such *memories and understandings* as Mr. B. here
speaketh of? I cannot here passe by a passage of
Mr. Caluins concerning such scruples; * *These and
the like*, saith he, *some frivolous trifles: but there is
more in them than men are commonly aware of. For
when mens Consciencies are once in this manner ensna-
red, they enter into a long and an intricate Labyrinth,
fram whence it is no easie matter to get out againe.*
† *If a man shall begin to doubt, whether he may vse
flax, or linnen made thereof, in his sheets, shires, hand-
kerchefts, towels, table-napkins, &c. he will not long af-
ter haue the like scruple of hempes, and after that of
towe too. And he will begin to thinke whether he
may not dine and sup without any Table-cloth or nap-
kins at all: and so consequently whether he may
vse them or no, when he may well enough be with-
out. Yea^s at length, saith he, you shall haue a man
come to that passe, that he will thinke it a sinne (as we
say) to stride over a straw. Such height of supersti-
tion men grow vnto, when way is giuen to such
frivolous scruples, which yet Mr. B. here ministrech
much*

* Calvinus lib. 1.3.
c. 19. § 7.

† Si dubitare cepe-
rit, an lino mi li-
ceat, nec de cannabe
postea securus erit,
tandem et de stupis
incidet dubitatio.

‡ Denique eo veni-
et, ut super trans-
versam, quod dici-
tur, festucam ince-
dere nefas ducat.

much matter vnto. For suppose we one of these scrupulous Christians, yea or any other, should re-
paire to Mr. B. and moue this as a doubt to him,
whether it be lawfull for him to weare band and
cuffs either of cambricke or holland, and Mr. B. hauing
affirmed that it is, he should demand of him, what
warrant out of Gods word he could furnish him with
for it. Answer him this way, that Apparell in gene-
rall is inioyned, and for the master of it there is no
speciall direction of restraint giuen in the word, and
therefore liberty left for any that is not against the
generall Rules in the word, of decencie, modestie, fru-
galitie, &c. resolving him of such as doubt or que-
stion may be moued of: and it is not vnlikely but
you may giue him good satisfaction therein. Where-
as goe Mr. B^s. way and tell him, that though appa-
rell it selfe be allowed, yet whether the matter of it
be determined or no, neither he nor any man can say,
vnlesse he had all the Bible, and whatsoever is contained
in it, or may be deduced from it, in his head: I suppose
you will be so far from giuing him any good satis-
faction, that you will leaue him more perplexed
than you found him at first. I propound somewhat
of this kinde in pursuit of mine Argument, which
Mr. B. misdoubting he might run a ground there,
silly faileth by, and not so much as once takerh no-
tice of. Either he medleth with the Conclusion, and
passeth by the premises: Or hee frameth me such
matter of confirmation as hee pleaseth, and letteth
passe that that I propound. I demand then, rubbing
vp Mr. B^s. memorie a little, as before in my Booke,
what other prooffe can be brought for the iustifying

of Bowles or Chesse-play, than such as is here propounded, which it behoued him to haue answered if he knew any better, considering that the *instance* was of much more moment for the clearing and confirming of this *branch* of mine *Assumption*, than many things that it hath pleased him to be piddling withall.

For the thing it selfe: First, it is well knowne, that for many *Heads*, or *Common places*, what is found in the word may soone be laid all together, as for *games*, for *markets*, for *marriage-feasts*, for *Lots*, and the like: by consideration whereof a man may oft be informed what is in *Gods word* either for or against them. Secondly, such things as require a *speciall Institution*, (and of this kinde must a *Lot* be, if it be a *diuine Oracle*, and an *immediate iudgement and sentence of God*, as Mr. B. pretendeth that it is) the matter is much more obuious. *Speciall Institutions* in the word are as *starres of the chiefe magnitude*, so eminent and conspicuous, that they cannot easily lie hid, nor need ouer-much search, and a man may boldly say therefore of such and such things, that there is *no speciall institution of them in the word*. Thirdly, for *morall matters*, wee may draw to a neerer scantling than the *bodie* of the *whole Bible*; ^h the *Summe of all* is comprised in the *Decalogue*, and whatsoeuer a man is sure to be against none of those ⁱ *ten Words*, or to come yet to a narrower compasse, against neither ^k *Piety*, nor *Charitie*, the *Summe of the* ^l *two Tables*, hee may surely know not to be against ^m *any part of Gods word*, and consequently to haue nothing in *Gods word*

^a Exod. 20.
Dent. 5.

¹ Exod 34.28.
Dent. 10. 4.

^k Dent. 6. 5.
Leuit. 19. 18.

Luk. 10. 27, 28.

^l Exod. 24. 12. &
31. 18.

^m Matth. 22. 37,
38, 39, 40.

Mark. 10. 30, 31,
32, 33, 34.

word against it, though hee haue not such a vaste capacitie of *understanding or memory*, as Mr. B. here requireth. But consider the whilst what an utter vncertaintie and irresolution in this kinde Mr. B. driueth vs hereunto: For by his grounds a man may not safely say, that *There is nothing against wearing of an Hat in Gods word*; vnlesse he know all consequences that may be deduced from *this Sentence of Scripture*, ° *In the beginning God made Heauen and Earth*. For if he must needs know so much of all, that may safely say so of ought, then of that in particular, that being one of those all.

° *Gen. I. I.*

° *Gen. I. I.*

At last let vs religiously consider the generall Rules so oft spoken of, and we shall finde, that Mr. G. should haue done well not to haue pleased Libertines by pleading Not against, but to haue given the word due honour by saying with Mr. Calvin. [*The vse of things is to be limited according to the generall rules.*] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vse of things not vndecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted, that in 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Paul saith not, *All things are lawfull, but some things are inexpedient*; but in both places thus; *All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient*.

I. B.

Of this distinction we heard before, and answer thereunto was there giuen. Yet lest I seeme to passe by so graue and serious obseruations with silence,

T. G.

First, if those rules require more than not vndecent,

cent, not inexpedient, &c. then whatsoever is not more than so, is against those rules, and is no more by Mr. G. allowed than by Mr. B. himselfe, for ought that Mr. G. here saith: which Mr. B. also might soone see, if he knew what he would haue. And therefore his, *It is to be noted*, might very well haue been spared, for any hurt it doth Mr. G. cause, if that be all that it proue.

Againe, though this might suffice to keepe Mr. B. exception from fasting on ought that I say: Yet let vs see of what weight his *annotation* here is. The Apostle saith not, *Some things are inexpedient*, but, *all things are not expedient*. Why? what difference is there in the Apostles meaning here betweene these two? Heare we the exposition of ^a as acute and iudicious a writer as the most of those that these times of ours haue afforded vs, though one that liued in much obscuritie; ^b on the former place of the Apostle he thus paraphraseth his words, *If we Christians ought to be so carefull in cherishing and improving piety, ^c that we deeme our selues restrained euen from the lawfull use of things that hurt or hinder piety, how much ought we to abstaine from things of their owne nature and euery way vnlawfull. ^d On the other place yet more plainly: But all things are not expedient: ^e that is, but the use of some things is sometimes incommodious and harmfull to a Christian man, in that that concerneth the defence and increase of his faith and piety, and the furtherance of his eternall safety. For it is not to be expected from earthly things, of which the Apostle principally here speaketh, such as are meat and drinke, that they should directly further*

^a Th. Morton. è Coll. Christi Cantabrig.

^b In I Cor. 6. 12.

^c *Ut vel à licito rerum usu pietati officiente abstinendum putemus.*

^d In I Cor. 10. 23.

^e *i. at quarundam rerum usus interdum incommodus & noxius est.*

our salvation: it is enough if they be not an impediment thereto. And againe afterward: ^f That doth not edifie; that is, is an hinderance to our brothers faith, piety, and safety. As for decencie and indecencie; piety and impiety, in actions capable of either, M^r. B. may as soone ^g divide the point of a Spanish needle, as assigne any medium betweene the one and the other. Meane while M^r. B. hath set a new snare here to intangle and snarle scrupulous Consciences in. For though no indecency can be discovered in some kinde of attire, yet if they ^h heare M^r. B. they shall hang, vpon this new conceit of his, still in suspence, whether it may be auowed to be decent or no. I might adde, that with much difficultie and no little ado they must haue it proued to them by some sentence of Scripture, (which I would faine heare M^r. B. performe) for no reason will serue else, that it is so.

Let vs consider these rules yet somewhat more neerely to the point. Touching the first: The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly; and by order.] In which is no intimation that all things are in themselves lawfull to be done, which are done honestly and by order: but a charge, that all things, be they in themselves neuer so lawfull, be done honestly and by order. Those drinke offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths, perantiphrasin, are solemnized sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, alwaies with putting off hats, and some speech more or lesse: are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, then

^f Quod non edificat. i. quod fratrum fidei, pietati, & saluti impedimento est.

^g Τὸ ἀτομά τιμω. Infecabilia secare.

^h Et Magis audiendum quam auscultandum censeo: Vnde de Aristolis Patro. Chryse. apud Cic. de divin. l. i. de Pharmacopolis Catu in Caelium apud Gell. noct. Attic. l. i. c. 15.

I. B.

be Lots and the users of them in gaming neuer so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore iustified.

T. G.

i Kal ἡμέτερον τὸ
καὶ παροῦν,
Αἱμα ἀπὸ τῆς οἰ
δ' ἀπὸ τῆς οἰ
φαι. Plut. ἀπὸ τῆς οἰ
λαοῦ. vel quod Ru-
fino Hieron. Manū
posceris, & pedem
porrigis. Vel Aca-
démico Domino si
serviret, facturum
quod se Epictetus
profitetur, Βάλε
ἐλαον. Ἐξάγον αὖ
γὰρ. Δὲς ὡς δὲ
ἡμεῖς αὖ. Ἡμεῖς
αὖ αὐτῷ ἡμῖς
παροῦν. ὁξυα-
ρη. Arian. dissert.
l. 2. c. 20.

Mr. B. taske is to instance if he meane to doe ought, against what generall Rule of Gods word a lufurious Lot is; for that is the issue that we now are at. But in stead thereof Mr. B. telleth vs that that no man denies, that if it be in it selfe vnlawfull, it is not the more iustificable, because it is not against this first rule of order. And what is this to the purpose? Iⁱ aske for a pickaxe, and Mr. B. reacheth me a spade. This is mine Argument, Game in generall being allowed, and no particular matter or manner of it prescribed, any is lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: But Lottery is such, to wit, not against any generall Rule of Gods word: therefore Lottery is lawfull. That it is of it selfe lawfull is the Conclusion; that it is not against any generall rule of Gods word is the Assumption. Mr. B. denieth the Conclusion; saith it is vnlawfull; and that it cannot be made lawfull, though it be not against some one such Rule. What manner of answering call we this, wherein nothing is denied or answered to, but that that indeed ought neuer to be denied?

I. B.

Touching the second Rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edifie, 1 Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sinne who stumble or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weake, Rom. 14. 13, 21. But lufurious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie, and therefore are not expedient.

Here

Here Mr. B. speaketh somewhat to the purpose indeed, if his *Answer* could be made good. For he saith, that a *lusurious Lot* is against this second Rule. But how proueth he it? Because *lusurious Lots* occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and grow weake in goodnesse. What doth euery *Lot* vsed in game doe so? Make that good and take all. Let Mr. B. proue, that euery *Lot* vsed in game, as for example sake, euery shuffling of arrowes, or choise of pawnes hid in the hand to decide leading, or euery game that children play at, even and odde, heads and points, &c. doth occasion thousands, or some one at least or other to fall into sinne, or grow weake in goodnesse, and I will yeeld all *lusurious Lots* to be vnlawfull. If he cannot, he must no more condemne all *lusurious Lots*, because where they are abused they produce such effects, then all use of boules for disport in generall, because bouling abused doth altogether as much.

Concerning the third Rule, Let all things be done to Gods glory, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Is this to Gods glory, to use his Name in any other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then to take that Name in vaine? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a *Lot* is to use Gods name in another case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed; and then also to take that Name in vaine: and it is a grieuous tempting of God, as shall be proued. Therefore playing with a *Lot* is not to Gods glory, and by consequence not agreeable to religion and piety.

This is, to vse Mr. B's terms, the kill-cow indeed.

But

I. B.

T. G.

** Nihil dicitur fu-
isse factum, quam-
diu aliquid agendi
superest. Reg. Jur.*

But all that here a *sporting Lot* is charged with, is yet to be proved. It shall be, Mr. B. saith. In good time; but till then ** nothing* is done. Nor is it true that Mr. B. saith in the next words, vnlesse what shall be done, be done already.

I. B.

Though it be sufficiently proved that lascivious Lots are directly against two of the generall Rules; and not warranted by the third: So that Mr. G. hath not bettered his cause by appealing to them.

T. G.

*1 Αὐτὸς δὲ ἡ μὴ-
εὐδοκίαν ἐστὶν ἔξα-
νν. Aristoph. thes-
mophor.*

How sufficiently M. B. hath proved this, what- soeuer he will doe; I haue shewed: ¹ Nor is my cause yet any thing hereby impeached, vntill more be brought against it, than as yet is.

I. B.

Yet it is to be observed, that all the Rules require Things and Actions to be according to them. But Mr. G. by onely speaking of them, would iustifie circumstances, and meanes of playing with Lots, if (forsooth) they be not against them.

T. G.

Of that frivolous exception, and distinction of according to them, and not against them, enough already hath beene said.

For the rest here objected, that by onely speaking of them, I would iustifie circumstances and meanes of playing with Lots, if they be not against them, albeit neither I, nor any man else, I beleene, besides Mr. B. him selfe, vnderstandeth well what it meaneth: yet to cleare my selfe from such aspersiō, as it may seeme to cast on me; I will briefly relate the summe
of

of mine Argument reduced into due forme. Thus then it standeth :

Any meanes or manner of recreation that is not against the generall Rules of Gods word, these and the like, is allowable.

Lottery is such a meanes of recreation as is not against any of the generall rules of Gods word, these or the like.

Lottery therefore is a meanes of recreation allowable.

The Proposition I thus proued :

Where a thing is allowed, and the meanes, manner, and other circumstances are not in particular determined; there is any meanes or manner of it allowed that is not against those generals. But such is recreation: for it is allowed in generall, nor are the meanes, and manner, and other circumstances of it determined in particular.

Any meanes or manner of it therefore is allowed that is not against the generall rules of Gods word.

In explication of the first Proposition, I relate those Rules: For confirmation of the Assumption, I require to be nominated, against what generall rule Lottery used in game doth offend. Now let Mr. B. shew which way herein I offend.

Thus hauing evidently shewed the Reasons inducing (not drawing) Mr. G. to allow lusurious Lots, to be both fearefull; as these euasine speeches, [Not euill in themselves] [Not prohibited] [Not determined] and [Not against the generall Rules] doe import; and otherwise unsound; I will (with Gods helpe

I. B.

Defence of Mr. G's Arguments,

helpe I hope) reply upon Mr. G's answers to mine Arguments against playing with Lots contained in my Dialogue.

T. G.

m Dextra sinistram
meliorem & gladio
scutum habere dice-
bantur, qui sua me-
lius defenderent,
quàm aliena im-
pugnarent.

n Autor laudat
opus. Ovid. de Pont.
l. 3. el. 9. Quidni?

Scruta quidem ut vendat scrutarius laudat. Lucill. apud Gell. l. 3. c. 13. Sed & suum cuique
pulchrum. Cic. Tusc. l. 5. Πᾶς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ· καὶ ἡδονὰς πῶτον οἱ ποιεῖται τὰ
οἰκεῖα πρῶτα, ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν αἰσθητικῶν. Aristot. ethic. l. 9. c. 7.

How well Mr. B. hath quit himselfe in this his
opposition, there will no doubt, I see, be made, if
he may be his owne Iudge. But if his *m* left hand
steed him no better than his *right*, nor his *shield* doe
him more pleasure than his *sword* hath, I doubt
much whether his Reader will receiue from him
any good satisfaction, howsoever he may therein
please and sooth vp himselfe. As there is seldome
n any workman but liketh well of his owne worke.

THE THIRD PART.

Mr. BALMFORDS

Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vpon Chance,
taken out of his Dialogue.

Together with

Mr. GATAKERS Answer to them
in his Booke of the Nature and Vse
of LOTS.

As also

Mr. B^s. Reply in defence of them : and
Mr. G^s. Reioinder thereunto.

The first Argument.

WHas soeuer directly, or of it selfe, or
in a speciall manner tendeth to the
aduancing of Gods name is to be vsed
religiouslyⁿ, and not to be vsed in
sport; as we may not pray or sweare
in sport : ° But the vse of Lots directly, or of it
selfe and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing
of the name of God in attributing to his speciall Pro-
vidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the
Lot, and expecting the enent P.

Therefore the vse of Lots is not to be in sports.

I. B.
Dialog. Arg.

I.
ⁿ Mala. 1. 6, 7.

° Exod. 20. 7.
Esa. 29. 13.
Ierem. 4. 2.

P Prov. 16. 33.
Aeth. 1. 24, 26.

T. G.

Answer.
Of Lots, chap.
7. Sect. 5.

f Prov. 16. 33.

g Act. 1. 24, 26.

h Vise Hieron. sup.
S. 4. Sic & Greg.
in Ezech. homil. 4.
Aliud est quod de
doctrina usu atque
discipline dicimus,
aliud quod de mira-
culo scimus.

i Josh. 7. 16, 17, 18.

k Ion. 1. 7.

l 1 Sam. 10. 20, 21.

m Act. 1. 23, 24,
25, 26.

I answer: The Assumption is not true if it be vn-
derstood vniuersally: it concludeth nothing to the
Question if it be taken particularly.

The prooffe annexed to it scarce carrieth good
sense: the Printer, it may be, is in fault. But if the
meaning of the Author be, as I conceiue it, (for I
must in part goe by guesse) that *the disposition of eue-
ry Lot is wholly attributed to, and the event wholly ex-
pected from the speciall and immediate Prouidence of
God*; I denie it, neither doe the places produced
proue it. The ^f former of them, concerning ordi-
nary Lots, or Lots in generall, was examined and
answered sufficiently before.

The ^g latter is an example of an extraordinary
Lot, wherein there was indeed an immediate and
speciall prouidence. But ^h extraordinary examples
make no generall rules. Neither is it a good course
of arguing, to reason from the speciall, or a singular,
to the generall and vniuersall; much lesse from one
extraordinarie act or event, to all ordinarie courses
of the same kinde. Herein is the difference betweene
the one and the other, betweene the extraordinarie
Lot, wherein there is an immediate hand of God for
speciall purpose, and the ordinarie Lot, wherein
there is not; that the one could not but fall certain-
ly, were it neuer so oft cast, as in the Lots vsed for
the discouery of ⁱ Achan and ^k Ionas, and in the ele-
ction of ^l Saul and ^m Matthias, and the like: where-
as the other cast oft in the same case, as for partition
of goods and chatels descending by inheritance
vpon, or bought in common by diuers, would not
constantly and certainly fall out still the same.

The

in defence of his owne Arguments.

165

The Assumption understood generally is true: and the places quoted make good the prooffe thereof, as shall be made manifest.

I. B.
Reply.

This is said; but should be done. But Mr. B. hauing said, it shall be, presently slincketh away from it: nor doth euer after doe what here he vndertaketh, vnlesse it be by saying that it is manifest to all that will see, that it is so as he saith.

T. G.
Reioinder.

First therefore let vs consider the supposed distinction betweene ordinarie and extraordinarie Lots. Mr. G. speaketh of a distinction, but sheweth not wherein (touching the Lots themselves) it doth consist. Indeed touching themselves (as they be Lots) there is no difference. For in an ordinary, as well as an extraordinary Lot, the things are by man of purpose intentionally disposed vnto a variable euent, and they are wholly disposed by God vnto this or vnto that euent, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. If so, then it followeth, that the vse of all Lots (as they be Lots) whether ordinarie or extraordinarie, directly or of it selfe, and in speciall manner, tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God. How? The vse of Lots attributeth to Gods speciall providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the euent. Doth this scarce carry good sense?

I. B.

Against the prooffe of the prooffe of Mr. B's assumption,

T. G.

sumption, from Act. 1. 24, 26. I object two things:

1. That it is but *one particular example*, and therefore cannot *prove a generall*. To which exception Mr. B. here answereth not a word; and the exception therefore standeth good still; and is enough to infringe the validitie of all *prooffe* drawne here from that place.

2. That it is of an *extraordinary Lot*: and from *extraordinarie actions*, much more from some one of them to conclude of *all ordinarie*, is an vnreasonable kinde of reasoning. And indeed it is as if a man should thus reason; *There was a speciall hand of God in Pharaohs^a dreame: There is the like therefore in all dreames whatsoever.* Or, *The Bush was holy that God appeared to Moses in; And therefore every common Hawthorne is holy.* So, *The Lot whereby Matthias was elected, was by Gods speciall providence immediatly disposed: Therefore the like is in every Lot.*

Now Mr. B. that he might seeme to say somewhat to this at least; Saith that *I deliuer a distinction of Lots ordinarie and extraordinarie, but shew not wherein touching the Lots themselues it consisteth.* He that readeth ^c my Booke may soone see where I define either, what difference I assigne betweene them: and Mr. B. himselve in part also hereafter acknowledgeth it.

Yea but saith he *so far forth as they are Lots, there is no difference betweene them.* No reason there should; for the same *generall nature of a Lot* is common to both: as the same nature of a *dreame* is common to all dreames: the same nature of a *bush* is common

^a Gen. 41. 19, 25.

^b Exod. 3. 2.

^c Of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1.

common to all bushes. Nor did Pharaohs dreame, as it was a dreame, differ from other dreames: nor that holy bush, as it was a bush, differ from any other bush.

But what is the common nature of a Lot? Heare Mr. B. himselfe, and he will tell you truly and fully else-where, that ^d it is the variable event of some sensible thing applied to the determining of some doubtfull matter. But because that will not here serue his turne, he changeth his note now, and maketh this the generall nature of a Lot common to all Lots, (begging withall pitifully that that is in controuersie) that things be by man of purpose intentionally disposed vnto a variable event, and wholly disposed by God vnto this or that event, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much lesse both jointly together. For neither is it true, that in euery Lot things are by man disposed to a variable event: as where a controuersie is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God euer wholly and immediatly disposed, as in the prooffe of his Assumption is affirmed, and here onely repeated; and much lesse are they euer disposed to such event, as by the vsers of the Lot is expected, but rather cleane contrary sometime, as in ^e Hamans example. But if it be so in all Lots, saith Mr. B. then mine Assumption is true. That is as much as to say, if you grant me what I affirme in the prooffe of mine Assumption, though I barely repeat it onely, and doe
not

^d Balmford. Dialog.

^e Ester 3.7, 13.

not at all prone it; then mine Assumption standeth firme; to wit, that a Lot doth directly or of it selfe and in speciall manner tend to the aduancing of the name of God, in attributing to his speciall providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the event. Which by the way he demandeth, whether it scarce carry good sense or no: because I said it scarce did, being withall willing to salue the matter by supposing that the Printer might be in fault. But I see now, Mr. B. will take it vpon himselfe; and I must shew reason for what I said. What others therefore may deeme of it I know not. But I supposed the word, *to attribute*, to be a *verbe transitiue*, requiring somewhat therefore to be expressed that should be *attributed*, as well as some thing or person to which or whom it should be *attributed*; which in Mr. B's words doth not appeare. It were senslesse for any man to say, that *hee doth in his words and deeds attribute to God*, not expressing ought that he doth therein attribute vnto him. But let vs heare Mr. B. further.

I. B.

Is there then no difference betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lot? The only difference is the Subiect matter whereabout the Lot is employed. The subiect matter of an ordinary Lot, is by Gods allowance, a controuerisie to be ended. The subiect matter of an extraordinary Lot, is any other matter, whereabout a Lot is employed by Gods speciall direction: otherwise it is unlawful, as be lusorious and diuinatory Lots.

I might well let all this wild discourse passe; since it is nothing at all to the purpose, neither to the iustifying of his *Assumption*, nor of the *prooffe* of it; yet since he saith it, we will see what he saith. That there is difference betweene an ordinary and extraordinary Lot, in regard of the *subiect matter*, is most true, but no such difference as M^r. B. here assigneth. What it is I shew where I handle the nature of either. But that the *subiect matter* of an ordinary Lot is ever some *controuersie*, is not true, as I haue formerly shewed: not if it were so, did it hinder, but that the Lot used in *sport* might be an ordinary Lot, since that a *controuersie* is thereby also oft times ended. And againe, that no *controuersie*, but some other matter is the *subiect matter* of an extraordinary Lot, is also as vntue: since that a *controuersie* also may and oft is the *subiect matter* of it also. Not to adde, that *lusorious Lots* are without all reason here ranked among extraordinary Lots, no reason rendred why they should be so termed. So that here is much vnfound matter packt together to no purpose.

In regard of which difference onely M^r. G^s. Logick holdeth good as thus. From the use of a Lot about another matter than ending a *Controuersie*, and that by Gods speciall direction, it followeth not, that it is lawfull to use a Lot about any other matter, than ending a *Controuersie*; as gaming, without Gods speciall direction.

In stead of making good his owne Logick, M^r. B.

Z

relleth

T. G.

f *Supervacua enim refutare, nullius artis est. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13.*

z Of Lots, chap. 4. sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1.

I. B.

T. G.

relleth vs what will hold good in Mr. G's Logick. What he meaneth by *my Logick*, I neither know nor inquire. When I make such an *Argument* as Mr. B. here frameth, then let him answer it and not before. For this is but to set vp men of straw, and then hauing runne a course or two at them, to ride away in triumph, as if he had done some great matter, and laid Mr. G. or I know not whom in the dust. But meane while Mr. B. forgetteth to shew vs the validitie of his owne Logick; to wit, how an *Argument* will follow, from one singular example of an extraordinary Lot (by himselfe confessed to be such) vsed therein by Gods speciall direction, to the ordinarie use of Lots in generall.

I. B.

But Mr. G. maketh another difference, to wit, an immediate and speciall providence in an extraordinary Lot, which is not in an ordinary Lot. He doth so: and therefore in his Logick, he cunningly ioyneth a supposed extraordinary Euent to a supposed extraordinary Act, and declineth the prooffe of an extraordinary Act, which rather he should haue done, because mine Argument standeth vpon the use of Lots.

T. G.

Nay by Mr. B's leave, Mr. G. doth not so. He saith onely that there is great difference betwene an extraordinary Lot wherein an immediate diuine providence is, and an ordinarie one, wherein the same is not. Not presuming that there is necessarily such an immediate diuine providence in euery extraordinary Lot, but that such there was in that extraordinary Lot by Mr. B. alledged, as also there is euer

in all such of that kinde as are done by Gods speciall direction. I spare to speake much of the idle distinction here betweene an *extraordinarie Lot*, which by Mr. B. owne grant this was, and an *extraordinarie Act*, which he would here imply that it was not, when he requireth *prooffe* of it. If the *event* were *extraordinarie*, it is enough for my purpose, because Mr. B. *Argument* is in expresse termes concerning the *event*, wherein somewhat, but I know not what, (for he mentioneth nothing) is said to be *attributed vnto Gods speciall providence*; which if it be therefore *more than ordinarie* in such a *Lot*, there is no reasoning from it to any where it is not so, much lesse to all whatsoeuer in generall. That this *Act* it selfe, or occasion and manner of vsing it, was *extraordinarie*, though neither I stand bound here to proue it, and the reason is senselesse whereupon Mr. B. here requireth it, yet I haue proued euidently ^a where I entreat particularly of it. But M. B. must remember that here it is his part to *proue*: it is mine onely to *answer, denie, or distinguish*; and his to take away mine answers, if he will make his *Arguments* good.

^a Of Lots, chap.
10. sect. 3.

Neither doth he soundly proue an immediate and speciall providence, or extraordinary event to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lot.

I. B.

Neither doe I affirme it generally of the former, but of all such of that kinde as are used by Gods speciall direction, in which Mr. B. himselfe here acknowledgeth it: and of the latter what I say, I haue

T. G.

i Of Lots, chap.
2. sect. 5. & chap.
7. sect. 4.

¹ in diuers places proued. Here I speake onely by way of distinction betweene the one and the other, which let M^r. B. if he can disproue.

I. B.

For as it is a tempting of God to cast an extraordinary Lot the first time without Gods speciall direction, p. 313. so it is a tempting, yea, a greater tempting of God, when he hath giuen his iudgement already by the event of the Lot, to cast the Lot againe without his speciall direction. How then can M^r. G. so confidently affirme, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly, were it neuer so oft cast?

T. G.

Whether it be a tempting of God or no, vpon any occasion whatsoever to cast a Lot more then once in such a businesse as God hath giuen speciall direction to vse it in, is not the Question, though I suppose it be more then M^r. B. will be able euer to make good that it is. And whether vpon so doing, because it were a tempting of him, God would refuse to giue answer or no, might also be questioned. He was content ^k by a Signe to answer Gideon the second time, though he had giuen assurance sufficient before, and as much as he at first required. He answered the sea-men in ^l the Lot that lighted vpon Ionas, though it were in them a meere tempting of God, by M^r. B^s. owne grant, hauing no speciall direction from God for the doing of it. Nor dare any man say, but that if it had bene by them for their better satisfaction cast oft, as ^m some thinke it was, it would haue lighted vpon Ionas still. But all that I say is this, that in an extraordinary Lot, wherein there is an immediate

^k Indg. 6. 37, 39,
40.

^l Ionas 1. 7.
Of Lots, chap.
10. sect. 5.

^m Arias Montan.
in Ion. 1.

direct hand of God for speciall purpose (good ground supposed for the reiteration of it) the events were it never so oft cast, would be ever the same. For God certainly would never give a sentence contrary to himselfe. And of the certaine steadinesse of such a Lot, we see a pregnant proove in ^a Achans case, ⁿ 1st. 7. 16, 17, 18. where the Lot foure severall times cast, kept on his due course, till it came to seize on that particular person that was aimed at. And the like may be presumed certainly of euery such Lot so reiterated. If God refuse further to answer, there is no such immediate hand of God for speciall end in it: if there be, and he doe answer, hee will bee euer like himselfe, there shall be no, ^o ² ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³ ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ ³⁹ ⁴⁰ ⁴¹ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ ⁵¹ ⁵² ⁵³ ⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ ⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² ⁶³ ⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ ⁶⁹ ⁷⁰ ⁷¹ ⁷² ⁷³ ⁷⁴ ⁷⁵ ⁷⁶ ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ ⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ ⁸¹ ⁸² ⁸³ ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ ⁸⁸ ⁸⁹ ⁹⁰ ⁹¹ ⁹² ⁹³ ⁹⁴ ⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ ⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ ¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰² ¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹ ¹¹² ¹¹³ ¹¹⁴ ¹¹⁵ ¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁸ ¹¹⁹ ¹²⁰ ¹²¹ ¹²² ¹²³ ¹²⁴ ¹²⁵ ¹²⁶ ¹²⁷ ¹²⁸ ¹²⁹ ¹³⁰ ¹³¹ ¹³² ¹³³ ¹³⁴ ¹³⁵ ¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸ ¹³⁹ ¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² ¹⁴³ ¹⁴⁴ ¹⁴⁵ ¹⁴⁶ ¹⁴⁷ ¹⁴⁸ ¹⁴⁹ ¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹ ¹⁵² ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁵ ¹⁵⁶ ¹⁵⁷ ¹⁵⁸ ¹⁵⁹ ¹⁶⁰ ¹⁶¹ ¹⁶² ¹⁶³ ¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶ ¹⁶⁷ ¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹ ¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ ¹⁷² ¹⁷³ ¹⁷⁴ ¹⁷⁵ ¹⁷⁶ ¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸ ¹⁷⁹ ¹⁸⁰ ¹⁸¹ ¹⁸² ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁴ ¹⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷ ¹⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁹ ¹⁹⁰ ¹⁹¹ ¹⁹² ¹⁹³ ¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ ¹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁹ ²⁰⁰ ²⁰¹ ²⁰² ²⁰³ ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁸ ²⁰⁹ ²¹⁰ ²¹¹ ²¹² ²¹³ ²¹⁴ ²¹⁵ ²¹⁶ ²¹⁷ ²¹⁸ ²¹⁹ ²²⁰ ²²¹ ²²² ²²³ ²²⁴ ²²⁵ ²²⁶ ²²⁷ ²²⁸ ²²⁹ ²³⁰ ²³¹ 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² Prov. 16. 33.

I. B.

hand of his guide the Lot thus or thus, to wit, to favour him that hath the better right in this, as to sever the innocent from the nocent in that. How far forth ¹ the place produced proueth any such thing, commeth hereafter to be discussed.

But Mr. G. hath answered this place before. Let us then consider what he hath answered.

T. G.

Answer.
Of Lots, chap.
7. sect. 3.

ⁱ De singularibus, mirabilibus, divinis, quas determinant à politicis. Chytra. in Jud. c. 1. Io. Winkelman profess. Marburg. & Barthold. Krakevitz in Ion. c. 1. & Pencer. de divinat. ^k Eastie hist. Gosp.

¹ Autores prae-
minati.

^m Prov. 16. 33.

בְּהִיטָה יִשְׁפֹּט
אֱלֹהֵי הַגּוֹרָל
Sicut Num. 26. 55.

אֶל-כֵּן בְּגִוְלוֹ
הַלֵּךְ אֶת-

terram tamen (quod attinet) sorte dividetur. Et Nebem. 9. 32. אל יפֿשֵׁט
de sit parum tibi totam hanc molestiam (quod attinet.)
omne iudicium. Mercet. ^o Prov. 29. 16. וְיִחְזַק
^q Prov. 21. 31. וְיִחְזַק הַשְׁעָה
Et Ion. 2. 9. וְיִחְזַק לִי הָאֵל
providentia, etiamsi nobis casu quodam fieri videantur, ut in quod sorte alicui contingit: qualis
providentia in alijs omnibus et antibus, quamvis maxime fortuitis cernitur: nec talis ista com-
munis providentia casum. Bellarm. de cleric. l. 1. c. 5.

For the sentence of Salomon, there want not good Authors that expound it of ¹ singular extra-ordinary, and miraculous Lots only: such, to use the words of one of our ^k Aduersaries, as are used immediately to finde out Gods will: whereas these that we now dispute of are no such; ¹ neither is it now lawfull to use any Lot at all to that end.

But the words seeme to be more generall, and are word for word thus in the originall, ^m The Lot, it is cast into the lap; ⁿ but every iudgement or disposition of it (for there is no article there answering our English The) is of God. As hee saith else-where, ^o Many seeke the Rulers face or favour; ^p but each mans iudgement is from God. And, ^q The Horse is prepared for the day of fight: ^r but salvation is of God, or belongeth to God, is Gods. Which words so read ^r import onely thus much, that there is a providence of God in all things, even in the least, in the

most casuall things, and among the rest by name in a Lot: And so is there no more said of Lots there, than is spoken else-where not of Lots alone or things casuall onely; but of all mens thoughts and purposes, and words and works, and counsels and courses; as we haue^{*} formerly shewn; and as beside the Authors there alledged, some of those that vrge this place for the prooofe of this point, confesse else-where against themselves, when they say, that
** The disposing of the Chance is secret, that it may be Chance indeed and wholly of God, who directeth^{*} all things.*

Ye take the words as they are vsually read, *The Lot is cast into the lap, but^{*} the whole disposition, or^{*} the whole disposing thereof, is of the Lord*; It may as truly be said with good warrant from diuers^{*} other places of Scripture beside^{*} those by the Aduerse party produced, that the whole issue or euent and disposing of all things great and weighty, or lesse and lighter, is of the Lord: which yet excludeth not the meanes, that God worketh by or with, in the most of them, nor implieth an immediate providence vniuersally in them: but is therefore so said, and may truly be said, to shew, that it is wholly in Gods hands to dispose of the euent and issue of all things, and to crosse or giue way to them, as he shall see good. So that a man may as well, and vpon as good ground out of the places concerning all other mens speeches and actions alledged by themselves, (together with those other, which are some of them yet more generall and of larger extent) exclude all things else whatsoever from game,

as

chap. 2. 5. 3.

^{*} Balesford dialog. Et Zanch. de fort. D. un omnia regere, igitur sortes etiam.

^{*} Prov. 16. 1, 3, 9,

33. B. lms. id.

^{*} Gen. transl.

^{*} The Kings Edit.

^{*} Isai. 33. 10, 11,

13, 14, to 20. &

37. 6, 7, 9, 12, to

16. & 127. 1, 2.

Prov. 10. 21. &

19. 21. & 10. 24.

& 21. 30, 31. Esai.

26. 11. & 34. 15,

16. Ierem. 10. 23.

Matth. 6. 26, 30.

& 10. 19, 30.

^{*} supra

as they may Lots, in regard of ought that concerning them can be pick'd out of this place,

I. B.
Reply.

Before he saith, p. 144. *Good Authors expound this place of singular extraordinary and miraculous Lots onely.*

T. G.
Rejoind.

*Disputatur is
Christianus scy' nō
victoria, sed i'ritar.
Tūto jō a'andōs
māhūe pō eadōs
h'ndūau. Greg.
Naz. epist. 15.*

I. B.

And if Mr. G. had stucke to this, I suppose Mr. B. would not easily have beene able to refute it, and so his Argument had stucke fast. But I refuse to take advantage of ought that in mine owne iudgement I deeme vnsound. For it is not victory, but truth onely that I stand for.

But, saith he, the words seeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [The Lot is cast into the lap: but every iudgement or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who hold onely extraordinary Lots to be meant in this place; and translating the Text [Every iudgement] and expounding it [or disposing it] shew plainly that this place proueth mine Assumption to be vniuersally true?

T. G.

I perceiue a man must not be over-liberall with Mr. B. for if a man giue him an inch, hee will too soone take an ell. He might well thinke me very silly, freely to grant him all this, and yet denie his Assumption, if this were so plaine a Confirmation of it.

That I confute them is not true: I shew onely my dissent from them. I leaue it to Mr. B. if he can, to confute them.

That I so translate and expound the Text, is true:
but

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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but very sorry assistance ariseth to Mr B's. *Assumption* from thence.

So that I maruell that he denieth this place to proue mine *Assumption*, because it concerneth Lots in generall.

I. B.

And maruell well he might, did I reason on that manner. But hee wanteth matter, it seemeth, to maruell at, that he frameth such to himselfe. 'It is one thing to say, *It proueth not Mr. B's. Assumption*, though it concerne Lots in generall: and another to say, *It proueth not Mr. B's. Assumption*, because it concerneth Loss in generall. That is all that can be gathered out of ought that I affirme. But Mr. B. his earnest desire belike to haue his *Assumption* confirmed, suggested this to him.

T. G.

*In eadem urna
& aurum est &
vipera. Si aurum
ex urna sustuleris;
quia illic & vipera
est, non ideo mibi
urna aurū dat, quia
vipera habet; sed
aurum dat, cum &
vipera habeat. Sen.
epist. 87.*

For if it doe so, then it proueth that ordinary as well as extraordinary Lots, tend to the aduancing of the Name of God.

I. B.

It seemeth that Mr. B. hath forgotten his owne *Assumption*. If he haue, I will make bold to put him in mind of it. It is this, *The use of Lots directly, or of it selfe, and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of Gods Name, in attributing to his speciall providence in the whole and immediate disposing of them, &c.* Here is a great deale more than barely tending to the aduancing of Gods Name, which all things that are disposed by him (and what is not disposed by him?) in some degree or other doe. A man might

T. G.

*Esa. 26. 12.
Dan. 4. 35.
Matth. 10. 29, 30.*

A a

maruell

Answer to Mr. B. Reply

maruell therefore rather why Mr. B. should, not so much, but at all *maruell* at Mr. Gs. *deniall*, that this place so understood, doth proue Mr. Bs. *Assumption*; yea, he might maruell, that Mr. B. should not see that it did not, if he remembered what his *Assumption* was.

I. B.

Againe, p. 145. Mr. G. taking the words, as they are vsually read in the Geneva Translation, and the Kings Edition, to wit, [The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof, is of the Lord] granteth that the whole euent is of God.

F. G.

αὐτολεξελ.

1. What I yeeld of my liberalitie, Mr. B. is one thing: What you must make good, if you will maintaine your owne cause, is another thing. That is the translation, say I, *a word for word*. Which vnlesse therefore he can either disproue, or proue his *Assumption* out of it, his *Argument* is vndone, and his cause with it, hauing indeed no colour of ground beside that place much wrung and wronged to support and vphold it.

2. I take not the words so, but supposing them so to be taken, I say, that no more is therein said of *Lots*, than may be said of all things that are done in the world, though by meanes the most of them, that *the whole issue and euent of them is of God*, because he not only hath an hand in them, but it is in his power either to afford or to deny such issue vnto them. And what hath Mr. B. cause gained hereby more than was granted it before? Or how is his *Assumption* hereby confirmed, when no more is yeilded

yeelded to be said therein of *Lots*, than may be said of a game at *boules*?

A grant, though true, yet turning the Reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lot cast into the lap.]

I. B.

And doe not I speake of *Lots* in generall? Or do I exclude any such as be cast into the lap? Or is it materiall, whether they be cast into lap, or ^{*} hat, or [†] helmet, or ^{*} lot-box, or ^{*} water-pot, or into none of all these, as in *crosse* and *pile*, or not cast at all, as in *best-betrust*? That M^r. G. should so flily seeke to conceale that, and by leger-demaine seeke to turne his Readers eye aside from it. But, saith M^r. B.

T. G.

^{*} Into a bonnet, Littleton Tenures, l. 3. c. 1.

[†] In galeam. Homer. Iliad. v.

^{*} de quo Enigma apud Aithē. dipteros. l. 10. Vide Casaubon. ibid. c. 18.

^{*} In bydriam, sive similia. Plant. Casus.

I. B.

If then the Lot cast into the Lap, that is, of purpose disposed by man unto a variable event, be wholly disposed by God, so as the event be that which pleaseth him, then God doth not mediate the Lot to this or that event: if not mediate, then immediately because the whole disposition is of him.

And what if the *Lots* then be not cast into the lap, or be not by man disposed at all? If that alter the case, as may seeme here implied, then that will not be true of every *Lot*, nor of many a *Lot*, that M^r. B. here saith.

T. G.

But if M^r. B. meaning be (for I would faine understand him) that there is an opposition betweene mans Act and Gods Act in the Text. So is there in those words, *The preparations of the heart are in*

^{*} Prov. 16. 1.

man: but the answer of the tongue is of the Lord. Which yet proue not an immediate worke of God therefore to be in euery answer that a man giueth, or in euery word that he uttereth.

But vnlesse Mr. B. can find some stranger matter in those words, *cast into the lap*, more than here he discouereth, or any man (I beleue) seeth beside himselfe, he saith no more than he said that I granted before, to wit, that *the whole disposing of the Lot is of God, so as the event is what he pleaseth*. Which doth not necessarily inferre an immediate act of God in it: No more than, if a man should say, as he truly may say, that *the whole disposition of warre and battell* (which ^a the Rabbines, some of them, compare here with a Lot, and so make this verse cohere with the next before it) *is of God the Lord of Hosts, so that the issue and event of it is such as he pleaseth*; it would follow thereupon, that he denied ^e armes to be of any vse in warre, or affirmed all victorie to come immediately, and without meanes from God.

^b Psal. 18. 29, 39.

^c 44. 3. 6, 7.

^d 60. 11, 12.

Nixi d' ex. Dies

Eti. Et h. Oia

Χειρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ

παλάστον αὐτοῦ.

In Dei arbitrio po-

sta est victoria.

Lallant. Contra quā

Sen. Hirs. fur. 1.

Omnis in ferro est

salus.

^e Sicut urbiū ex-

puatiō, ita fortis-

simū temperatio a

Domino est. Hebra-

orum nonnulli, teste

Alercero in Prov.

16. 33.

^f Prov. 21. 30, 31.

^g 2 Sam. 10. 12.

I. B.

Doth not this then make good mine Assumption?

T. G.

No indeed; not a whit: Vnlesse the asking of the Question doe ought in it.

I. B.

But for all this Mr. G. will not haue it so. For as he translateth this place, he saith, it importeth thus much, [That there is a Providence in all things, even the least, & most casual.] And this he would confirme by these my words, viz. [The disposing of the Chance is secret, that

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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it might be Chance indeed, and wholly of God, who disposeth all things.] Doe these words iustifie Mr. G's interpretation of this place? Yes: for they say plainly, God directeth all things; and they say withall, The disposing of the Chance (that is, of the things purposely disposed by a man unto a variable event) unto a certaine event, is secret, that it may be Chance indeed, that is, an event not by the will of man, but wholly of God. So that my words imply this Argument. God directeth all things: therefore much more, in our discerning a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is far from saying that this place importeth only, That there is a providence in all things.

Mr. B's words I have faithfully related; and they iustifie as much as I alledge them for, to wit, a confession, that God directeth and disposeth as well all other things as Lots. What Mr. B. may please to fish further out of his owne words, I am well content he doe: what the words themselves of themselves import, any man may soone see.

Neither doth Mr. G's translation inferre this imported interpretation.

What it will necessarily inferre, is not materiall; what it will well beare, is for me enough. It is sufficient, that no more can be inferred out of it: and that is all that I auerre. But Mr. B. (you shall see) will shew that there may.

For this discretion [But] doth so oppose every iudgement,

T. G.

I. B.

T. G.

I. B.

iudgement, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth Iudgement) to a Lot cast into the lap, as that euery disposing, is all one with the whole disposing.

T. G.

^d Prov. 16. 1.

^e Prov. 29. 16.

The *discretiue* (for so I suppose his meaning is) but, doth no otherwise *oppose* here than in the place before cited; but ^d the answer of the tongue is of the Lord: nor doth it any more proue, that euery disposing is all one with the whole disposing, (though I refuse not that also in such sense as I haue shewed) than that euery mans iudgement is all one with the whole iudgement of euery man; in that speech also of Salomon, ^e Many seeke to the Rulers face, but euery mans iudgement is of God.

I. B.

This place so troubleth Mr. G. that from it he would haue no more gathered, than that the whole euent (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by meanes in the most of them, and not implying immediate providence vniuersally in them.

T. G.

Rather this place so troubleth Mr. B. being indeed the only maine bulwarke of his cause, that like a man in a maze he runneth backward and forward, from Mr. G^s. to the Geneva translation, and then backe to Mr. G^s. againe, as not enduring the triall of, or triall by either.

It is true, I auerre it, nor doth Mr. B. himselfe here denie, but that the whole euent of all things is of the Lord: nor haue the words of the Text in the ordinary Translations any one word more of a Lot, and no necessarie implication therefore of any immediate

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ate providence in them, which Mr. B. would pick out of them.

I neede not examine the meanes or immediate providence of all the instances quoted in the margent. For here it is impliedly granted, (for he saith not, all, but, the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by meanes, and that there is an immediate providence particularly; for he denieth such a providence only, as being uniuersally.

I. B.

Mr. B. it seemeth, little passeth what hee say, though neuer so little to the purpose, so hee may seeme to say something. The instances some of them are by Mr. B. himselfe, though contrary to his owne purpose, alledged. Mine *Argument* standeth thus:

T. G.

Nothing is said by Salomon in this place of Lots, but what may with good warrant from Gods word be truly said of all other humane actions, in the most whereof yet God worketh not immediatly, but by meanes.

There is nothing therefore said of a Lot in this place, that may proue any immediate providence of God therein.

Now what is it to the purpose whether there be an immediate providence of God in some of them or no. This phrase that may be truly vsed, where none such is, proueth it not. The *impropriety* of speech here vsed I passe by, because it is nothing to the purpose. But till either the *Antecedent* here be disproued, or the *Consequence* (which I suppose no
man.

man will once question) infringed, Mr. B. remaineth cleane put beside his maine bulwarke.

I. B.

Howsoever it be in other things, I thinke it is manifest to all, that will see, that God without meanes, and therefore immediatly, doth dispose the Lot cast into the lap vnto this, or that event, what pleaseth him, whereas man disposeth the things onely vnto a variable event. As at cards a man shuffeth them of purpose to dispose them vnto a variable event. But by the immediate providence of God, they are so shuffled as that this or that event followeth.

T. G.

Here Mr. B. letteth goe his hold of that Text, and without any direct *Answer* at all given to mine *Argument* against his *deduction*, now vpon his bare word onely telleth vs, that it is so here, howsoever it be else-where, and we are all wilfully blinde if we see it not to be so as he saith. Let him pardon me; *I belecue him not.* He must first shew better Cards for it than he hath done yet, or else few wise men and well aduised, I suppose, will belecue that either all Lots in generall, or the shuffling of the Cards so and so, are effected without meanes. Any man, I thinke that hath his eies in his head, may soone see it to be otherwise.

3 E'gō d'ns & m-
20 m' d'ns. Theocr.
idyll. 7. Sed non ego
credulus illi. Virgil.
eclog. 9.

I. B.

Therefore (with Mr. G's fauour) any reasonable man may iudge it not senslesse to say (which he doubteth of, p. 147.) that in Childrens plaies at even and odde, or at Heads & Points, there is an immediate providence, in inclining the will of the Child, & guiding his coniecture.

And

And with Mr. B's good fauour, I beleeeue any iudicious Reader will smile to heare Mr. B. here affirme it. But I would gladly know of Mr. B. why he skippeth thus from place to place in his *Answer*, and doth not goe thorow with my *discourse and Argument* about this very particular, but balke or stride ouer all that lieth betweene that he last dealt with, and this that commeth in the very end of it. But especially I would haue him tell what hee can answer to that instance of a *Lot* propounded next immediatly before this, wherein two appeale to the *Cards* as they lie left by those that last vsed them without further shuffling, who (suppose it) left the *Cards* (though vnknowne to the appealants) in some certaine manner sorted as to themselves then best seemed; whether the euent fall out by an *immediate providence* therein or no. Or, which I now adde, when two shall determine to shape their course by the tracke of a beast gone before them, which being driuen to the market by its owner, taketh this rather than that way, because the market that way lieth, whether this be also by an *immediate providence* or no.

T. G.

Thus we see this place doth confirme mine Assumption, and the prooffe annexed, Mr. G's. interpretation notwithstanding.

I. B.

But no man, I am sure, vnlesse he borrow Mr. B's spectacles, will be able euer to see it.

T. G.

But he giueth two reasons against an immediate providence in ordinary Lots.

I. B.

Bb

Though

T. G.

⁂ Affirmanti incumbit probatio.
Negans probare nō
teneatur. Reischwich.
reg. Jur.

Though I needed not to giue any : ^h *he that saith it, should proue it* : yet I giue indeed not two onely ; but more than two, if Mr. B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I giue these.

I. B.

Seruo quidam.

The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate providence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate providence in all things that are casuall. But the latter is not true : ergo not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true ? That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God (saith Bernard, but Mr. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting vs with his will, p. 17. and, In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence, p. 22.

T. G.

But for ouer-burdening this Booke, I would insert here *mine owne Argument* at large : but so much as Mr. B. relateth shall suffice. Hee denieth (it seemes) here the *Assumption* ; and so auerreth that which all euidence of daily experience doth abundantly confute ; and which some of those therefore that haue heretofore made this the maine ground of their opinion in this point now doe relinquish ; that *there is a speciall and immediate providence of God in euery thing that falleth out casuall*, as in euery meeting of any by the way vnsoought for (though his businesse lying this way and mine that way at that time are the meanes of our meeting) the stumbling at a stone, or stepping in some vncleane thing, while

while a man looketh vp or aside at some sight in a shop-window, and the like infinite accidents that daily occurre. For mine owne part the *Assertion* to me seemeth so senselesse, that I will no more spend time to dispute it with him that shall offer to defend it, than with one that shall affirme all the *Riuers* in the world to run with *salt water*.

Yea but there be some sayings in mine owne Booke that auerre it. Let vs heare them.

Why first *Bernard* saith, ¹ *That which seemeth* ^{1 Bern. de divers. serm. 26.} *Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God acquainting vs with his will.*

First for the *Translation*, then for the *Exposition*, and the end for which it is alledged. The words of *Bernard* are *Sermo quidam*, that is, word for word, some kinde of word, or to auoid ambiguitie, a word in some sort. For I hope M^r. B. when he translateth it, a certaine word, doth not take certaine in that sense that he did, who expounding the words of the Gospell, ² *There was a certaine rich man*, obserueth ^{2 Luk. 16. 19.} thence, that though the *Rich man* there mentioned, were otherwise an euill man, yet he was sure and certaine of his word. But M^r. G. translateth it, as a word. And who knoweth not that *quidam* and *quoddam* are vsually notes of *diminution* and *qualification*? I wish M^r. B. had committed no greater fault in relating my words both here and elsewhere, than I haue committed in translating *Bernard* in that manner.

For the *exposition* of it how it is to be vnderstood, because I shew ¹ there at large whence by M^r. B. it is cited, I doe thither refer my Reader. Only I adde ^{1 Of Lots, Chap. 2. Sect. 3.}

* *Distorum siquidem intelligentia ex dicendi causis sumenda est. Hilar. de trinit. Et Ioan. Savisber. ep. 254. Distorum determinatur secundum suam causam. Reg. Iur.*

thereunto, vpon further view of the place, that it is euidently apparent by the whole sequell of the *Sermon*, (the maine scope whereof is to perswade men to rest satisfied with Gods will and pleasure in all accidents and occurrents, as losse of friends by decease, and the like) that *Bernards** meaning is, that when ought falleth out, whether by *casualtie* (which hee mentioneth, because that might most be stuck at) or otherwise, Gods will was thereby manifested that so it should be, and therefore that we were to submit to Gods will in it. But no more will it hence follow, that there is an immediate providence of God in all casuall things, more than in any other sort of euent. Gods decreeing will in euery euent is reuealed by his worke. And every euent, be it casuall, or not casuall, is a word of God revealing his pleasure vnto vs, and acquainting vs with his will.

■ Of Lots, chap. 2. sect. 4.

For the latter allegation Mr. B. most shamefully abuseth me, or himselfe, and his Reader rather, clipping off iust so much of the sentence spoken by me, as to make it speake directly contrary to that that it doth. He bringeth me in affirming, that *In casuall euent*s there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence. Whereas my words are these, *ⁱf in casuall euent*s we consider ought beside the creature and the uncertaine motion thereof, (uncertaine, I say, to vs, because not determinable by vs, though determined ordinarily by some naturall cause or other) there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence. I remember one that in the *Schooles* gaue this *Position* to be disputed of, *Virtus est vitium*; and being required to shew some *Author* for it, produced *Horace*, where he saith,

Virtus

Virtus est vitium fugere. And I could relate the like trick that a *Popish Priest* sometime shewed me in some things that passed in writing betweene him and me. And such shifting may well besee me such as they are. But I would wish Mr. B. to be better advised than to deale thus, if he regard his owne credit. Which I wonder he would thus hazard the calling in question, vnlesse he thought that no body would take the paines to search the places quoted by him: where how that that I say, fitteth his turne, may soone be seene, or rather how directly it contradicteth it.

Horat. epist. 1.

But suppose there is not an immediate providence in all things that be casuall, what is that to the purpose? For all things casuall are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man vnto an vncertaine event: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God vnto a certaine event, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things and Lots are not such.

I. B.

Mr. B. before denied mine Assumption. Now he denieth either the Conclusion, or nothing. Though it be so, saith he, in other casuall things, yet in a Lot it is not so; for they are wholly disposed by God, that is, in Mr. B's vnderstanding, there is an immediate providence of God in them, which is the contradictorie of my Conclusion.

T. G.

What he talketh to no purpose in the world, of Lots not being such, is very frivolous. For either he vnderstandeth not what I say, or what himselfe

* Quod convenit
tali quatenus tale,
convenit omni tali.

would. I ground my Proposition, vpon a generally
received Axiome thus;

* That which agreeth to a thing as it is such or such,
agreeth necessarily to all things that are such;
Therefore whatsoever agreeth to a Lot as it is a
Casualty, must necessarily agree to every Ca-
sualtie.

Mr. B. denieth neither Antecedent nor Conse-
quence: but telleth vs, that all casuall things are not
such with a Lot. To what, thinke we, doth this An-
swer? Every Casualty as it is a Casualty is such with
each Casualty. For the same reason and common na-
ture of Casualtie is in each; though each of them
haue something ouer and beside distinct either from
other. And what agreeth therefore to any Casualty as
it is a Casualty, must needs agree vnto all.

I. B.

Neither is it said, an immediate providence is in a
Lot, as it is casuall, but as the Lot being made casuall is
wholly disposed by God to this or that event.

T. G.

• Afferat ipse licet
sacras Epidamius
verbas, Nulla sana-
bit hoc tibi vulnus
ope, uti Ovid. fere
Pontil. 1.

p The vnlawful-
nesse of games
consisting in
Chance.

Mr. B. hath here giuen so sore a cut to his owne
cause, as ° he will neuer be able to cure againe with
all the skill that he hath. For what hath beene the
maine ground, yea the onely ground in effect where-
upon these Games haue beene by his Master herein,
himselfe, and those that concurre with them con-
demned, but this, because they depend vpon Casualty
either in whole or in part? Aske Mr. B. himselfe
why these Games are vnlawfull; the very p Title of
his Booke telleth you, because they consist in
Chance. In his Epistle dedicatory hee repeareth the
same

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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same againe. In the entrance into his Dialogue, Dice are therefore unlawfull, because they depend upon Chance. And after, Dice wholly euill, because they depend wholly upon Chance; Cards and Tables somewhat euill because they depend somewhat upon Chance: And are therefore Lots, for from thence they haue the denomination of a Lot, which in Latine is called Sors, that is, Chance or hazard; and therefore unlawfull. And againe, Whether you call Cards and Tables Lots or no, you play with chance or vse Lottery, and by so doing make God an vmpire in play, which must needs be a sin: because you take the name of God in vaine and tempt the Almighty by a gamesome putting of things to hazard, and making play of Lotterie. Againe what doe those words imply, the disposing of chance is secret that it may be chance indeed, and wholly of God: but that therefore it is wholly (that is in Mr. B's. meaning immediatly) of God, because it is Chance, which else it were not. Goe we a little higher from Mr. B. to his Teacher (as himselfe termeth him) herein Mr. F. ^a The Nature of a Lot, saith he, lieth wholly in this, that although the thing be of vs, yet the disposition is wholly of God, that is, he vseth not our meanes of cunning, practise, strength, &c. but taketh it wholly to himselfe. And therefore Dice, dealing of Cards, &c. where the matter is laid on hazard (as they call it) or rather Gods providence, without vsing any cunning of ours to dispose, is upon the same reason of a Lot unlawfull. Yea hence he inferreth that to say, what lucke is this! how crooked! is in plaine termes (so he speaketh) as much as to say, what a God, or a crooked providence of God is this! as presuming that lucke, chance, or hazard, (for

^a Fennor of Recreation. rule spec. 4.

^r Idem ibid.

(for all is one in effect) is nothing else but *Gods providence*. Now what doth all this tend vnto but this: That therefore *these games are vnlawfull* because they depend vpon *Casualty*, which maketh them to bee *Lots*: and that therefore it is vnlawfull to vse any game depending vpon *Casualty*; because in that regard there is an *immediate providence of God* in it? Whereas Mr. B. therein crossing all this, and ouerturning his owne grounds, here telleth vs, that *it is not said an immediate providence is in a Lot, as it is casual*. But how then? forsooth *as being casual it is wholly disposed by God to this or that euent*. That is as much as to say, *An immediate providence of God is not in a Lot, as it is casual*, (though that be the ground whereupon we haue formerly affirmed it to be) *but as there is an immediate providence of God in it; (idem per idem)* for that is, *to be wholly disposed by God*; as Mr. B. still meaneth. Thus you see how Mr. B. hath now mended the matter, and made good his owne grounds. But he will haue somewhat out of my words yet, before he haue done with them.

I. B.

So that from Mr. G's. axiome this Argument may be framed. *An immediate providence in an extraordinary Lot is acknowledged by Mr. G. as it is a Lot (say I) wholly disposed by God: Therefore an immediate providence is in an ordinary Lot, (as it is a Lot) wholly disposed by God. For there is no difference betweene these sorts of Lots (as they be Lots) and so disposed. For Mr. G. hath shewed that Prou. 16.33. speaketh as well of one sort of Lots, as of another.*

T. G.

How this that followeth commeth in with a,
So

So that, I know not. Yet let vs see what it is. M^r. G. he saith, *hath shewed*, (I grant it indeed, but I shew it not; it is he that should shew it, or hee will neuer be able to conuince those that say otherwise) *that* *Prou. 16. 33. speaketh of Lots in generall as well ordinary as extraordinarie.* Be it so, what of that? But I acknowledge also an immediate providence in an extraordinary Lot; and that is therein as it is a Lot; saith M^r. B. and therefore by M^r. G^s. *Axiome*, it must bee so in an ordinary one also. For this I suppose it is that he would say. But he must first shew where I acknowledge an immediate providence to be in euery extraordinary Lot, which I deny to be in many thousands of them: and then proue it to be in such a Lot as it is a Lot; which to affirme and not proue, is to require that in effect without prooffe to be granted, which all the controuersie is about, and which he must not thinke will be yeilded vpon his bare, I say.

The other Argument is this, which is the Kil-kow. If in euery Lot there be necessarilie an immediate worke and providence of God, then it is in the naturall power of man to make God worke immediatly at his pleasure.

But to say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediatly at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an immediate worke and providence of God necessarily in euery Lot. M^r. G. like an Orator seemeth desirous to draw his Aduersary into hatred by these words, [Necessarily, Naturall power, Set God on working, At pleasure, To say, and Absurd]

[urd] Verba dum sint, surdo canit. But hoping better, I answering his Logicke deny the Assumption. For it is as much in mans naturall power to set God on working immediatly in an ordinarie, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God and man doe respectiue as much in the one Lot as in the other.

T. G.

It is M^r. B^s. guise not mine to seeke to draw his Adversaries into hatred, by traducing them as Pleaders for Dice-play and such abuses as attend thereon, where it is vsed otherwise than it ought, because they deny euery lufurious Lot to be unlawfull, or dice-play simply euill in regard of the Lot vsed in it. I reason but here from what M^r. B. himselfe granteth, as shall hereafter appeare.

But M^r. B. denieth the Assumption, which is this, To say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediatly at his pleasure, is absurd. And dare M^r. B. then deny this Assumption? He might as well say, It is in mans power naturally to set God on working of miracles at his pleasure; as say, It is in his power naturally to set God on working immediatly at his pleasure. For is not euery immediate worke of God, or euery worke wrought without means, miraculous? Some miracles haue beene wrought by meanes: but nothing is wrought wholly without meanes, that is not miraculous. Well, I will not say, that it is blasphemous to auerre this: but yet I beleue it commeth neerer blasphemy than any thing in my Booke doth.

Yea but M^r. B. hath some good reason for the deniall of mine Assumption. For, It is as much in
mans

mans power naturally to set God on working immediately in an ordinary as in an extraordinary Lot. Very true, as much in the one as in the other. That is in very truth in neither. If there be in an extraordinary Lot of Gods speciall appointment, (for in no other is there any certainty of it) an immediate providence, neither is that there by any power of man naturally procured, nor is God set a worke therein at mans pleasure, but he worketh therein vpon his owne pleasure, and man onely by his appointment. This Mr. B. himselfe saw well, and addeth therefore,

*Quod ille olim,
tam doctrina quam
moribus: cum neu-
tra ex parte idone-
um ad gradum of-
ferret.*

But an extraordinary Lot is by the speciall direction of God. True; So is an ordinary Lot by Gods speciall ad-
vice to end a controuersie.

I. B.

It followeth not from the one to the other. And the reason is apparent. Because in the extraordinary Lot the euent required, be it, to finde out a malefactor, as in Achans case, or to discover who the man is that God hath fore-appointed to such an office, as in Sauts case, cannot certainly bee effected without such an immediate providence; whereas in the ordinary Lot, nothing is to be determined, but may well and certainly be decided without it. But if it be so, as Mr. B. saith, that therefore in an ordinary Lot there is an immediate providence; and therefore a setting of God on working immediately so oft as such a Lot is used, because an ordinary Lot is by Gods speciall advice to end a Controuersie: How is that true both in his Dialogue, and in the very next words im-

T. G.

*Iosh. 7. 14, 15, 16,
17, 18.*

*1 Sam. 10. 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22.*

plied by him, that *in a luforious Lot God is thus fet on working*? For if God haue giuen no allowance for *luforious Lots*, how is he in them *set so on working*, who doth not so worke, but where *Lots* are vsed by his owne allowance? Or how *finne they in setting God on working* there, where he doth not worke? Mr. B. therefore here hangeth fast in the briers.

I. B.

If then euery Lot be a setting of our glorious God on working, there ought to be praier, if not by words, yet in heart in the vse as well of ordinarie as extraordinary Lots. If so, then Lots are not to be vsed in sports.

T. G.

If euery Lot be, saith Mr. B. contrary to what before he implied, that vnlesse it be done by Gods assignement, it is not. If it be so indeed, the rest will follow. But that is it that is to be proued. And for Conclusion of this Argument, let it be obserued, that Mr. B. cannot make this good, whereupon the whole strength of this his principall Argument dependeth, & for the prooffe wherof he alledgeth, Pro. 16.33. to wit, that there is an immediate prouidence of God in euery Lot whatsoever, vnlesse this absurd Position be also granted him, that

It is naturally in euery mans (nay in euery childs) power, to set God on working immediately at pleasure.

And that little children as oft as they cast for crosse and pile, cause God therein to worke a miraculous worke. That which the rather I require to be obserued and remembered, because the whole pish of the
next.

next Argument, yea of all the rest in a manner, dependeth vpon this point.

The second Argument.

WE are not to tempt the Almighty by a vaine desire of manifestation of his power and speciall providence.

But by using Lots in sport we doe so: therefore we may not use Lots in sport.

The Assumption they seeme to proue on this wise.

To call God to sit in iudgement where there is no necessitie so to doe, or for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mocke God:

But by the use of Lots in sport, God is called to sit in iudgement where there is no necessitie, for the determining of trifles.

By the use of Lots in sport therefore we tempt and dishonour God.

The Proposition is confirmed à simili, by the King and Councell, by whose gouernment though we all liue, yet were it a dishonour to them to be called vpon by children to determine their sports.

The Assumption is proued à pari, by comparing together a Lot and an Oath: A Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the providence and determining presence of God, as an Oath in the nature thereof doth suppose the testifying presence of God. Yea so, that as in an Oath, so in a Lot, Prayer is expressed or to be understood. In which regard also as

I. B. Dialog. Arg. 2.

T. 6. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 6.

o Dan. de lud. al. 6.9. rat. 1.

P Tanquam rei gerendae extraordinarius moderator & arbiter. Dan. ibid.

q Eastie historie of Gosp. Reas. 5.

I. B. Dialog. Ground 3.

y Balmf. ibid. & Zanch. in miscell. ar. de sort. Etiam si actus non invocet, tamen reipsa Deum invocat sortitus.

ap 2 1 Sam. 14. 41.

^a Perkins Cas. of
Consc. lib. 3. cap. 4.

[§] 4. q. 2.

^b Res sacra. Dan.
Iud. al. c. 9. rat. 1.
Religiosa. Iun. in
lon. c. 1.

^c Perkins ibid.

^d Aik. 1. 24, 25,
26.

^e Wise sup. cap. 5.

[§] 3.

^f Perkins ibid.

^g Eastie hist. of
Gosp. Reas. 6.

T. G.

Answer.

ibid. sect. 7.

^h In ludo taxillato-
rio iudicium divi-
num non requiri-
tur, sed fortune res
constituitur. Thom.
de sortib. c. 5. &
Lyra in Prov. c. 16.

ⁱ Iudice fortuna
cadat alea. Petron.
satyr. Fortuna sit
optinis iudex, &
sorte dirimatur. Lu-
cretius lib. 1. l. 2. 11. 20.

an Oath, so ^a Lot is an ^b act of religion, in which we refer unto God the determining of such weighty things as can no other waies be determined: and therefore ^c in the use of it is ever infolded, and sometime also expressed, both a confession that God is a soveraigne Iudge to determine such things, and ^d a supplication to him, that by the Lot, when it is cast, he will be pleased so to doe. A Lot, therefore, as an Oath, is not to be used but ^e in case of necessitie and extremitie: and ^f being a solemne act of religion may not be applied to sporting: ^g We may as well iest with the Word, and Sacraments, and Oaths, as with Lots.

There might be divers severall Arguments framed out of these allegations; but because they build all on one ground, and stand upon one bottome, I have thought best to put them in this manner together, that the same common answer might serve them all.

First therefore the vsing of Lots either in matters sage and serious, or of sport and delight is ^h not of it selfe any desire of the manifestation of Gods speciall power and providence by an immediate disposition, vnlesse men offend against the caution before giuen in doing it to this end, to try thereby whether God will vouchsafe to worke immediately and extraordinarily or no; which being not of the nature of the thing it selfe, is not necessarily implied in the ordinary use of it. Neither is there any such calling in of God to decide doubts in game, but ⁱ the matter in question is put to the casuall disposition of the Creature; no more than there was any solemne calling of God in, or calling upon him to determine

determine the Tithe, in the example before alledged out of ^k the Law. And therefore consequently ^l no such tempting of God, as is here charged, in the vse of a Lot, be it vsed either in case of necessitie or otherwise.

Yea rather if a Lot be such, as here they say, it is not to be vsed in any businesse at all vpon any occasion whatsoever. For, *It is ^m not lawfull to tempt God ⁿ in any case whatsoever: But to vse Lots in any case whatsoever is to tempt God: It is not lawfull therefore to vse Lots in any case whatsoever.*

The Assumption is thus proued evidently ^o by the former grounds and grants: *P To require a worke of Gods immediate power and providence in this or that kinde, is to stint, and so to tempt God: But to vse a Lot in any case, is to require a worke of Gods immediate power and providence: (for euery Lot, say they, is such:) Therefore to vse a Lot in any case whatsoever is vnlawfull.*

But this Conclusion is vntrue: for ^q a Lot in some cases may lawfully be vsed: the former ground therefore is false.

It is indeed ^{*} vnlawfull and a tempting of God to vse a Lot so as they would haue it vsed only, to wit, requiring and expecting an extraordinary worke of God in it, in any case or vpon any occasion whatsoever, without Gods expresse appointment of it, though all meanes should faile otherwise. For to haue recourse to extraordinary meanes when ordinary faile, is to tempt God by refusing to depend and wait vpon God, as our Saviour implieth, when ^r at the Devils motion he refused to

^k Levit. 27. 37.

^l Non est periculum ne Deum tentare videatur.

Martyr in 1 Sam. 6. 10.

^m Deut. 6. 16.

Matth. 4. 7.

ⁿ Præcepta negativa ligant semper et ad semper. Gerson. reg. mor. al.

^o Ex concessis.

^p Exod. 17. 2. 7.

^p Psal. 73. 18, 19, 20.

^q Prov. 18. 18.

^{*} Nō permittit nos Deus voluntate suam per media extraordinaria investigare. D. l. v. disq. mag. tom. 2. l. 4. c. 4. q. 5. §. 2.

^r Matth. 4. 3, 4, 2.

speake

עֵינֵי, &c. sicut
 אֲמַרְי 1 Reg. 2.
 17. male vulgo ex-
 ponunt, lube, im-
 pera, &c.
 * Exod. 17. 2, 3.
 Psal. 78. 41.

† *speake* to his Father to haue *stones turned into bread*, lest by so doing he should tempt God, though it were in case of extremitie: that which was * the sinne of the *Israelites* sometime in the *Wildernesse*. No such Lot therefore at all as they allow of is allowable. And to *speake* as the truth is, by the course and force of this their discourse, the only lawfull vse of a Lot is disallowed and condemned, and an vn-lawfull and unwarrantable vse of it is allowed in the roome of it.

Ibid. sect. 8.

Secondly, an Oath and a Lot are not alike: the comparison therefore laid betweene them will not hold. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot put to the speciall prouidence or immediate and extraordinary worke of God; as † the truth of the thing testified is in an oath put to his testimonie: neither is there in euery Lot any such solemne inuocation of God, as there is in an Oath euer either * expressed or implied, by which God is called to witnesse with vs the truth of that we auow, or the truth of our purpose to performe what we promise: as may hereby appeare.

† 2 Cor. 11. 31.
 Galat. 1. 20.
 Phil. 1. 8.

* 2 Cor. 1. 23.

* *Balm. Dialog.*
 ‡ *Lyra in Pr. 6. 16.*

The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so * some of the aduerse party define Lottery out of * *Lyra*, *To vse Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull or uncertaine matter.* Which definition of Lottery containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.

Neither

Neither doe the * places produced proue it. They proue only that Prayer was sometime vsed (but "a faithlesse prayer" the one of them without word or warrant) before an extraordinary Lot for an extraordinary power and prouidence to direct the euent of it; * the thing intended being such as the Lot by no naturall power, either of the Creature vsing it, or vsed in it, was able to effect: which kinde of prayer hath no place, nor is lawfull in ordinarie or meere diuisory Lots. For example: ^p In assigning and setting out Tithe, it was not lawfull, much lesse necessarie, to pray God so to *giue a right Lot*, that euery Lambe or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainly or constantly so cometo hand. But they proue not that prayer is part of a Lot, or is in the Lot, as it is part of an Oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the vsuall ^q definitions of an Oath may appeare. In election of offices sacred or ciuill, prayer is vsed or at least ought to be vsed: yet it followeth not therefore that praier is a part of the choise, or that therefore the election *in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a speciall prouidence and determining presence of God*. Yea prayer may be vsed both before game and in game, as both before and at meat, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a speciall prouidence of God and a determining presence in it.

Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it selfe, as * before hath beene shewen: there is much difference therefore betweene Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments, and Oaths. For these things

D d

are

* 1 Sam. 14. 41.
Aet. 1. 24, 25, 26.
m Precatur, sed
prorsus absque omni
fide. Martyr in
Sam. c. 14.
n 1 Sam. 14. 41.
o Aet. 1. 24.
p Levit. 27. 32.
q Hoc est iurare,
Deum testari. Aug.
in Psal. 109 Deum
testem adhibere Cic.
Offic. 1. 3. Quid est
iurare, nisi in ver-
ritatis Deo reddere.
Aug. de verb. Ap.
serm. 28. Iurare est
testem adhibere De-
um. Lomb. sent. l. 3.
d. 29. F. Deum
in testem vocare.
Thom. sum. par. 2.
2e. q. 89. a. 1. 4.
et q. 98. a. 2. im-
plorare testimonium
Dei exhibendum.
Ibid. q. 89. a. 1. In-
rumentum est Dei
attestatio ad veri-
tatem sermonis na-
stri confirmandam.
Calv. instit. l. 2. c. 8.
§. 23. Inuocatio Dei
qua petim^{us} ut Deus
sit testis de animo
nostro quod fallere
nolumus, et ut vin-
dex sit si sefellere-
mus. Melan. b. loc.
com. in definit. In-
uocatio itaque ad in-
uocationem pertinet.
Ibid. de 20 precept.
chap. 6. §. 6.

are holy of themselves and in their owne nature, as the very definitions of them will soone shew: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not alwaies and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as euer, in our ordinary vse; whereas no Lot is holy that we can vse now adaies; nor indeed was euer any so, saue extraordinarily. But Gods taking of any thing sometime extraordinarily, or from ordinarie vse, to apply it to some holy and extraordinarie vse, doth not exempt the kinde in generall, but the thing only it selfe so vsed in speciall from ciuill or light and ordinarie vsage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the vse of water in Baptisme hindreth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptisme, or that hath so beene, but is not now. In like manner, when a Lot shall be extraordinarily vsed for a speciall signe of Gods immediate election and choise, whosoever shall then contemne or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and Gods name in so doing; but not whosoever shall vse otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had beene vsed in such a businesse before; there remaining no more holinesse in it after that vse is ouer, than in the bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.

Exod. 3. 2, 5.

I. B.
Reply.

To this long Answer I might make a short Reply. For whereas M^r. G^s. maine ground is this: There is

no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinary Lot, and thereupon he buildeth these Answers. Therefore there is no tempting of God by using Lots in sport. Therefore Praier expressed, or to be understood, is (not) required in ordinary Lots: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is not an holy thing in it selfe. I might (referring my selfe to the defence of my former Argument) briefly reply and say: There is an immediate providence of God in an ordinarie Lot: Therefore God is tempted by using Lots in sport: Therefore Praier expressed, or to be understood, is required of them who use an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is an holy thing.

Here that appeareth that I told you before, that vnlesse you grant Mr. B. what he could not in the former Argument make good, all is gone. For here is nothing that will stand, vnlesse that be made good. So that by his owne acknowledgment nothing needed to be anew answered to this Argument, it sufficient Answer haue beene giuen to the former.

T. G.
Reioinder.

But Mr. G. hee saith vpon such ground denieth all this.

1. Mr. G. need lay no ground at all for his deniall: It is enough for him barely to denie some Proposition, which vpon his deniall Mr. B. is to proue.

2. Mr. G. doth not denie all this vpon such ground as Mr. B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediate providence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in euery extraordinary one:

for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to worke in such manner saue when he himselfe will? But because it cannot be proued that there is so *ordinarily in ordinarie Lots*, nor doth *the nature of a Lot* require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already beene shewed.

3. I might demand of Mr. B. how *the use of a lufurious Lot* can be a *tempting of God*, by *desiring the manifestation of his speciall providence in his immediate disposing*, if such an *immediate providence of God* be generally in all *Lots*. For what is it to tempt God, but to *stint him to that*, or to *try him whether he will doe that, or no*, which it is *uncertaine whether he be willing vnto or no*? But if in all *Lots* such an *immediate providence of God* be, then it is certaine before hand that God will so worke in it. And if it be said, that God is not willing to haue *lufurious Lots* cast; yet he is not vnwilling, if this ground be good, when they are cast so to worke in them: for who can enforce him to it, vnlesse he will? A man might reason therefore rather backward from Mr. B's grounds, and say, *An immediate providence of God is in euery Lot necessarily: And, Therefore it is no tempting of God to expect that of it, that cannot but be in it*, to wit, a *speciall providence in disposing the Lot without meanes*.

I. B.

But something more in replying, will haue more saueur in reading.

True:

* True : if it be not so vnsauourie as some things before haue beene. ^b Otherwise the more and the longer, I suppose, the lesse sauiour.

T. G.

^a *It enim alie bonas res, ita bonus liber melior est quisque, quo maior. Et*

At. Tull. j oratio optima fertur esse que maxima. Plin. epist. 10. b Méyas τίς αὖ, μέγα γὰρ. Callimach. apud Aibem. dññ s. l. 3. Et, O. ior γὰρ, μέγα αὖ γὰρ. Diogenian. in Pagan.

Therefore I first maruell that Mr. G. forgetteth himselfe in concluding : That all Lots be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate providence in all Lots. What? Were extraordinary Lots vnlawfull too? Nay; he understandeth an exception of them, because they were commanded by God. So I say, ordinary Lots were aduised by God to end controuersies. Therefore vsing them in that case is no tempting of God.

I. B.

Mr. B. might, if he pleased, easily haue seene what my Conclusion intendeth, not to determine ought concerning any such Lots as by Gods speciall appointment were sometime vsed with expectation of such a speciall and extraordinary providence in them, but of such only as may in these daies be lawfully vsed, which alone we now deale with. Betweene which two sorts there is much difference in the case now questioned. It being no tempting of God to expect such an extraordinary worke of his in the one, because without it that could not be certainly effected, for which he had inioyned them to be vsed. Whereas in the other it is; because neither the businessse whereunto they are vsed, requireth it, nor hath God himselfe any where promised it. So that

I. B.

it is not *the want* of either *command* or *warrant* for the use of them, but the *expecting* or *requiring* that which there is *no ground* or *promise* of God for in the use of them, that maketh them guilty in that kinde.

That which followeth therefore I auow still, and can easily make good; both that *all extraordinarie Lots now used are unlawfull*, and no better than *meere Sorceries*; as the attempting by *Lot* to discover a malefactor would be, which yet was lawfull when * God enioyned it.

* *Josh. 7. 14, 15.*

And againe that to use any *Lots* in that manner as Mr. B. prescribeth, to wit, with *inuocation* for and *expectation* of a *speciall and immediate worke* of Gods providence therein, or to put things to *Lot* upon presumption of such providence, is to tempt God, he hauing no where promised any such thing.

I. B.

I marvel also, why Mr. G. should so confidently affirme, that by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate providence in all Lots, an unlawfull use of a Lot is allowed in the roome of the onely lawfull use.

T. G.

The reason is apparent, because such an use is allowed, as is *superstitious*, and *without warrant*. Yea such as Mr. B. himselfe, I doubt not, but will condemne, if that position be vnfound, to wit, that *such an immediate providence*, as Mr. B. pretendeth, is *ordinarily in Lots*; which Mr. B. knowing that Mr. G. denieth: why should hee marvel that hee holdeth that, that doth necessarily follow vpon the deniall of it?

But

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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But I referre the discussing hereof to the defence of my third Argument.

I. B.

There then we shall deale further with it.

T. G.

Againe it is to be obserued, that he sets downe a Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, which I set not downe, whereby the minde of the Reader may be troubled. For I say not: As the truth of a thing is by an Oath put to Gods Testimony; so in an Ordinary Lot the right of a thing is put to Gods immediate providence. This is it that I say: As an Oath in the Nature thereof supposeth the testifying presence of God: so a Lot, in the Nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a Controuersie; I say not, Deciding a right: For before diuiding the land of promise by Lot, no Tribe, or family could challenge more right to one portion than to another. Ending (I say) a controuersie is by a Lot referred to Gods determining, the same by his whole or immediate disposing the vncertain Lot to a certaine euent.

I. B.

I set downe no more as Mr. B. but what is his, and he himselfe in precise termes hath set downe before me. Onely I shew diuers differences, and those materiall betweene an Oath and a Lot, in regard whereof there is no sound reasoning from the one to the other. And among other things withall shew, that there is no necessitie of Gods determining presence in such manner as is here presumed in a Lot, because there is nothing in an ordinary Lot put vpon Lottery, that requireth any such diuine determining presence.

T. G.

But

But whereas Mr. B. here auerreth that *no right of ought is in an ordinary Lot put to Question, because the use of it is onely to end Controuersie*; the reason is most friuolous: For are not *Controuersies* most frequent about matter of *Right*? and many of them more impossible to be ended by any other course, than other *Controuersies* ordinarily are? And sure if there be such an *immediate providence and a determining presence of God* in them, as by Mr. B. is presumed, why should not *questions of right*, where they cannot well be determined otherwise, be referred to a *Lot*, as well, if not rather, than any other? Since also that that place in the *Proverbs* speaketh of *Controuersies* in generall, without distinction or exclusion of any. For to reason, as Mr. B. heere from a particular to a generall, *There was no question of right* (though that also may be questioned by those that ranke that among *extraordinary Lots*) *in the diuision of the land of Canaan*; Therefore there is none in any: I say no more but that it is like Mr. B's reasoning oft else-where.

I. B.

It is also to be obserued that in the 2. Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, touching Praier, he saith, *Neither is there in euery Lot any such solempne inuocation. Therefore in some Lot, there is, that is, in an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate providence to direct the euent of it. For the same cause (say I) praier to be expressed, or vnderstood in the use of an ordinary Lot to.*

T. &

You see, if a man grant Mr. B. what he will, hee can

can proue what he list. Wee had this before in the briefe *Answer* at first : Why doth hee trouble his Reader now with it againe ? But you see, he cannot goe on an inch vnlesse that be still granted ; which will neuer be made good.

But, saith Mr. G. Prayer is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lot. I haue said nothing to the contrary. So that he might haue spared his definition of a Lot.

I. B.

But if he say nothing now to it, hee answereth not mine *Argument* ; that therefore prayer is not necessarily in euery Lot either expressed or implied. Wherein also because I spake somewhat short then, it being sufficient to giue the contradictory to Mr. B's assertion, I speake further home now and say, that it is not in any Lot at all ; for it is one thing to be vsed about it, another thing to be in it. Prayer, and other discourse is vsed oft about or at our meales, but is not therefore in them.

T. G.

But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed ? Euen by Gods whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination ? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or vnderstood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof.

I. B.

Answer to Mr. B's Reply

T. G.

1. If that definition be but a sory one, why did Mr. B. giue no better? Or why doth he not shew wherein it is defectiue?

2. You see still, he must haue that granted him, which so oft hee inculcaterh, or else nothing will fadge with him.

3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principall, because a ruling and ouer-ruling hand in all things. Must solemne prayer therefore be necessarily vsed before euery thing, euery step that a man strideth, or euery chery that he eateth?

4. It is one thing to haue prayer vsed about a thing; an other thing to haue prayer necessarily vnderstood or implied in it.

5. By this silly reason it may be proued that any serious affaire about which solemne praier is to bee vsed, is of the same nature with an Oath.

I. B.

Now then let vs consider the places produced to proue it. The former (saith Mr. G.) was faithlesse. I say so too. Because that Lot was without any warrant. This notwithstanding, praier in this and the other place, doth shew that Gods people beleewing that God doth signifie his iudgement by the whole or immediate disposition of that Lot, did therefore thinke themselves bound to pray.

T. G.

^a Matb. 14. 14.
Luke 24. 30.

What is all this to proue that in a Lot, as in an Oath, praier is ener vnderstood or implied. A man might as well reason thus; Our Saviour ^a more than once prayed, before he brake bread: Therefore in all breaking of Bread praier ener is implied.

I need not adde, that in those being extraordinary,

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nary, there was necessary cause to craue by prayer some speciall presence and prouidence, because Mr. B. himselfe in his next words obserueth it.

But both their Lots were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate prouidence of God. Therefore they might well beleue that they should pray. True: so all Christians may, yea and must beleue, they ought to pray in the vsing ordinary Lots, because of Gods immediate prouidence exercised therein.

I. B.

True, if they will beleue Mr. B. on his word: but not else: for out of Gods word, I am sure, he cannot make this good, which yet so oft he repeateth, and buildeth all vpon.

T. G.

Nay; It was unlawfull in setting out Tithes. If so; not because it was an ordinary Lot, (if a Lot) but because the Lord exprestly saith, of all that goeth vnder the rod the tenth shall be holy.

I. B.

I no where deny that any *Praier* might haue beene vsed at that manner of assignement, but *prayer onely to such particular purpose*. Which yet if it had beene vsed, did not require ought against the *tenths being holy*, but that each *tenth* might come forth according to the due order of being yeaned.

T. G.

The instance of election of Offices is besides the purpose. For it is not argued thus: Because Gods people praied when they vsed a Lot; therefore there is an im-

I. B.

mediate providence of God in a Lot. But thus: There is an immediate providence of God in a Lot: Therefore Gods people praied when they used a Lot.

T. G.

Then belike it was produced to proue nothing at all that was to be proued. For the point to bee proued was not that Gods people praied at the use of a Lot, but that *that* a Lot doth suppose the determining presence, or immediate providence of God. Which hereby also Mr. B. endeoured to proue. But now Mr. B. it seemeth, taketh that for a thing granted; which is the point that he is to proue.

The instance is to the purpose; for it doth shew that *Praier is not therefore implied in a Lot, as in an Oath*, though it be used thereabout.

I. B.

If then there be an immediate providence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof praier is to be expressed or understood in the lawfull use of a Lot, then praying and playing (though they rime well together, yet) run not well together in the lawfull use of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both, That a Lot is not to be used but in a case of necessitie more or lesse. And therefore strange (I will not say, absurd) is Mr. Gs. Position p. 111. to wit, The lesse weightie the matter is, wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be proued, that the lesse weightie the matter is, the greater is the necessitie of ending the controuersie by a Lot. The said Position is more strange, because he granteth p. 95. That Prayer specially applied to the Lot may (in some case) be conceined, where the matter is more weightie, as in the choise of a Magistrate. But concerning

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cerning this also more shall bee said in my next Reply.

If a man grant Mr. B. his *If's* still, hee can proue any thing: else nothing. He said but euen now that he doth not here proue it, and yet presently vpon it, he telleth vs, *If then it be so &c.* as if it were heere proued to hand. But vnlesse that bee proued, all that followeth is iust nought. For *nought and nought and nought maketh nought*; as in CIPHERING they vse to say.

T. G.

Yet that *praying & playing doe not at all runne well*, I hope Mr. B. will not affirme. For albeit a man may not play with praier, yet hee may pray, I hope, before he play; yea and vpon iust occasion too at his play.

That *absurd Position*, as Mr. B. here implieth it to be, hath beene sufficiently canuased already; and hath more truth in it, I belecue, than Mr. B. is aware of. If ought further come against it, it shall in his due place be answered. That here alledged of *Praier vsed with some Lot*, no way crosseth it; nor doth Mr. B. shew wherein it any way doth.

Lastly, It serueth my turne that Mr. G. acknowledgeth that Gods name, and an Holy thing is abused, whensoever an extraordinary Lot is contemned, because an immediate prouidence of God is therein. For the same cause an ordinarie Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abused in sport. But Mr. G. hath shewen before, that a Lot is not in it selfe an Holy thing. Indeed; he would haue shewen in his third

I. B.

Reason, inducing him to allow lusurious Lots, as not euill in themselves, that a Lot is not holy either in it selfe, or by diuine institution. Whereunto I haue already answered somewhat. But hauing learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now for some more satisfaction, answer somewhat more. A Lot (saith Mr. G. p. 132, & 133.) is not holy either in it selfe, because a Casualtie hath no holinesse in it selfe: For then all Casualties should be holy: or by diuine institution in the word sanctifying it to some holy Use.

I answer briefly. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an holy thing in it selfe, because of Gods immediate providence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in respect of the same providence? If it be, Then though all casualties be not holy in themselves, yet all lawfull Lots be holy in themselves. So that as the Bush that burnt and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, p. 156. So a Lot is holy, because of Gods speciall presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully used, because of Gods speciall presence therein from time to time. Therefore howsoeuer sport might haue beene made with the Bush, the presence of God being remoued; yet ought sport neuer be made with a Lot, because Gods speciall presence is euer therein.

T. G.

^a Mirabar, inquit
ille, si quid offerres
noui. Ter. Phorm.
3.2.

This should haue come before. Yet better at last, we say, than neuer. But ^a what new matter hath Mr. B. here brought? Doth hee any more than abuse

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^b abuse his Reader by singing ouer and ouer his wonted song, that *in euery lawfull Lot* (it must be in euery one lawfull or vnlawfull, if it be of the nature and essence of a Lot) there is an immediate providence: and if so, then that such and such things follow; that which no man doubteth of or denieth. I passe by, that he saith, *I grant that euery extraordinary Lot is Gods Name, and Gods Name abused in it, when it is contemned*; whereas I hold many extraordinary Lots, as all *Diminutorie* ones vsed now adaies, to be rather *the Devils Name*; and Gods Name most honoured, when they are most, not contemned only, but detested too.

b At enim tades iam eadem auare millies: dum eandē semper castilenam canis. Ibid.

Againe, I need not proue that an ordinary Lot to end controuersies is by diuine institution in the word, seeing Mr. G. granteth that God in *Pro. 18. 18.* aduiseeth vs to use it to that end.

I. B.

What I grant, is to be seene. But by this Argument a man may as well proue, euery *peare-plum*, or *Lectise-lease*, to be holy, because by diuine institution in the word, all *herbs* and *fruits* are for mans vse. Mr. B. himselfe saw the slighnesse hereof: and addeth therefore to mend the matter:

T. G.

But it is not sanctified to an holy vse. I haue shewed otherwise.

I. B.

Where? Can you tell?

T. G.

But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwaies holy in it selfe? as Mr. G. saith in this passage.

I. B.

T. G.

I no where say, that a Lot is not alwaies holy in it selfe, (nor is any at all so) but onely, that Lots are not alwaies sacred.

I. B.

Were all extraordinary Lots sanctified to holy uses?

T. G.

Yea: all that were vsed by Gods speciall direction, if Mr. B. speake of such, were sanctified to an holy vse, to wit, to be *diuine Oracles*. And what then?

I. B.

Yet Mr. G. deemeth them all holy in themselves, because of immediate providence in them.

T. G.

Rather: therefore he deemeth them sacred, and in that regard holy, though not holy otherwise of themselves.

I. B.

Why may not I for the same cause, thinke the same of all ordinary Lots?

T. G.

*⁊ Versat Sisyphus
ingens Saxum su-
dans nitendo; neque
proficit hulum. Cic.
Tuscul. l. i.*

⁊ τοῦ σισυφίου.

I. B.

Proue the same, and then thinke the same of them. But this is nothing but *⁊ the rowling of Sisyphus his stone forward and backward: and taking still for granted * the maine Question it selfe.*

And the rather because Mr. G. saith, p. 227. *Marriage being Gods ordinance is holy in it selfe. But (as he acknowledgeth, p. 1.) a Lot is Gods ordinance. Therefore from his grant a Lot is holy in it selfe. If then a Lot is holy in it selfe, I conclude with Mr. G. p. 133. It may in no case be made matter of sport.*

T. G.

This belike is the new matter that M. B. had of late better learned, and which hee thought good therefore

therefore to close vp this his wilde and diffused discourse with; * reseruing that that he thought would strike all dead to the last. But so sory and silly a thing it is, that I wonder a man of his grauitie, vnlesse he did it a little to recreate himselfe, would produce it. For what man of the meanest vnderstanding seeth not, that there is a meere *equivocation* in the word *holy*: taken in the *Proposition* in a generall sense, as all *Gods ordinances, recreation and meat* (which in ^e one of the places of Scripture there by me cited, is conioyned with it) as well as *marriage*, are said to be *holy*: but *concluded* in the strict sense here disputed of, as those things only are termed *holy, that haue speciall relation vnto God*: which of *marriage*, I suppose, vnlesse it be, as the *Popish* sort say, a *Sacrament*, Mr. B. will not auouch. What such poore shifts as these are argue, I had rather others should say than my selfe.

Let me adde but a word, to solue a seeming contradiction; (howsoeuer I say not in that place, that *Marriage is holy* in it selfe, which yet I well might;) that it is one thing to say, a thing is *holy of it selfe*, not requiring therefore any further speciall institution to make it such; and another thing to say, that it is *holy in it selfe*, in way of opposition to mans corrupt and euill vsage of it, that ^e may pollute and vnhal- low that that is holy in it selfe.

• Δεῖ δὲ ἀρξέμεν
τε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
πύργου, καὶ ἀγγεῖον
οἷς ταῦτα. *Libar*
in *Demosth.* *Que*
excellunt ad pero-
randum seruentur.
Cic. de orat. l. 2.

^e 1 Tim. 4. 4. *Sic*
Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7.
Coitus viri & mu-
lieris res pura est,
honestas, & sancta;
quia Dei institutio.

^e *Ti. 1. 15.*
Hagg. 2. 13.

The third Argument.

I. B.
Dialog. Arg.

3.

² Math. 21. 12, 13.

^{*} Num. 26. 55.

Prov. 18. 18.

W Haisocuer God hath sanctified to a proper end, is not to be perverted to a worse end².

But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controuersies^{*}.

Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worse; viz. to play, and by playing to get away another mans money, which without controuersie is his owne.

T. G.
Answer.
Of Lots, chap.
7. Sect. 13.

This Argument thus conceiued is faulty two waies. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be *perverted*, or puerly vsed; but whether the vse of Lots questioned, be a perverting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither againe is the question whether men may vse Lots playing for money; (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it be lawfull or no, I shall not need now to discusse) much lesse, whether they may be vsed in game to that end, to get another mans money from him, or no; (which is no generall vse of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is vsed onely at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall ioyne, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be vsed in sport.

Secondly, there is more inferred in the conclusion than was in the premisses, and that which followeth

loweth not from ought in them. For the vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controuersie truly so termed; otherwise it were no Lot.

For the mending of these faults, the Argument may better be conceiued on this manner:

That which God hath sanctified to some proper vse, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse vse.

But ^a God hath sanctified Lots to this proper vse, to wit, the deciding of controuersies in matters of weight.

A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other vse, much lesse to a worse.

The Proposition is proued by ^b an instance of the Temple, set apart for praier, which the Iewes therefore are reprov'd for applying to market and merchandise.

The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Salomon, *The Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty.* For ^d the other

place is but an instance that a Lot once was by Gods owne appointment so vsed. It is amplified ^e *à simili*, by the like vse of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought ^f to proue that Salomons purpose in those words before alledged, is to shew the only lawfull vse of a Lot, (*viz.* to end controuersies, which otherwise conueniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mighty to yeeld) thus: ^g *As when the Apostle saith, An Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach*

^a Their proper vse is to decide great controuersies. Perkins gold. chaine, chap. 20. on precep. 3.

^b Math. 21. 12, 13. ex Esai. 56. 7. & Ier. 7. 11.

^c Prov. 18. 18. ^d Num. 26. 55.

^e The proper end of a Lot, as of an Oath, is to end a controuersie. Balmford dial. ground 2.

^f Fennor of recreat. spec. rule 4. reaf. 1.

^g Fennor ibid. ^h Hebr. 6. 16.

us, that men use an Oath to end controuersies; (which euery man knoweth) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure onely for that use of necessarie deciding of doubts of importance among men: so the like words used of a Lot must be understood in the same sense, not so much to teach us that a Lot ended such controuersies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it onely for that use.

ibid. sect. 14.

For the fuller answer to this Argument and the proofes of it, diuers distinctions, of some good use, would be obserued.

First therefore the word, *sanctifie*, is diuersly taken. For to omit all other acceptions; it is taken sometime in a larger sense; and so to *sanctifie* signifieth to assigne a creature to any speciall or singular use whatsoeuer, either sacred or ciuill: thus are ¹the Medians said by God to be *sanctified* for the subduing and sacking of Babel: and so are ²meats said to be *sanctified* by Gods word for mans food; and ³the *unbeleeuing Mate sanctified to the married beleuer.*

Sometime againe it is taken in a stricter sense; and so to *sanctifie* signifieth to set apart a Creature beside his ordinary use to some sacred and spirituall employment: as where it is said, that ⁴God *sanctified the seventh day* of the world; and where ⁵men are commanded to *sanctifie* the same: he by precept inioyning that employment of it; they by practise employing it according to his precept.

Now in both these kinds may the Lord well be said sometime to *sanctifie*, but not to appropriate; when by his ordinance he either inioyneth or granteth the use of a Creature so in some kinde, as yet he

¹ Esai. 13. 3.

² 1 Tim. 4. 4.

³ 1 Cor. 7. 14.

⁴ Gen. 2. 3.

⁵ Exod. 20. 8.

he restraineth not, nor inhibiteth the vse of it in any other kinde. Thus are the fruits of the earth so ^o *sanctified* for mans food, as they are ^p not yet restrained from physicke: yea thus was the water that ^q miraculously gushed out of the rocke so ^r sanctified to a spirituall imployment, as yet it was not denied vnto ciuill and prophane vses; euen ^f to the watering of brute beasts: sometime *to sanctifie and to appropriate*, when God sequestreth and seuereth the Creature so sanctified vnto some one speciall or proper vse from all other vses else whatsoeuer.

And thus he sanctifieth and appropriateth either the whole kinde of the Creature; as ^t that curious composition of pretious and holy ointment expressly inhibited to all other vses; or some particular onely of that kinde; as ^u the spices and odours ingredients of that holy ointment; as ^v the Tabernacle, ^w the Temple, and the appurtenances of either: and as those Elements of ^x water, ^y bread and ^z wine that in the Sacraments are sanctified to be signes and pledges of spirituall grace: and that againe, either so to continue during the date of that law, as in the vnguent before spoken of; or during the time onely of the speciall vse to those ends, as in the Elements last mentioned.

To apply these distinctions then to the present Argument: If they take the word *sanctifie* in the stricter sense, the Proposition is true, but the Assumption is vnfound: for Lots are not set apart, or said so to be in either of the ^a places produced, to any holy or spirituall, but to a ciuill vse onely.

If in the larger and more generall sense, then ei-

^o Gen. 1. 29.
^p Esai. 38. 21.
^q Num. 20. 10, 11.
^r I Cor. 10. 4.

^f Num. 20. 8, 11.

^t Exod. 30. 31, 32, 33.

^u Exod. 30. 23.

^v Exod. 30. 26, 27, 28, 29. & 29. 44.

^w I King. 8. 10, 63, 64. & 9. 3.

^x Matth. 3. 11.

^y Ephe. 5. 25.

^z I Cor. 6. 11.

^a I Cor. 10. 16.

^b Matth. 26. 27, 28, 29.

^c Prov. 18. 18.

^d Num. 26. 55.

ther they speake of things sanctified onely but not appropriated, or of things both sanctified and appropriated too, and that either the whole kinde in generall, or some of the kinde only.

If of things sanctified onely, but not appropriated, the Proposition is not true; For ^b bread and wine are sanctified to be seales of Gods covenant, and yet doth not that hinder ^c the lawfull vse of them otherwise: so was oyle sometime ^d sanctified to annoint ^e Kings and ^f Priests, and yet did not that then restraine ^g the ciuill vse of it for food, physicks, necessity or lawfull delight. Or to vse a more familiar instance and neerer the present purpose, ^h the fruits of trees are sanctified to bee mans food; yet doth not that let but that children, as of old time they did, may lawfully play and make themselves pastime as well with ⁱ nuts or ^j almonds, as with cheri-stones, or with check-stones, and the like.

If of things sanctified and appropriated; as it was in that ^k holy ointment inhibited to all other vses; and as it is in the ^l Sacraments sequestred and set apart to certaine spirituall purposes onely, the Assumption is vnfound.

If of the sanctification and appropriation not of the whole kind, but of some particulars of the kind, the premisses might bee granted, and yet nothing concluded against the vse of Lots in generall.

^b 1 Cor. 11. 23, to 28.

^c Psal. 104. 15.

^d Leuit. 21. 3, 10, 12.

^e Psal. 89. 20. & 133. 2.

^f 1 Sam. 16. 1. & 24. 7. & 26. 11.

^g 16. 13. 2 Sam. 2. 4. & 5. 3. 1 Kin. 1. 39. 2 King. 11. 12. & 23. 30.

^h Leuit. 8. 2, 10.

ⁱ Psal. 104. 15.

^j Eccles. 9. 8.

Matth. 6. 17.

Luke 10. 34.

^k Gen. 1. 29.

^l Da nucs pueris.

Catul. epitbal. Sparge, marito, nucs.

Virg. Eclog. 8. Iam tristis nucibus puer relictis.

Marcial. l. 5. ep. ult. Et, Alea parua nucs & non damnosa videtur.

Saepe tamen pueris abstulit illa nates.

Idem l. 14. epig. 18.

Quatuor in nucibus non amplius alca tota est, cum sibi suppositis additur una tribus. Ouid.

nucem quem vise. Sed & Augustus animi laxandi causa cum pueris minutis, quandoque nucibus ludebat. Suet. Aug. c. 83.

^l xv. d. 10. cap. 10. 1. Pollux l. 9. c. 7. In comment. Rabbini.

inbetur paterfamilias die festo poma, nucs amygdalas, pueris praebeere. Casaub. ad Suet. Aug.

^m Exod. 30. 31, 32, 33.

ⁿ Rom. 4. 11. Exod. 12. 11.

^o Rom. 4. 11. Exod. 12. 11.

^p Rom. 4. 11. Exod. 12. 11.

^q Rom. 4. 11. Exod. 12. 11.

If of the whole kinde, the Proposition is true, though the prooffe be not so pertinent; but the Assumption is not sound.

For the prooffe of it out of ^m Salomon: that place sheweth onely ^a how a Lot may well and wisely be vsed; but neither iniogneth that vse of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. It approueth onely the vse as good and commendable in that kinde: But it is one thing for a Lot to bee vsed well and wisely to that end; and another thing to haue that the proper or onely end of it.

^m *Prou. 18. 18.*

ⁿ *Summa est singulariorem esse sortis usum in componendis litibus. Cartwr. in Prou. 6. 18.*

But ^o the Apostles speech of an Oath sheweth that Salomon meant so, when he vsed the like speech of a Lot.

^o *Hebr. 6. 16.*

It doth nothing lesse. For neither is it true that the Apostles scope was to shew that this is the only end of an Oath, *to stint strife and controuersie*, neither is it so indeed.

His purpose is not to shew it: for ^p it is only to shew how sacred, firme and inuiolable an Oath is among men from man to man; (which he proueth by that which all men know and acknowledge) and how much more then from God to man, when ^q he sweareth to us by whom we swear: like the Argument vsed by the Apostle else where, *A mans couenant or testament once ratified no man annulleth; much lesse can any annull or abrogate Gods.*

^p *Hebr. 6. 13, 16, 17, 18.*

^q *Iurat vobis per quem iuratis. Cassiod. Var. 4. 8. ep. 3. Galat. 3. 35.*

Neither is that the only lawfull end of an Oath. For there be other ends of it; as, to give assurance of the performance of couenants and promises. For what controuersie was there betweene Jonathan and David to be ended by Oath, when ^r they sweare either

^r *1 Sam. 20. 16, 17, 42.*

^t Gen. 22. 16, 17.

Heb. 6. 13, 14, 17,

18.

^u Psa. 119. 106.

& 132. 2, 3.

^a Prov. 18. 18.

^z Wise LANAT. &
Bainū in Prov. 18.

^y Cartw. ibid.

^o Iosb. 7. 14. Jon.

1. 7. 1 Sam. 14. 42.

Leuit. 16. 8; 9.

^u *Vsus particularis
fortis litium direm-
ptio. Valet porro ad
veritatem investi-
gandam; ad con-
cordiam ubi prius
culpa est alendam,*
&c. Cartw. in
Prov. c. 18.

I. B.

Reply.

either to other? or what controuersie was there be-
twene God and Abraham, or David and God; when
^t God sware to Abraham, and ^u David to God? or
what controuersie is there to bee ended by those
Oathes, that men vsually take at entrance into office
both in Church and Common-weale?

The like may be said of that ^a other place of Sa-
lomon. The scope of the place is not to stint or re-
straine the vse of a Lot to the ending of strife, much
lesse to the ending of great quarrels onely; or a-
mong men of might alone, though Salomon expresse
name such: For he speaketh of contentions in gene-
rall: And why may not a meane inheritance be di-
uided by Lot among meane men as well as a rich
one among mighty men? Or doe not contentions
arise among mighty men many times about meane
matters? But the scope of it is rather ^z to perswade
all sorts of men to compose their controuersies, be
they great or small, rather by such a course so easie
and so equall, than to plunge themselues by eager
pursuit of Law-suits into further inconueniences;
and ^y to induce men of meane condition the rather
so to doe, when euen men of might are content oft
to submit themselues thereunto.

Not to adde, that Lots haue beene vsed ^z oft to
other ends (for it is but one vse among many that is
there mentioned) as both hath beene in part, and
shall further hereafter be shewed, and as ^a some of
them that in this point oppose vs, confesse.

*I would thanke Mr. G. for mending mine Argu-
ments, though there be not any great need, if he had not*
put

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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put into his Assumption these words [In matters of weight] for his owne purpose, as shall appeare.

What need there was both of mending it, and of inserting those words, that it might conclude, and the conclusion might not be wholly impertinent, by mine Answer may appeare.

T. G.

But to the matter. In mine understanding and meaning, the proposition doth sufficiently expresse all that which moueth Mr. G. to grant it.

I. B.

Yea and somewhat more too ; for it beggeth the question in controuersie, and presumeth that that is to be proued ; which the Conclusion following it must needs also haue done ; as in mine Answer I shew.

T. G.

Well ; then let vs consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned ? What ? Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by iust consequence ? as Mr. G. in his allowance of lufurious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so usefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controuersies, inioyned by precept, either directly or by iust consequence ? Doth God more carefully prouide for recreations, than for peace among his people ? But Mr. G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135, where he saith : The use of Lots is not simply commanded. For *Prou. 18. 18.* is rather a per-

I. B.

mission than a precept; and not so much a commandment, as an aduice and counsell. I will come to an issue. If it will please Mr. G. to set downe his iust consequence to proue Recreation inioyned by precept, I will undertake to set downe as iust a consequence to proue, that a Lot to end a Controuersie is likewise inioyned by precept. In meane while, I cannot be perswaded, that our God of peace, who commandeth vs to seeke peace and follow after it, and hath ordeined a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate providence, to end controuersies, which otherwise cannot bee ended conueniently, doth leaue vs at liberty in that case, to vse or not to vse a Lot.

Psal. 34. 14.

T. G.

* Οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ λέγων ἐξω τῷ ἀδύνατος λέγειν καλούμενοι. Aristot. rhet. l. i. c. i.
* Οὐδὲν ὁπὸς ἑ-
πος. Nihil ad rem
ipsam.

I. Mr. B. is somewhat like those Lawyers of whom Aristotle saith, that * they would haue little to say, if they were held to the matter that they are to deale in. He taketh occasion here to run out into a by-matter, which though all were granted him is a not a pin to the purpose. For the question is, whether Lots be not onely sanctified, but appropriated so to the ending of Controuersies, that to no other purpose they may be used, and whether Salomons testimonie, Prou. 18. 18. proue as much. Now grant all that Mr. B. here pleadeth for, and that I deny not; That the vse of Lots is inioyned in some cases, such as hee last mentioneth, or, that it is inioyned by iust consequence out of the word, is this sufficient to proue that it is therefore to that vse onely appropriated, or that this place of Salomon proueth the same? This I deny to follow; and (besides that reason it selfe euidently discovereth as much) Mr. B. himselfe ^b else-
where

^b Dialogue.

where cutteth the very sinewes of his owne Argument, where hauing objected that Bread and Wine are in the Sacrament to holy uses sanctified, and yet we may recreate our selues therewith; as also that singing of Psalmes is sanctified to the praise of Gods Name, and yet with singing also we may recreate our selues, he answereth that those ends be not proper, though they be holy. So that all this granted, yet is his Assumption, by his owne grant, as far from being proued as euer it was.

2. He chargeth me most vntruly to deny that the use of a Lot for ending of any Controuersie is nowhere inioyned in the word, either expressly, or by iust consequence. I say onely, that Salomon in that particular place questioned, neither inioyneth that use of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. Which latter branch it is especially, that Mr. B. must oppose & disproue, if he will from thence haue any prooffe. But this is like the Argument that Bellarmine and some others vse to proue Calvin and Erasmus, Arrians, because they denie some places to be vnderstood of Christs Deity, out of which the same is supposed to be confirmed by others. Doth a man necessarily say, Such a thing cannot at all be proued out of Scripture; if he say, that Out of this or that place it cannot be proued? ^a Calvin holdeth degrees of glory in heauen; and yet denieth that ^c some places affirme it, which are yet alledged commonly for the prooffe of it. But whether either this or any other place of Scripture doe proue that the use of Lots is inioyned for the ending of Controuersies, is nothing to the purpose, vnlesse it be proued also that they restraine it wholly thereunto.

^c Vide Bellarm. prefat. ad Controuers. 2. & Apolog. Erasmi adv. articulos a monachis Hispanis sibi objectos. Sed & Egid. Hunnium in Calv. Iudaif. & Param in Calv. Orthod. prefat.

^a Scriptura docent non equalem fore glorie modum in calis. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 25. §. 10.

^c Dan. 12. 3.

1 Cor. 15. 41.

Vide Calv. coment. in hac loca.

3. A man if it were to the purpose, might well make question, whether the use of Lots to end controversies, be so necessary as recreation is. Since many an one haue liued quietly enough, and done well enough without vse of the one, which no man liuing can doe without the vse of the other.

4. Why doth Mr. B. offer to ioine issue hereupon here, where it is nothing to the purpose, and not rather accept of it before offred him, in the last of my Arguments, concerning other recreations, as Boules, Chesse, &c. generally iustified, and some other ciuill actions; but silyly sincke by it there, as if no such matter had at all beene once mentioned? And I would gladly yet heare what prooffe he would bring out of Gods word for recreation by Boules or Chesse, or for wearing band and cuffs, ruffs or falls, and the like. Here it needeth not: for I grant all he requirereth; and doubt not but that in some speciall cases, though very few, a Lot is inioyned necessarily, & that by the word the same may be shewed. But Mr. B. is very forward indeed to proue that that is not denied: but that that is most denied, he still obtrudeth vpon vs without prooffe, to wit, that God is in a Lot present by his immediate prouidence. For that cometh in also here againe. It is as the Crosse with the Papists; ^f nothing can be done without it.

^f Crucis signum in
omnibus rebus ad-
hibendum. Ex Pseu-
do-Dionysio &
Martiale Steph. Du-
rant. de rit. Eccles.
l. 2. c. 36. In omni-
bus sacramentis Cru-
cis signum adhibe-
tur. Bellarm. de
Imag. c. 29.
Quod Lucian. de
Rhetor. Eni πῶς
ἢ ὁ Μαρδίων ἢ
Κωδύγεος, ὡς
ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ γέ-
νοιτο.

I. B.

But suppose the use of a Lot be not (thus) inioyned; yet doth not Gods counsell (which me thinks is a com- mandement, though it be said of a mans counsell, that it is no commandement) sanctifie it to be used to end con- trouersies? This (I thinke) will not be denied.

I. If

1. If it will not, as indeed it is not: why doth Mr. B. keepe such a coile about it; as if it were denied, when it is not. But thus Mr. B. as he saith of some, & loueth to be brieft in the maine point, and long (euen to tediousnesse) in by-matters.

2. Whether *difference* be or no betweene Gods counsels and commands, (the Apostle seeming^h to allow some things, which yet he would not advise, and not absolutely to inioyne some things, which yet he wisheth and adviseth to) I stand not now to dispute. Sure I am, that he that adviseth a man rather to *diuide by Lot*, than to *waste* himselfe at Law, doth not inioyne him thereby to *diuide by Lot*, but onely to use that course, or some other of like nature, (for it tieth him not to that particular) whereby a quiet end may be had.

3. But to what end should words be multiplied more about this, when as it is acknowledged, whether it be a counsell or a command, a permission or injunction, it is sufficient to *sanctifie Lots to that use*? So that Mr. B. need not have strained himselfe to vtter herein an vntruth, and then dilate vpon it with so many Rhetoricall amplifications, if he had not beene disposed^t to picke a quarrell without cause.

*jugium facit; ut quod nemini negari debeat. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Celibatus res est indifferens à Domino in lege nemini vel præcepta vel prohibita, sed tantum omnibus permessa. In istis verò rebus indifferentibus imperium quidem peremptorium jubens vel vetans, nullum; at consilium earum commoditate vel incommoditate ostendens, magnum & usum & locum habet. Morton. ibid. i. avai-
nor ainqad. Homer. Iliad. 7.*

But it is denied, That the use of a Lot is restrained to end controuersies, much lesse great quarrels onely; and

I. B.

ε Τὸ δὲ ἄ, παρρησίαν,
ἐργον, ὅς ποτε μὲν
Τὸ δ', ἐργον ὅς,
παρρησίαν ἐκ παρρη-
σίας. Azatho apud
Clem. Strom. l. 5. &
Athen. dipnos. l. 5.
Observanda traje-
ctio, ne lepos inter-
cidat.

^h 1 Cor. 7. 5, 6, 7,
25, 27, 28, 39, 40.

De virginibus, in-
quit, præceptum
Domini non habeo.
Cur? Quia & ipse
ut effect virgo, non
fuit imperij sed pro-
priae voluntatis.
Hieron. ad Eustoch.
de custod. virgin.
Celibatium ut lau-
det, nihil audeat præ-
scribere; nemini
necessitatem vult
imponere; sed suam
cuique libertatem
relinquere. Celiba-
tum commendat, li-
berum tamen con-

3. A man if it were to the purpose, might well make question, whether the use of Lots to end controversies, be so necessary as recreation is. Since many an one haue liued quietly enough, and done well enough without vse of the one, which no man liuing can doe without the vse of the other.

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I. B.

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I. If

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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T. G.

1. If it will not, as indeed it is not: why doth Mr. B. keepe such a coile about it; as if it were denied, when it is not. But thus Mr. B. as he saith of some, *loueth to be brieft in the maine point, and long (euen to tediousnesse) in by-matters.*

2. Whether *difference* be or no betweene Gods counsels and commands, (the Apostle seeming^h to allow some things, which yet he would not advise, and not absolutely to *inioyne* some things, which yet he *wisbeth* and *adviseth* to) I stand not now to dispute. Sure I am, that he that *adviseth* a man rather to *diuide by Lot*, than to *waste* himselfe at Law, doth not *inioyne* him thereby to *diuide by Lot*, but onely to use that course, or some other of like nature, (for it tieth him not to that particular) where-by a quiet end may be had.

3. But to what end should words be multiplied more about this, when as it is acknowledged, whether it be a counsell or a command, a permission or *injunction*, it is sufficient to *sanctifie Lots to that use*? So that Mr. B. need not haue strained himselfe to vtter herein an vntruth, and then dilate vpon it with so many *Rhetoricall amplifications*, if he had not beene disposed^t to picke a quarrell without cause.

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ε τὸ δὲ, παρὰ τὸν, ἔργον, ὡς πρὸς τὸν, ἔργον, ὡς, παρὰ τὸν, ἐκ τῶν, ἔργων. Agatho apud Clem. Strom. l. 5. & Aiben. dipnos. l. 3. Observanda trajectio, ne lepos intercidat.

^h 1 Cor. 7. 5, 6, 7, 25, 27, 28, 39, 40.

De virginibus, inquit, præceptum Domini non habeo. Cur? Quia & ipse ut esset virgo, non fuit imperij sed propriæ voluntatis.

Hieron. ad Eustoch. de custod. virgin. Celibatum ut laudet, nihil audeo præscribere; nemini necessitatem vult imponere; sed suam cuique libertatem relinquere. Celibatum commendat, liberum tamen con-

But it is denied, That the use of a Lot is restrained to end controuersies, much lesse great quarrels onely; and

I. B.

Gg 3

undry

sundry instances are giuen of vsing Lots to other ends than to end Controuersies. But all those Lots were extraordinary. Therefore whereas in the beginning of this Answer, where he would finde fault with mine Argument, he saith, That the vse of Lots in play is euer to determine some question or controuersie, though a light one (it is like) yet a question or controuersie truly so termed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in generall, then (with his fauour) he forgetteth himselfe, in saying, Lots by him quoted were not to end controuersies. If he speake of a Lot in play, as being an ordinarie Lot, then he faileth in iudgement, In denying that the vse of ordinary Lots (whereof is the question) is restrained to end controuersies: and the instances which he giueth being extraordinary Lots, are not to the point.

T. G.

1. Let it be obserued, that Mr. B. hath neuer a word here to proue that that is denied. It is denied, as Mr. B. himselfe here confesseth, that *that place, Prou. 18. 18. doth restraints the vse of Lots wholly to the ending of Controuersies*, so that they may not in any other case be vsed with good allowance. For this in effect I cite some of those that seeme to concur in opinion with Mr. B. at least in part, Mr. Cartwright by name: Nor is there ought either in the Text or about it, as I there plead, to inforce any such thing out of it. * All which Mr. B. sliding by, and not offering by any Argument to make good any such thing out of the Text; pitcheth at length vpon some instances in the very taile of my discourse, giuen of Lots wherein no controuersie was to be ended.

His

* Hoc est quod dici solet, Απεὶς τὸν νόμον, ὁ νόμος, ὁ νόμος. Hyperides apud Suidam.

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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His exceptions against them are two:

1. That *they were all extraordinary Lots*; which yet is more than of all he can make good. For how will he proue it to haue beene an extraordinary Lot, that was ^k cast vpon the scape goat? But suppose there could be no instance giuen of any Lot in Scripture vsed where no *controuersie* were. Would that proue that the place of Salomon restraineth it onely to such? Nothing lesse: Nor doe I offer to hazard my cause thereupon. My maine Answer, which I relie vpon is this, that out of the Text no such restraint can be proued or produced: Not to adde, say I afterward, that Lots haue beene vsed oft to other ends, &c. as some also that in this point oppose vs, confesse. Besides that, it would be obserued, that Mr. B. who hath so oft offered to argue from extraordinary to ordinary Lots, yet can by no meanes here endure to heare of any such arguing. He shall doe well to remember that Rule giuen in both Lawes, ^l *What is not lawfull to the one party, neither is lawfull to the other*. Though indeed neither doe I, as may appeare, frame any Argument at all out of it.

2. That by mine owne confession, if they be not to end controuersies they are no Lots at all. But he taketh my words, as I haue shewed formerly, a little too short. For I say not simply, *controuersie*, but, *question or controuersie*, as he himselfe here citeth me; the former whereof is a terme more generall than the latter, and easily salueth the seeming repugnancy.

Besides the subject matter of an extraordinary Lot,
being

^k *Le. ii. 16. 8, 9.*

^l *Non licet alicui, quod reo licitum non existit. Bonifac. in 60. de Regul. Iur. c. 32. Non debet alicui licere, quod reo non permittitur. Pandect. Reg. Iur. l. 42. ex Vlpian. ad Sabin. lib. 26.*

I. B.

being by Gods speciall direction, if it be lawfull; there may haply be no present controuersie. Whereas the subject matter of an ordinary Lot being something questioned betweene man and man, there may be a great controuersie. I say, May be. For if it be well obserued, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwaies a present controuersie to be determined: But alwaies some question to be decided to preuent a controuersie. As may appeare by Mr. G's owne words, partly here, where he saith, [That there must be some question or controuersie, or else it is no Lot] but more evidently where he saith, that the Lot vsed by the Souldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth a serious diuisorie Lot, was to preuent all contention and strife, p. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was vsed about the Land of Promise, about which was no present controuersie. For God who would haue no controuersies, would haue such things remoued, which may cause or iustly occasion controuersies. Therefore ^m Christ expounding the Commandement, Thou shalt not kill, forbiddeth words of prouocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common controuersies, and the occasions thereof be, giueth direction in Prou. 18. 18.

T. G.

Oh ⁿ how plentifull Mr. B. can be where no prooffe needeth! But ^o keepe the horse, as they say, home to the hedge. That Lots may be vsed also for the preuenting of controuersies; (and that is more than

^a Quod Passinus olim cuidam, teste Plin. ep. 6. l. 7. Bene, bene: sed quo istud tam bene? Bene scripsisti, sed nihil ad e-usam pertinens. Hieron. ad Ioan. Hier.

^o Κέντη τὸν πῶλον αἰτίαν ῥύσας. τὰ τῆς ἐορτῆς ἡμῶν φιλοσοφεί. Greg. Naz. in Christi natal. & in Pasch. ex Homer. Iliad. 4. Μὴ πῶρ τῆς ῥύσας δέωμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ὁρᾶν φιλοσοφείτω. Idem ad Eunom.

the

he bare ending of them: for * a thing cannot be ended ere it be begun) Mr. B. hath at large shewed vs. Though I know not by what *Logick* he can gather out of my words, that it must needs euer be either for the one or the other; because I say, it was for the one of them in the Lot cast upon Christs coat. But P what is all this to the purpose? How doth all this proue a restraint of Lottery to the deciding onely of some controuersie? which it may be Mr. B. hoped that this long discourse would haue put cleane out of his Readers head. That, he told you, was denied; and that, not onely is not proued, but no assay of prooffe made of it. For Mr. B. in the whole ensuing discourse giueth it cleane ouer, and spending many words about other by-matters leaueth his Argument to shift as well as it can for it selfe. ⁹ It is the manner of those, saith the Heathen man, that maintaine a bad cause, that they desire to dwell rather on any thing than that that they should deale in.

* Non potest videri habere desuisse, qui nunquam habuit. Reg. Iur. Civ. 208.

† Τι ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶν Διόρυον; Quid hoc ad Bacchum?

9 Οἱ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἔχοντες, ἢ δυνάμεις παρὰ τὰς βλάπτον διατρέχειν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον. Aristot. rhet. l. 3. c.

14.

I. B.

That which is said of an ordinary Lot, may iustly be also said of an Oath, that the use of it is sanctified to end controuersies by present determination, or preuention. For, as it is true that Hebr. 6. 16. implieth, that Gods oath to man is more inuiolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof onely Mr. G. taketh knowledge: so it is true, that Hebr. 6. 16. intimateth, That as an Oath, for confirmation, is among men an end of all strife: so Gods Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question, or controuersie. Else these words [An end of strife] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me

understood, appeareth in the two next verses, where it is written, That God bound himselfe by oath, as to shew the stablenesse of his counsell, so that the heires of promise might haue strong consolation. So that Gods oath to Abraham tooke away daubting, questioning, and all strife that might be, not onely in Abrahams minde, but also in the mindes of the heires of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not onely end present controuerfies, according to Mr. G's understanding, but confirming a promise or covenant, doth also end a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is giuen, to wit, by pre-mention.

T. G.

I wil not stand (lest I either seeme too contentious, or proue ouer-tedious) to frame such exceptions, as well I might, against diuers particulars of this discourse, built mainly vpon a meere equivocation: Nor to presse anew the Oaths taken vually at entrance into office: Onely I demand, how all this pro-ueth, that the Apostles purpose there is to limit the use of an Oath, and to restraine it wholly to such an end. Which though it were also granted, as it neuer can be proued, yet it leaueth that place of the Pro-uerbs still as free as before. But Mr. B. hath forgotten, it seemeth, what he was to proue out of it.

I. B.

Now let vs somewhat consider Mr. G's purpose in putting into the Assumption these words, [In matters of weight] Forsooth, by denying the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. Because (as he saith, p. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lots, that is, with vncertaine hazard.

A witty man, they say, can soone finde a fault, where none is. Why I put or required those words to be put into M^r. B^s. Assumption, I render a reason in his due place; to wit, because without them the Conclusion could not haue gone currant against a luforie Lot. Now M^r. B. if any man can be so silly and senslesse as to beleue him, telleth vs, that I did it to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, viz. to end controuersies; saith M^r. B. in generall. I wish him to put in, lest his Conclusion else against luforious Lots come short, in weighty matters. Whether this be to make way for the bringing of them in, or the shutting of them out, let any iudge that hath but common sense onely. He might as well haue said, that M^r. Perkins put in the word great for the same purpose, when in the place cited there in my *margin*, he saith, *The proper use of Lots is to decide great controuersies*. But belike M^r. B. had no other way to hooke that in here, that he is now falling foule on.

T. G.
 Δεινὸς αὖτις τὰ
 χαλὰν ἢ ἀδαιτὸν
 αἰτῶντο. Homer.
 Odyss. v.

I. B.
 Καὶ πᾶσι γὰρ
 δῖος Ἀπόλλων. Philostr. vita
 Apollon.

Perkins gold.
 Chaîne, chap. 20.
 on precept. 3.

Surely if M^r. G. had acknowledged Gods speciall presence by his immediate providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God to end controuersies, he would not haue so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot.

I. B.

I beleue M^r. B. that if I beleued as he doth, (for I hope he thinketh as he writeth) I should beleue otherwise than I doe. But these colewaris come so oft in still, that I feare there is the lesse fauour for them

T. G.

them in this his tedious discourse, which yet he promised vs should haue the *more saunour* in it for the length of it.

He must proue, he must proue this *his immediate providence* and imaginarie *speciall presence*, before he controll others either for not admitting of it, or not obseruing what would necessarily ensue vpon it.

But why was he offended with me for putting that into his *Assumption*, that he himselfe, as appeareth here, would haue therein maintained?

I. B.

It is true, that a matter of lesse weight in it selfe, may be the subiect matter of a controuersie, as a controuersie may be among men, as well meane, as mighty in their estate, as Mr. G. here saith, p. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prou. 18. 18. are meant men strong in affections, so as the controuersie cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the subiect matter of the Controuersie be of more or lesse weight in it selfe, so as there is a necessitie that one or both parties be satisfied. For otherwise there may be a great quarrell about a matter of lesse weight. Neither doe I say, that onely great quarrels are to be ended, or preuented by a Lot, as Mr. G. denieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, p. 173) God speaketh in Prou. 18. 18. of contentions in generall.

T. G.

גבורים

Gen. 6. 4.

עצוים

Prou. 18. 18.

1. Not to question the exposition of the word *mighty* here and Gen. 6. 4. (albeit the word be " not the same also in either) which yet I beleue Mr. B. is not able to make good. All granted that is here said, how

how doth it hence appeare, that the use of Lots is in that place of the Proverbs restrained to such quarrels or controuersies, as Mr. B. here speaketh of? Or how appeareth it hence, that for some sinister end I put in those words?

2. If any Controuersies but weighty, may by a Lot be decided; how holdeth the comparison betweene a Lot and an Oath, both by himselfe, and by those that herein concur with him, so oft vsed and vr-ged, for the excluding off from light matters the vse equally of either?

Here then we may enter into further consideration of that which Mr. G. writeth, p. 135. to wit, That by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the onely lawfull vse is condemned, and an unlawfull vse is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that onely vse of a Lot? I can finde none other, than the putting of that to a Lot which he calleth, (p. 130.) A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe or omit. Howsoeuer there may be a lawfull vse of a Lot about such a matter questioned, to determine, or preuent a Controuersie, yet I wonder that Mr. G. deemeth that onely lawfull.

Mr. B. is like children, that are willing rather to goe any whither than to come home. But it is our taske now to follow him; and to tread in his steps. What I there say therefore, I stand still vnto. And I maruell as much at Mr. B. that he should once imagine that a man may safely put any other matter then is here specified, to the hazard of a Lot. For

I. B.

T. G.

Non iussa quidem
licitè vel admittan-
tur vel omittantur:
iussa verò non sine
culpa negligentur,
non sine crimine
contemnantur. Ber.
de precept. & di-
pens.

may a man put it to the hazard of a Lot, whether he shall either omit some necessary duty, injoy-
ned him of God, or commit ought that is naught
and euill. If he may neither, of those there is no-
thing left for a Lot to deale but such things as are in-
different, and may consequently be either done or
omitted.

I. B.

Doth he not grant p. 91. that Praier may be conceiued
in weighty matters, as in the choise of a Magistrate,
which is not a matter of meere indifferency, that is, such
as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted.

T. G.

And in the choise of a Magistrate, if there appeere
a materiall difference betweene party and party, in
regard whereof it may bee of consequence whe-
ther the one haue the office or the other, it is not law-
full to put it to the hazard of a Lot, vnlesse some
far greater inconuenience enforce it. Which when
it shall so doe, it may be lawfull to entreat God so to
direct the Lot, that the mischief may not ensue; but
yet there is no assurance (it is but as prayer for other
temporall things) that the Lot shall be so directed. For
whither the choise of a Magistrate be a matter of meere
indifferency or no, is no whit to the purpose. It is
not Magistracy it selfe that is put to the Lot, in such
cases, whether men shall liue without it or no, but
that presumed that Magistracy must be maintained,
and Magistrates consequently designed, whether
this man or that man shall haue the place, which if
they be both alike fit for, it is a thing indifferent, and
not materiall at all, whether of them haue it.

Did

in defence of his owne Arguments.

239

Did God specially appoint Lots to be used about only matters of weight? and must man so farre swerve from Gods example as to strive onely about matters of such indifferencie, and then to put onely such controuersies to the determination of a Lot?

L.B.

Mr. B. Rhetoricke will not so carry it. What men may strive or not strive about is not now to bee discussed (and yet who dare condemne *lusive controuersies*: or what strifes in themselves are more harmelesse than they are?) nor what one mans iniquitie may enforce another to put to the hazard of a Lot. But in all controuersies bee the matter in question of more or lesse weight, the more equality things are reduced vnto on either side, the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth; and the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth, the lesse danger of wrong or inconuenience; and consequently the lawfuller the Lot. Let Mr. B. lay aside his Rhetoricall amplifications, and answer this Argument.

T. G.

So that I doubt not, but that with sound iudgement, and a cleare conscience not accusing me of not duly respecting the speciall providence of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirme, That the more weightie the subiect matter of a controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the Controuersie: and be that matter of more or lesse weight, the greater the necessitie of ending a Controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the use of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abusing of Gods ordinance?

I. B.

T. G.

7 Probationibus de-
ficientibus fidem
suam interponunt.

It is the manner of *bad pleaders* when *proofes* faile them to fall to *protesting*. And it is reported to be the guise of your *preaching Friers*, when they know not how to confute our doctrine, to assure their hearers upon their *salvation* that it is *heresie*. Mr. B. methinkes should doe otherwise. I say nothing in this *point* without *reason*; which Mr. B. must refuse, if he will haue me alter my iudgement. But if it may be had with *protestations*, Mr. B. will not misse of it. Which when he hath thus solemnly made, grounded still vpon a false supposall, (which vnlesse you grant him, all is gone,) he then demandeth, *Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abuse?* Why so? what is the reason. Because Mr. B. is *perswaded* so as he saith. All This * *wind* will shake but little corne, saue with suchy if there be any, that haue pinned their faith vpon Mr. B's. sleeue, and must depend vpon his perswasions. It is the property of * *truth*, saith one, not to instruct by *perswading*, but by *instructing* to *perswade*.

* Pali aura paleas
non triticum ex a-
rea dispergit. Aug.
de verb. Dom. 18.
2 Veritas docendo
suadet, non suaden-
do docet. Tertull.
adu. Valent.

I. B.

But, (saith Mr. G. glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot) The use of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie truly so termed. If so, then he might haue called it a serious Lot according to his doctrine, the lightnesse of the subiect matter controuerted notwithstanding.

T. G.

2. ὁ ἀνὴρ οἱ ἀμω-
τιν τῆς, ἀπερ μολο-
γῶν τὰ μαρτύρια
αὐτῶν εἶτε τῶν διότι α-
τὰ χρεὶ λέγειν, εἶ-
τε τὰ μαρτυρία. Greg.
Naz. de pace 2.

Mr. G. is not so glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot, as Mr. B. is * glad to lay hold on anything to be girding at Mr. G. what a silly toy hath he found here to cast in his dish, that if any question

or

or controuerſie be by a luſoricus Lot decided, it may be by Mr. G^s. doctrine termed a ſerious Lot. If you aſke how; you may goe ſeeke. But ſuppoſe it were ſo, (as he cannot, I know, make good,) what then?

But where about is that controuerſie? Mr. G. in his written Answer to my Dialogue before mentioned ſaith; The controuerſie tendeth to victorie, which till it be decided, there is a Controuerſie, though a light one, yet a Controuerſie truly ſo termed. But is that truly or worthily to be called a victory, which falleth out by hazard (according to Mr. G^s. eſteeming a Lot) without any deſert? But (ſay I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him by his immediate providence in diſpoſing the Lot, to humour (I ſay not, honour) ſome of the vaine-glorious fooles with ſuppoſed victory, who make a pretended controuerſie thereabout, whereas (before they intended ſo to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a controuerſie truly ſo termed? I need ſay no more.

I. B.

No: you haue ſaid, though not enough, becauſe nothing at all to the point, not one tittle to make your Argument good, or to proue the maine matter denied in it; yet a great deale too much, becauſe ſo much cleane beſide the matter. And here nothing but vnſauoury ſtuffe, vnworthy to be answered.

T. G.

You tell here of Mr. G^s. writing, which you neuer returned any answer to. Why picke you this alone out of it, letting paſſe many other things in it of more moment ſtill vnanswered?

But what is the fault here I maruell, that hath

I i

moned

^b *Adversus*
medra.
^c *Quemodo ille,*
Fortuna multis dat
nimis, nulli satis.
Martijal.

ἡ Δέξιον τὰ πό-
 τα ἢ νενικηκότων
 οἱ νενικημένοι. Eu-
 stat. ad Il. 6. ex
 Pausan. Lex. Attic.
 Περίλειτο τὸ
 πᾶν δὲ τὸ νικᾶν.
 Pollux. l. 9. c. 7. Ἐν
 τῷ πᾶσι τῷ ἀλ-
 μάτῳ ἢ νικᾶν τὸ
 βάλοντι. ibid. Vi-
 cissim vel quinquaginta millia Aug.
 apud Sueton. c. 71.
 Aliquantū ut vin-
 eat, ludit assidue a-
 leam. ibid. c. 70. Ve-
 rū in rebus aperitis
 argumentari tam sit
 stultū, quam in cla-
 rissimū Solē mortā-
 le lumen inferre.
 Quint. inst. l. 5. c. 12.
 ὁ Χρόνος δ' ἐν οὐ-
 διασπείρας σπείρας
 τας Πέρας κύβας,
 τεπερπὸν ἀγρίας
 αἶκος. Sophoc. Palā.
 Σοφὸν κὺ βουτῆρ. ἐ-
 πιστήμην γὰρ πᾶς ἐ-
 δίδαν τοῖς κύβας
 δεξιᾶς χερσὶ. He-
 sych.
 ἡ Πολὺ ἀφ' οὐνό τε-
 ρος ἢ ἰχθύων ἐστῆ-
 ται. Lucian. Gallia.
 Ad incitas reda-
 ēt. Plaut. Trin. 2. 4.
 ἡ Πρᾶξις καὶ ἀφ' οὐ-
 μνα. Proa c. puz-
 pis. Cic. epist. fam.
 l. 16. ep. 24.
 ἡ Καὶ τὰ ἐκ ἀφ' οὐ-
 ρας, φασὶ, καὶ τὰ ἐκ
 ἀφ' οὐμνα τὸ λαίῳ.
 Philostr. in Hero. c.

moved Mr. B's choler thus much? I say, forsooth
there is in play a controuersie, and that it tendeth to
victory. And is it not so in all games and sports ordi-
 narily? Or doth not ^d common vse of speech con-
 firme as much? *matter of desert*, I thinke, is not vsu-
 ally much respected *in play*. Yet in those Games that
 Mr. B. condemneth there is ^e *vse of wit and Art* to
 in managing what the *Chance* affordeth. I might
 adde that there is *in Game question, and controuersie*
 also, if with Mr. B. leaue I may so speake, whether
 of the two shall leade, and who shall ioyne either
 with other, either of which in some cases may well
 be termed a *controuersie*, though it tend not directly
 vnto victory, and which by Lot also is and may be
 lawfully decided, for ought Mr. B. hath hitherto to
 the contrary discovered.

But what kinde of *controuersie* or *victory* soeuer
 it be, that is in *Game* and *disport*, must they needs all
 be stiled *vaine-glorious fooles*, that in game strue, as
 we say, who shall beat either other. This sauoureth
 too much of *supercilious* (for I will not say *supersti-*
tious) either *Stoicisme* or *Pharisaisme*.

But his reason hereof is worth all: for that is it
 that is all in all with Mr. B. which if you once de-
 barre him of, ^f he is *as mute as a Fish*, and standeth
 stone still, as ^g *one at his wits end*. It is a tempting of
 God, by putting him to dispose the Lot by his immediate
 providence, and thereby to humour such *vaine-glorious*
fooles. This is the ^h *head and foot* of all, the perpe-
 tuall burden of Mr. B's song, which if you grant
 him, he is able to proue all that euer he would: but
 if it goe, ⁱ *all is gone with it*.

The

*e Scriptura multa
dissimulat, multa
tacite praterit, &c.
Aug de nat. & grat.
contr. Pelag. c. 37.
& 38. & de mend.
ad Consent. c. 10.
f Gen. 4. 17.
g A facto ad jus:
a non fieri ad non
licere.*

Faith, nor such as a man is necessarily bound to be-
leeue: but not to say, *e* such a thing is not mentio-
ned or related in Scripture, therefore it was not
done, or it neuer was: as for example, *f* Cain hath
but one sonne mentioned by *Moses*, therefore he
had no more sonnes or children but him. Much
lesse may a man reason *g* from matter of Fact to
matter of Right, as to say, such or such a thing we
neuer reade in the word to haue beene done, and
therefore it may not be done. For how many things
are there whereof there is no example in Gods
word, and yet the vse of them is generally allowed
as lawfull and good? Many things there are where-
of no precedent of the vse of them but in some one
kinde onely, which yet may be vsed also vnto o-
thers. No vse of butter recorded in the word but
for food onely: may it not therefore be vsed also
for physicke? Yea many things there are of ordina-
rie vse, whereof there is no mention at all in Gods
word, which yet all generally allow: as sugar for
sweetning, printing of books, shooting in guns, and
the like, which all by this argument are viterly con-
demned; or if they be iustified, then the grounds
of it faile.

*h. Voluntas Dei di-
citur præceptio, pro-
hibitio, consilium,
permissio. Lomb.
sent. l. 2. d. 45. G.*

Secondly, an Action may haue *h* warrant suffici-
ent by permission without precept or practise. For
where God hath not limited the vse of any Creature
or ordinance, there he hath left the vse of it free.
Where he hath not determined the circumstances
of any action, there what he hath not prohibited,
that hath he permitted, and that is warrant sufficient
for it. Where therefore circumstances are deter-
mined,

mined, the argument holdeth from the negative to make that vnwarrantable, that is not either expressely or by good consequence inioyned. But where they are not determined, the argument is strong enough from the negative to proue that warrantable that is not either expressely or by iust consequence prohibited.

For this cause in the point of Gods worship the argument holdeth ⁱ from the negative for the substance of it, because ^k God hath determined it. But in ciuill affaires it will not hold from the negative to disallow ought; because God hath not so determined them. Else what warrant is there for boules, for tennis, for foot-ball, for chesse, &c. which yet no man disalloweth? Let one example serue for all to shew the weaknesse of this kinde of arguing. *There is neither precept, nor practise, (at least allowed or allowable) of eating bloud in Scripture: therefore a man may not eat a blacke pudding.* In which conclusion I assure my selfe these Authors will not accord with the *Familists* and new *Sectaries*. And yet may they say more against the one, than these can any of them against the other. For the one is found expressely forbidden both in the old and new Testament both ^m before the Law, ⁿ vnder the Law, and ^o after the Law, (to omit what ^p sundry of the An-

ⁱ Jer. 7. 31. & 19. 5.
Coloss. 2. 22, 23.

^k Deut. 12. 30, 31,
32.

^l 1 Sam. 14 31, 10
35

^m Gen. 9. 4.

ⁿ Lev. 7. 26, 27. &
17. 10, 15.

Deut. 12. 16, 23,
24, 25. & 15. 23.

^o Act. 15 20, 29.

^p Ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος
τοῦ ζώοντος καὶ αἵ-
ματός· ἀπὸ καὶ
τῆς πάσης νεύου,
μοδέτω τῆς ψυχῆς.
τῶ νόμῳ φυσικῶς.

Clem. constit. apost.
1.6.c.12. εἰς δὲ π-

σας πρὸς ἡν ὁ πρὸς
βύπτος ἡ διακο-

νὸς φέρει καὶ αἵ-
ματι ψυχῆς

αὐτῆς, ἡ μεταβολή
την ἡ θνητῶν,

καὶ μεταβολῶν· τῶτο
γὰρ ὁ νόμος ἀπὸ

πν. εἰ ἡ λαϊκὸς
εἶναι, ἀπορρίπτει.

Canon. Apost. 62.
ἐκπεσόντας ἡμᾶς

ἐν τῷ αἵματι τοῦ
ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ δια-

τῷ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ πνι-
ται μέγας εἶδω-

λοκαλείας καὶ ἔσθ' ἀδελφῶν αἱμάτων, ἔστι πάλιν ἀνακλινόμεναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐπα-
νακλινόμεναι. Greg. Naz. de pasch. In Christo omnia reuocantur ad initium, &c. ciborum libertas, &
sanguinis solius abstinentia, sicut ab initio fuit. Tertull. de monogam. Sacra Scriptura nobis præcipit,
ut abstinemus à sanguine & suffocato: merito igitur damnamus eos qui cuiuscunque animalis san-
guinem arte aliqua condunt, & sic comedunt. Qui hoc fecerit, Clericus deponatur, Laicus excom-
municetur. Synod. 6. can. 67. Qui suffocatum aut sanguinem manducavit, biberitve, 40. dies peni-
teat, Greg. 3. penitenti. c. 29.

Galat. 5. 1.

Act. 10. 13, 14,
15.

Rom. 14. 14.
Tit. 1. 15.

cients haue held of it) but the other no where in neither. And if ¹ Christian liberty notwithstanding bought with the blood of Christ, giue Gods children a free vse of the one, how much more then of the other. If ^r it loose them there, where they were bound before; sure it bindeth them not there, where they were free before.

I. B.
Reply.

Mr. G. in his booke sheweth many instances of Lots used both by Iewes and Gentiles, and all in serious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they by the light not onely of the word, but of Nature too discerned, that Lots are to be used onely in serious matters. O let vs take heed how we put out so great light.

T. G.
Reioind.

True: out of the word I relate many instances of Lots used in serious matters both by Iewes and Gentiles: nor doe I finde any *lufurious* Lots mentioned there to haue beene used by either. Gods word dealeth most with *serious*, not with *lufurious* affaires. Nor doth the Spirit of God busie it selfe to tell vs what *sports* and *pastimes* men did vse in those daies. But doth it follow therfore that both Iewes & Gentiles did by the light both of Gods word and Nature discern that they might not be used in any other affaires than such? Nothing lesse. For what an infinite number of examples are there, ¹ whereof not a few Mr. B. might haue found also in my Booke, of Lots used in sport and recreation, whereof in that regard neither Iew nor Gentile that Mr. B. can shew, euer made scruple? Which doth evidently rather infer the contrary to that that Mr. B. here affirmeth. But

¹ Of Lots, Chap.
6. Sect. 1. & 2.

to quit Mr. B's. close, If a man should say to Mr. B. We reade of many garments in Scriptures used both by Jewes and Gentiles: But we reade of none that ever wore band or cuffs; which intimateth to me, that it is by the light both of Gods word and Nature too, discerned that such are not to be worne: O take heed, Mr. B. how you neglect this light, and doe that that you haue no warrant for, in wearing such. I suppose that euen Mr. B. himselfe would deeme him to be ridiculous, that should so argue. I say nothing more, but leaue the application either to Mr. B. himselfe or any other. Onely I adde, that there is ^b nothing more vnfaoury than to trifle so seriously.

^b *Magno conatu
magnas nugas age-
re. Iul. Scal. de sub-
til Et tristes ineptias,
ut Cæcilius, eo-
que magis ridiculas,
habere, ut Sen. ep.
113.*

But let vs consider his answer, which is onely to the Proposition, though I haue already confuted many principall parts thereof.

I. B.

He may doe well to shew what parts and where. For I know not, for my part, what he hath as yet either confuted or confirmed.

T. G.

Yet a little, by his leaue, to the *Assumption*; though not his, yet Mr. *Easties*, ioyned here with his; and by him acknowledged: It is this in effect; *There is not any warrant in the word for the ludicrous use of Lots either by precept or practise, generall or speciall, expressed or implied.* Now if we belecue Mr. B. this is a very presumptuous Assertion, and such as no man may auow, vnlesse he had a memorie able to containe every sentence of Scripture, and an vnderstanding so absolute, as to know enery consequent that might be deduced and drawne from each of them. And therefore

^c *Nodus Gordius, an Gordianus: à Gordio Mide patre, ut Curt. de gest. Alex. lib. 3. non à Gordiano nescio quo.*

fore Mr. E. or Mr. B. ought to haue said, *There is no such warrant, by precept or practise, so far as I know, or to my best remembrance.* And thus might Mr. G. with a knife lent him by Mr. B. cut asunder this ^c *Gordians knot*, to vse Mr. B's words, and so let the denial of the Proposition alone. But we will not take all aduantages that Mr. B's offers may afford.

I. B.

In my Dialogue, to shew that the Spirit sometime reasoneth from a matter of fact to a matter of right negatively, I quote these Scriptures, Ioh. 8. 39, 40. 1 Cor. 11. 16. The words of the former are these; Yee goe about to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth: This did not Abraham. The Argument is this: Abraham did not kill any that told him the truth: Therefore yee ought not to goe about to kill mee, if yee would be the sonnes of Abraham. This is Christs Logick, wherewith I dare finde no fault. Neither doth Mr. G. For he saith nothing to it, because the Printer putteth for vers. 40. the 48. vers. wherewith Mr. G. maketh pastime. But I will let passe time now to take further knowledge of it.

T. G.

^d *There needs a Delian diuer. A Prouerbe vsed by either Crates or Socrates, vpo view of an obscure discourse. Δνδ' ἵς δὲ καυχήντ' ἐ. Lacrt. in Heraclit.*

^e *One famous for arreading of riddles. Hic ille apud Terent. Andr. 1. 2. Dauid sum, non Oedipus.*

Mr. B's Proposition in truth is this: *That which there is no example of in Gods word is not warrantable by it.* This to make good, he setteth against his first ground in the margin, a quotation of those two places. The Printer, it seemeth, had misprinted the one, and directed me to a wrong place, where finding nothing that caried any the least semblance of confirmation for the Point propounded, it may be, I say, that ^d *opus est Delio natatore*, to fetch ought out of those words; or that I am no ^e *Oedipus* to assoile Mr. B's riddle, or some such like, (for I haue no copie

copie now by me of that *writing*, nor had Mr. B. (I will not say, the honestie, but) that care of his word, that he should haue had, to returne me either *answer*, or it againe) and that is all the *pastime* that Mr. B. here saith, I make with it. He should haue done well to haue set downe my words, whereby it might haue appeared, whether I had vsed any other termes therein, than might well stand with due reuerence and regard to him. In which kinde, whether either in *that writing*, or in *my Booke*, after it published, I haue beene faulty, I appeale to any that haue seene the one, and to all that may, if they will, take a view of the other.

But for the thing it selfe, how I should haue knowne what it was that was intended, vnlesse it were by *diuination*; or how should I haue answered it, before I knew what was intended, vnlesse it had beene by *prophecie*, (as he said sometime that *a proclamation* was penned) I know not. But Mr. B. dealeth herein as *Bellarmino* is wont, who when he hath produced a testimonie out of some *new-found*, and it may be *new-coined Author*, that hath not beene long abroad; and those he dealeth with, it is like, neuer so much as once heard of; *and to this*, saith he, *the Heretikes giue no answer at all*. But now we know what it is that Mr. B. would haue, he shall not be long without an *Answer*. Where to omit that Mr. B. speaketh, as if our Sauour CHRIST had a *Logick* by himselfe, or would either here or elsewhere teach vs a *new Logick*, or another *Logick*, than I say not *Aristotle the Heathen*, but *Ramus* and other *Christian Logicians* haue taught: when as indeed he

*Ἐὼς μὲν οὖν
τελευτῶντος τοῦ
ποῦ. Euripid. Hip-
pol. Non sum di-
vinus. Marial.*

*3. Master of Pauls
Schoole in Rich.
3. his time. The
More story.*

*h Ad hoc testimo-
nia neque respon-
dent aduersarij, ne-
que respondere ali-
quid possunt. Bellar.
de Euchar. l. 2. c. 19.
& c. 21.*

1 John 14. 6.

wrongeth our Saviour in deducing from his words that which they will not beare, yea if they should beare, he that is ¹ Truth it selfe, should be contrary to himselfe. Our Saviour, as it is apparent, reasoneth on this manner: *They that doe such wicked works as Abraham neuer did, nor would euer haue done,* (for euen this also Mr. B. himselfe hereafter acknowledgeth to be intimated; which if it had here beene mentioned, would haue marred all) *shew themselves to be such as are no children of Abraham: But you doe such wicked works as Abraham neuer did, nor would euer haue done: for you offer to kill me for telling the truth: which Abraham would not haue done.*

Therefore you shew your selues thereby to be none of his children. So Piscator analysing and explicating the place:

* Piscat. in Ioan. 8.

² The Lord thus convinceth them from their doings: *If yee were Abrahams sonnes, you would doe Abrahams works; that is, such as he did, to wit, good.*

But you doe not Abrahams works, that is, such as he did, to wit, good: and I instance in one, for you seeke to slay me that haue deserued well of you.

Therefore you are not Abrahams sonnes.

And it is well obserued by Calvin, that not all things simply that Abraham did or did not, but ¹ those for which he is specially commended, are notes to distinguish the children of Abraham from others. Now obserue but, I beseech you, what absurd, if not Logick, yet deductions and consequences Mr. B. would fasten vpon our Saviour. For if this place helpe Mr. B's cause, or doe proue that a man may reason in the

1 Quid enim precipue in Abraham laudatur nisi obedientia fidei? Hæc igitur discriminis nota est, quoties ab extraneis discernere oportet ejus filios. Calvin. in Ioan. 8.

point

point now controuersed, from matter of fact to matter of right, this must be the Argument:

That which Abraham did not, no Christian man may doe:

But Abraham neuer plaid at Cards, or Abraham neuer used a sporting Lot:

Therefore no Christian man may doe either.

Or put we some other Assumption to the former Proposition:

But Abraham went not in doublet or hose:

or, Abraham wore not bands and cuffs:

or, Abraham neuer walkt London streets, &c.

Therefore no Christian man may warrantably doe any of these.

Yeato goe a little further: if we should stretch, as M^r. B. doth, the words of our Saviour, we might thus reason:

They that doe not as Abraham did, are none of Abrahams children:

But they that denie not their wines, doe not as Abraham did:*

* Genes. 12. 13, 18.
& 20. 2, 5.

Therefore they that deny not their wines, are not Abrahams children.

Not is this to controll our Saviours Logick, but to shew, what manner of Logick M^r. B. would either teach our Saviour, or make vs beleue that our Saviour vsed. In a word, here is the prooffe of M^r. B^s. Proposition:

Our Saviour proueth the Iewes not to be the children of Abraham, because they would haue killed him, which Abraham did not:

Therefore whatsoever there is no example for in

Gods word, is unwarrantable.

But let vs see whether his next quotation stand him in any better steed.

I. B.

Of the other quotation the words be these: We haue no custome, nor the Churches of God.

The consequent implied is: Therefore women ought not to pray vncouered. Hereunto Mr. G. answereth indeed, but so, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatively from a matter of fact to a matter of right: which is all that I intended by the quotation; and not, to imagine this Argument, The Churches of God, and faithfull men doe not vse Lots in gaming. Therefore such gaming is unlawfull.

T. G.

Mr. B. would make his Reader beleue here that Mr. B. had laid this for a ground in his Booke, that from matter of fact a man might reason in some case to matter of right; (which yet would doe him as much good for the prooffe of his Proposition, if it were granted him, as a little water would in his shooe) and that for prooffe thereof Mr. B. hauing produced this place, Mr. G. in his writing had granted the same; (for so he would seeme to imply, when he saith, Mr. G. doth not deny it) whereas indeed all this is but ^m a fiction, and a meere made matter. For howsoeuer in mine answer to the entire Argument, peeced vp partly out of Mr. B. and partly out of Mr. Eastie, I speake of such arguing, yet in Mr. B's Dialogue there is no mention at all of it. But Mr. B's Proposition is, or must be, to make vp his Conclusion, That which there is no example of in Gods word, is unlawfull.

^m Fictio juris, or giuing of Colours to haue matter to worke vpon. A course vsuall in legall proceedings. See Doctor & Student, lib. 2. c. 53.

unlawfull. Now how doe the Apostles words proue this? Or what other Argument to further Mr. B. cause could be framed out of them, but such as is aboue by him mentioned, and I supposed he would haue made? But since he waiueth that, let vs see how it will proue that that it should. ^a It is not the custome, saith the Apostle, of Christians, to be contentious; as ^o some expound it; or as ^p others, It is not a custome among Christians, for women to be vnuailed. Therefore none ought to be such, to wit, contentious: or none ought to doe so, that is, bring in such new fashions, as are both vndeceit, and vnusuall. Will it now follow hence, that because the Apostle either condemneth contentiousnesse, because ^q it is not the manner of Christians to be contentious: or womens appearing in the publike congregation vnuailed, because it was contrary to the custome of the Christian Churches; and ^r to breake settled order in such things is not allowable: Will it, I say, follow hence therefore, that nothing is warrantable, whereof no example is in the word? If it doe not, either let Mr. B. put it out of his Booke, or else forbear at least to vrge it.

quam venit, inueneris: dummodo nihil contra fidem aut mores fiat. Ipsa quippe mutatio consuetudinis etiam que adiuuat utilitate, nouitate perturbat. Quapropter quae utilis non est, perturbatione infructuosa consequenter noxia est. Aug. epist. 118. c. 6.

ⁿ 1 Cor. 11. 16.

^o Chrysostom.

Morton.

^p Tertullian.

Theodoret.

Hervaeus qui Anselmi nomine profat.

Lyran.

Hugo Cardin.

Heming.

^q Vtrumq. conjungunt Theopylact.

Oecumen.

Piscator.

Arelius.

^r Ταῖς ὁδοῖς τῆς πόλεως

καὶ συνεστίατο καὶ

συνέχευ. 1 συνδύ

καὶ ταῖς, λέγει ὁ

ἀποστόλος. Greg. Naz.

καὶ ἐν ταῖς.

Faciat quisque, quod

in ea Ecclesia, in

So that I need not herein reply vpon Mr. G.

I. B.

No: but he hath need to proue his Proposition, vnlesse he will haue vs to take it vpon his word.

T. G.

I onely wonder that he saith: The vse of Lots in

I. B.

games hath beene common in the Churches of God. What? In the publike assemblies? as was the fault of women their heads uncovered in the Church at Corinth?

T. G.

To put Mr. B. out of his wonderment; (you see how faine he would be quarrelling) I meane by the Churches of God, the whole multitude of men professing the faith of Christ, distinguished into particular Churches or Congregations, consisting of diuers households and persons: among whom these luxurious Lots hath beene frequent and ordinary in all ages, nor hath there beene scruple made of them till of very late times. And by Mr. B. leaue, the Apostle vnderstandeth no other Churches, when he saith, *The Churches of God haue no such custome*. But this is but *shooting beside the marke*.

Tum nas Christi
Apostoli, tum Chri-
stiani Deum Patre
in Christo colentes.
Morton.
Ego in exor-
batione. Greg.
Naz. monod.

I. B.

But Mr. G. in this answer speaketh of things meerely naturall or ciuill, as *sweetning with sugar, &c.*

T. G.

Name all, good Mr. B. There is besides, *printing of Bookes, and shooting in guns, playing at houles, tennis, chesse, foot-ball, &c.* against which the Argument will hold as well as against either *Cards or Tables*.

And must not warrant be had as well for *ciuill actions* as for others? Or is not *recreation*, whereof we now dispute, a *ciuill thing*? Or must warrant be had by some *example* out of the word for *Cards* and *Dice*, more than for *Chesse*, or else they are in that regard *unlawfull*?

I might here exclaime, as Mr. B. vseth to doe, yea
and

and that with better ground than M^r. B. so oft doth; Oh what a wide gap doth M^r. B. open here to licentiousnesse, when he implieth that for actions meereley naturall or ciuill, there needs no warrant at all be had out of Gods word! It griueneth my soule to see what will ensue hereupon. For now will ungodly men, when they are reprov'd for ought amisse in the course of their life and conuersation, and required to shew what warrant they haue for it, be ready to say, These are but things meereley either naturall or ciuill: and therefore we need not care whether we haue any warrant out of Gods word for them or no. And either M^r. B. must imply no lesse, or else his exception is idle, and of no vse.

I will not endeouour to proue, that in the word there is matter of iust consequence, either generall or implied (which is a part of the Proposition) to allow, as well sweetning with sugar, &c. as Recreation in generall: and therefore they may be lawfull, though they be not mentioned in the word.

I. B.

Here M^r. B. telleth vs, that he will not endeouour to proue that which he need not, because it is not in question: and withall* in stead of prouing what he should proue, he doth vtterly himselfe overthrow it.

T. G.

That that he saith he will not endeouour to proue, is not at all questioned. For the entire Proposition made vp out of M^r. Eastie and him doth not say, that whatsoeuer thing hath no allowance from Gods word is unlawfull: but, whatsoeuer hath not allow-

* Hoc ipsum evertit quod est confirmandum; confirmat id ipsum quod est diluendum. Quintil. instit. l. 9. c. 2.

ance

ance either by precept or practise in Gods word is unlawful. In neither kinde whereof, I suppose, Mr. B. can finde ought touching diuers of the particulars before mentioned, which yet he denieth not to be lawfull.

That hee ouerthroweth directly that that hee should proue, is apparent. For his *Proposition* is this; *Whatsoever there is no example of in Gods word, is unwarrantable*: And yet here he saith, that *some things may be lawfull, though they be not mentioned in Gods word*. What is this but a direct contradiction of that?

I. B.

But suppose Mr. G's. *Axiome* holdeth in them: what is that to Lots, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate providence, and the use whereof is limited, to end serious controuersies? In regard whereof doubt I not, but an *Argument* concerning the use of them may hold from the negative in matter of fact, as well as in matter of faith, or of the point of Gods worship for the substance of it. For I presume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occasion, as he did not, kill a man that told him the truth: so that all that feared God, and knew the nature and use of a Lot, would not, as they did not, use a Lot in game.

T. G.

If Mr. G's. *Axiome* hold in any, your *Proposition* is infringed. Any one particular denied, ouerthroweth an affirmative generall. Let his *Axiome* alone therefore, and proue your *Proposition*. But that you will neuer be able to doe: and doe wisely therefore to let it alone.

Yea

Yea but if you will suppose and take that for granted, which was the ground of Mr. B. his first Argument, and without which neuer an one of them can sublist, then Mr. B. presumeth that Abraham would not haue plaied at Cards or Dice, nor no other godly man: And what then? Why? Then we should haue had no example either of Jew or Gentile recorded in Scripture that had done so. And consequently, (for that is the Proposition in Question) Nothing is warrantable, whereof there is no example in the word. Here is a deale of * loose sand without ought to binde it together. The maine matter in Question still begged, and yet nothing inferred out of it, that is ought to Mr. Bs. Argument. No due proceeding in ought, onely *a wheeling* round about with a returne to the old principle, of an immediate providence in enery Lot, the ground of the first Argument; For that commeth in still to helpe at a dead lift, and is as good as the Tragedians their *God in an Engine*, that serued to helpe out still when they were at a streffe.

* Arena sine calce.
Quod de Seneca
scriptis C. Caligula.
Sueton. Caio c. 53.
γ τ' ἄρα περὶ
φῆ. Plut. adv. Stoic.
περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ
τῇ αὐτῇ πύργῳ
(an novitum) ἔχ
μὲν δὲ ἐκ αὐτῶν
των. Hesych.
* Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς.
Lucian. Philop.
vel Θεὸς ἐκ μηχανῆς.
Idem de sect.
Ὁ μὲν οἱ τὰς ἀπο-
ποιεῖ ἐπεὶ δὲ π
ἀποποιεῖται, ἐν τῇ
μὲν ἔχει ἀποποι-
εῖται. Plato Cratyl.
Vt Tragici poetae,
quum explicare ar-
gumenti exitu non
potestis, confugitis
ad Deum. Cic. de
nat. Deor. l. 1.

Secondly, why may there not be for a thing permitted, some precept in the word, generall or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the word, either expresse or by iust consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. G. reconcileth these two Axiomes, [Every Action is indifferent] and [No Action is indifferent] thus, Every naked and bare Action simply conceived, is indifferent: But no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent, p. 94. So that he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular

L B.

morall Action, or no Action of the reasonable Creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto, p. 95. These things, especially these words (rules of Gods word) considered, I may say, that howsoever a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. G. saith, Recreation in generall is both by permission and by precept, if not expressly yet by iust consequence p. 138. Doth then Mr. G. make permission a iust exception against the Proposition?

T. G.

Mr. B. hauing in stead of prouing it ouerthrowne his owne Proposition: now commeth to try, if he can yet make good Mr. Easties.

A thing may be warranted, say I, though neither by precept or practise, yet by permission.

Against this Mr. B. obiekteth, that for a thing permitted some precept may be. I answer.

1. Vnlesse he say, *must be*, he saith nothing; because he saith nothing to the purpose.

2. If there be a precept for ought, so farre forth it is not barely permitted: for where permission is, ^a the thing is left free.

Yea but Mr. G. saith, that recreation is warrantable both by permission and by precept. True by precept in some cases, by permission in other: or by precept in generall, by permission in particular, for balls or bowles, and the like.

Yea but againe Mr. G. saith, (to let the rest passe of Mr. Bs. ^b Besomes here without bands) that every thing

^a Libera res relinquuntur. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Huc illud in Iure Canonico, Quod licet, non precipitur. Zachar. Ferrer. addit. ad Abbat. de Cohab. Cler. & mul.

^b Scope dissolute. Cic. de orat. perfect.

thing indifferent, is lawfull, if by rule, and consequently, if you giue Mr. B. leaue to expound it as he list, by precept. Let me minde Mr. B. what before he told vs, it is ^c a cursed glosse that corrupteth the Text. Doth euery Rule necessarily imply a precept? Then belike of things Indifferent, that is, (not, of things neither good nor bad; in which sense my former words cited by Mr. B. iumbling things heere together, nothing to the purpose, are to be vnderstood; but) of things neither inioyned nor inhibited, no Rules can be giuen. But let vs try (though it be too palpable) the truth hereof. When the Apostle saith, ^d A woman is free to marry againe if her husband be deceased. Is it not a Rule? Or is it therefore a precept? when he saith, ^e If an infidell inuiteth you, you may goe if you will: for^f that is also implied: and, when you are there, you may eat of all that is set before you without scruple of conscience. Are not these Rules, and yet no precepts? If they bee, by Mr. B's. owne grant, Mr. G's. exception against Mr. Easties proposition standeth good, and the proposition consequently is vnsound.

^c Maledicta glossa que corrumpit textum.

^d 1 Cor. 7. 39.

^e 1 Cor. 10. 27.

^f Ire vel non ireliberum vobis relinquo. Morton.

Touching his prooffe, that permission is a sufficient warrant: I first would know, what ordinance of God that is, which hath not some limited or appointed use thereof.

T. G.

That Gods permission is a sufficient warrant, he that requireth to haue it proued may as well require it to be proued, that Gods word is a good warrant. Idle had the Apostle beene if in so weighty affaires be-

I. B.

1 Cor. 7. 28.

*h Mero meridie si
dixerit illi tenebras
esse, credet. Petron.
satyr.*

1 Of Lots Ch. 8.

ing craued his aduice, he should haue deliuered that that would not warrant those things that he gaue way for, yea and iustified them as free from sinne. *h If she marry, saith he, she sinneth not.* And he that denieth it, may as well *h deny that the Sunne is vp at high-noone.*

His friuolous question therefore is to no purpose in the world: For what if God hath by certaine generall Rules restrained in some kindes and cases the use of his ordinances: doth it follow therefore that there is nothing in them left free? God hath restrained Recreation by such Rules as by way of Caution are in my Booke of Lots *h* deliuered. Doth it follow therefore that it is not free for men to recreate themselves either with bowles, or with coites, whether they themselves will, and to make bowles indifferently either of beech or of brasil, and coites either of tile shreds or of horse-shoes. For, I hope, none of all these may be done without warrant.

I. B.

I am sure and haue shewed that Gods ordinance touching a Lot hath.

T. G.

If your owne word without further prooffe may be taken, you haue.

I. B.

Secondly, I grieue to obserue what a gap Mr. G. hath by this doctrine opened to Licentiousnesse. What! may man disposed to sinne, imploy any creature, whose use God hath not limited, to what use he will? No: for here is to be understood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason touching circumstances, viz.

[Any

[Any use, but that which is prohibited] Howsoever I could demurre thereupon, especially if an expresse prohibition be understood, yet herein I will be silent having enough granted me.

These be all but ^k idle fancies of Mr. B's. owne braine. I open no greater gap to any licentiousnesse, than ^l the word of God warranteth : which Mr. B's. vniust charge must therefore consequently fall vpon, and vpon the *Apostle* himselfe together with me. I spare to obserue what grievous and inextricable streits Mr. B. would cast *Christian Consciences* into by his contrary *Affertions*; such, I am sure (let him take heede ^m whom he followeth therein) as himselfe will neuer indure to be tied to : to wit, to bring some (I say not warrant, but) precept out of Gods word, for euery particular Act that he doth, euery sort or part of apparell he weareth, euery kinde of recreation that at any time he useth, and the like.

Onely I wish that Mr. B's. ordinary faithfulness may here also be obserued. He saith hee could demurre vpon this position, that I giue for the circumstances of such Actions, in which they are not determined, viz. [Any use, but that which is prohibited, is lawfull] especially, if an expresse prohibition be understood. When as my words are expresse, not either expresse or by iust consequence prohibited. I would know of Mr. B. what precept, (for vnlesse precept, no warrant, saith Mr. B.) or what permission at least there is for such dealing in Gods word.

But he hath enough granted him by Mr. G. without this. Let vs heare how.

T. G.

^k .velut agri somnia, vana Finguntur species. - Hor. art.

^l Μηδεις εγω μηδε τω νόμω νομιμώτερος, μηδε λαμπρότερος τω φαιός, μηδε τω κανόνω ενδύτερος, μηδε τ' εστολῆς υψιλότερος. Greg. Naz. de eulax. Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ θεὸς τ' ἀκαουσῶντων, καὶ θεὸς σφίαν πίδος. Eccles.

7. 16. Ibid.

^m Math. 23. 4.

I. B.

For the use of Lots in game is prohibited by iust consequences, as I haue demonstrated.

T. G.

* Ω³ δουρί' αὐ-
σπῶν, μὴ μέγιστα
λίαν λέγει. Ne mag-
na nimium dixeris,
mirande vir. Ari-
stoph. Ranis. Nam,
Multa fidem pro-
missa levant, ubi
plenius æquo Lau-
dat, venales qui vult
extrudere merces.
Horat. ep. 2. l. 2.

ⁿ Qui per metemp-
sychofin in Homero,
Ennio rediisse fe-
rebatur, ut Tertull.
de resurr. & alij.

ο Notum illud Py-
thagoreorum, Αὐτὸς
ἔφη, Ipse dixit: in
quo per omnia ac-
quiescebant.

ρ ἢ φερρεῖν δὲ ἑλασσον, ἢ δουάει μεῖζον. Samijs Lacones. Plut. apophib. ρ Πλεῖν ἢ
μέγα, ἰσχεῖν ὃ μικρόν. Democrates apud Stob. c. 22.

If Mr. G. left it indefinite, as Mr. B. in his very next words before intimated, and expressed not himselfe, whether he meant *prohibited expressly only*, or *by iust consequence also*: how hath Mr. B. enough by Mr. G. granted for the effecting of ought that here he would haue? If he did *expresse* himselfe therein, why was Mr. B. pleased to question what his meaning was?

But how Mr. B. hath not *proved* onely, but * *demonstrated*, what he here saith he hath done, I know not; vnlesse ^a Pythagoras bee reuiued againe in him, and ^o his bare word be as authenticall as the best *prooffe* that is. Such ^p great words might haue beene well spared, vnlesse his *proofes* had beene more *pregnant*: least it be said of him, as he said sometime of the Athenians, that they were like *old men*, that ^q blew hard, but did little.

I. B.

For the better understanding of the second part of the reason (hasting to an end) I onely desire an Answer to this Question. Is any use of a Lot lawfull, where the circumstances of Time, Place, and Persons be not determined?

T. G.

Mr. B. weary, it seemeth, of *arguing*, commeth now to *asking*. The end of his *Question*, he saith, is for the better understanding of the second part of my Reason. Why? admit my reason or some part of it were not worth a button, how doth Mr. B. make good

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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good the *Proposition*, which all this while he should haue proued? But to the *Question*, I answer as the *Spartans* sometime in a word: * *No*. And what then? Are there no more *circumstances* to be obserued but these onely? Or are there not *generall Rules* according to which I require the *use* of such things to be regulated?

* *Ad prolixam Philippi Maced. qua quadam ab eis de- poscebat epistolam, unica vocula an vocali respōdebant, v, vel (ut Scal. ad Euseb. ex Athen.*

iten: que ad Auson ex Athen. & Gell.) Hinc Auson. epist. 25. Vna fuit quondam, qua respondere Lacones Littera, & irato Regi placere negantes. Idem & Dionysio rescripsit Philoxenus: unde Prouerbiū, φίλοξενος γέγραμμεν. Suidas.

If Mr. G. except an extraordinarie Use, I may as well except the lusurious use of Lots.

I. B.

Can any man liuing tell what this meaneth? I answer as before; and if Mr. B. can picke ought our of mine Answer for his aduantage, he may.

T. G.

I answer to the exemplification of this reason, granting that an Argument holdeth from the negative for the substance of Gods worship. I yet make this *Quare*, whether onely because God hath determined it?

I. B.

Whether Mr. B. grant this part of mine Answer or no, yea whether it be sound or vnfound is nothing materiall, since that the strength of mine Answer for the disproofe of the *Proposition* resteth wholly vpon the other part, to wit, that from matter of fact not expressed in Scripture, it is no good arguing to matter of right or wrong; and that a thing may be lawfull without either precept or practise recorded in the word expresse or implicite: and much lesse is it materiall

T. G.

materiall what become of Mr. B's *queres*: which I needed not therefore stand to answer; nor doth ought therefore that followeth here, at all touch our *cause*.

^f Nam & vino lavare gentibus quibusdam bodieque nō est insolens. Quo & forsan allusit Iacobus Gen. 49. 11.

^e As in the Passouer, Exod. 12. 9.

^u Heretici quidam Artotyrite hinc dicti. Epiphan. heres. 49. Aug. heres. 28. ex Isidor. Grat. decr. caus. 24. quest.

^{3.}
^x Quia tibi sic placitum: uti Christus ad Patrem, Matth. 11. 26. Quamquam nolim ex hoc loco argumentum con-textere: prout supra

D. B. voluit ad Arg. 6. y Deut. 12. 31. Talia Ethnicorum Sacra Taurica, Cabinica; sed & Florealia, Lupercalia, Saturnalia, Bacchanalia, Aphrodisia, Priapeia, &c.

But let vs heare Mr. B's *quare*. He maketh it a Question; *Whether the Argument therefore onely holdeth from the negative for the substance of Gods worship, because God hath determined it?* I answer: It is enough for my purpose if it doe *hold therefore*. Which Mr. B. it seemeth, doth not deny. And in many cases it holdeth *onely therefore*: For why we should vse *water* and not ^f *wine* in Baptisme: why *bread*, rather than ^e *rosted flesh* in the Lords Supper, and why *bread onely* and not *cheese* too, as ^u some haue vsed; no reason can be rendred, but ^x because God so pleased to determine the *elements* in either. It is true indeed that some sorts of *Worship* are in themselves ^y *impious*, and are therefore also disallowed. But let vs heare the reason why this *Quare* is made.

I. B.

For in those places of Ieremie, God doth blame his people onely for using a worship [which he commanded not] without any intimation that he prescribed his owne worship.

T. G.

Is there not an euident *intimation* that God had prescribed his owne worship, (vnlesse it be presupposed that he would not at all be worshipped) when for this very cause he reiecteth some kinde of worship, *because he had not prescribed the same.*

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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To the same purpose writeth Paul to the Colossians against the Traditions of men, and will-worship, not for Mr. G^s. cause, but because in so worshipping they held not the Head, vers. 19. which is Christ, King of his Church, teaching and governing the same in all things.

I. B.

The Apostle expressly condemneth one sort of the *superstitious* he there speaketh of, because they were meere ^a will-worships, and humane inuentions (wherein let Mr. B. take heed lest he be found faulty in denying vnto Christians the lawfull vse of Gods creatures vpon conceits meereley superstitious, as those false teachers then did) that is, as Piscator well, ^b because God was not the Author of them. Which is in effect for the very same cause that I auerre.

T. G.

^a ἰδελοφρονεῖναι.
Col. 2. 22, 23.

^b Quum Deus istarum autor non sit.
Piscat.
^c Col. 2. 19.

As for that of ^c not holding the Head, it is not vrged by the Apostle for any such purpose as Mr. B. here affirmeth, confounding and blending together those things that are to be distinguished; but against those that would haue brought in the ^d Adoration of Angels, who in so doing the Apostle saith ^e relinquished Christ the Head, who is of him selfe all-sufficient to foster and propagate his Church, without such sending of his seruants to seeke assistance from any other.

^d Ἀγγελωφρονεῖναι.
Coloss. 2. 18.

^e Quod Christum isti dignitate sua spoliunt, ut qui un^o toti suo corpori tum fovendo, tum augendo sufficiat. Piscat.

I. B.

But in Deut. Mr. G^s. cause is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other Nations serued their Gods, and sendeth them to his word to obserue the same, without putting any thing to, or taking ought from the same. Surely I should not gather from hence Mr. G^s. cause. Because I feare it

M m

would

would incourage Papists in their superstitious rites and ceremonies called Circumstances, though indeed parts of the substance of outward worship. For they are ready to take hold thereof and say, God hath determined nothing touching these supposed Circumstances, and they are not against the word of God; therefore they are permitted and so warranted.

T. G.

Is it not implied, when God saith, they should not serve the true God as the Heathen served their false Gods, but so onely as he had himselfe prescribed; is it not implied, I say, that God had for the substance of it determined his owne worship?

1 Tim. 5. 8.

Or is not this a senselesse consequence, Mr. G. holdeth that God hath determined the substance, but not all particular Circumstances of his service and worship: Therefore Mr. G. giveth incouragement to Papists to adde to Gods worship such things as they call Circumstances, but are indeed parts of the substance of it. It is as if one should say, ¹ The Apostle chargeeth all Christians to provide for themselves and theirs: Therefore hee giveth worldly men incouragement to be greedy of the world, which they call providing for them and theirs.

I. B.

Exo. 20. 5.

But I should gather from that and the other places, (I thinke, directly, and not auckwardly,) this Conclusion: Because all things in and unto the service of God ought to be precisely according to Gods will revealed in his word; therefore whatsoever is not commanded ought not to be. And the rather (God being iealous) because of the meaning of the fringes upon the

the Israelites their garments, to wit, That you may remember all the commandements of the Lord, and that yee seeke not after your owne heart, not after your owne eies, after which you goe a whoring. Num. 15 39.

Now we haue Mr. B's. collection, not auckward, as mine, but direct, as his are wont to be.

T. G.

Where first I would vnderstand wherein Mr. B's. cause differs from Mr. G's. cause: that is, whether that, whatsoeuer it be, that is there forbidden, be not therefore, yea and therefore onely there forbidden, because God had determined his owne worship. That which was Mr. B's. exception against Mr. G's. cause before.

2. I would be informed whether Mr. B. will affirme that all particular circumstances of Gods seruice and worship be precisely determined in the word, for if that be not his meaning here, what saith hee more than I say? If it be, let him returne answer to the instances produced to the contrary before. For the conceit it selfe is so senselesse, that^h it deserueth not further to be refuted; neither doe I thinke that any man liuing will concurre with Mr. B. therein.

3. For the place out of Numbers produced by him, whereby he would proue that, (whatsoeuer it is) that he saith, it doth no more proue that all things in the seruice of God ought to be precisely according to Gods will revealed in his word, than that all other humane actions as well ciuill as sacred ought so to be. For the place speaketh of Gods commandements in generall.

4. How followeth it hence that no action or circumstance

^h Demonstrate solummodo, destruere est. Tertull. adv. Valent.

ⁱ Hinc Iudeorum commentum, cum qui mandatum de sin. brijs istis obseruet, tantundem facere atque si legem totam seruaret. Primus enim nodi 5. sunt in unaquaque fimbria. His nodis si fila 8. adnumeraveris, 13. existent. Iam vocabulis Heb. ציצית 600 facit: quibus 13. illa adiecta 613. consistunt: quot nimirum mandatis lex constat uniuersa, &c. Buxtorf. synag. Iud. cap. 4.

circumstance in Gods service, yea or in other affaires is left free, because all such things ought to be precisely according to Gods will revealed in his word? I suppose that that Christian that being invited by a Gentile, when there was no iust cause otherwise to hinder his going, did as well in going to an Infidels table walke according to the precise rule of Gods word, as he should have done in not going: and in eating indifferently of each dish, as in forbearing either this or that when he was there. And I suppose they walke precisely according to the rule of Gods written word, as well where they begin their solemn service of God on the Sabbath day at seven of the clocke, as where they begin it at eight, or at nine. Which yet were not, if that circumstance of time were precisely determined, and nothing at all therein left free.

I. B.

To the last I answer, That a Lot is no more a ciuill affaire than is an Oath, though it (as is an Oath) be used in ciuill affaires.

T. G.

Here is no Question about it whether it be or no: but a Proposition, which Mr. B. hath all this while forgot, to be iustified. As for the rancking of a Lot and an Oath together; and the supposed sacrednesse of a Lot, enough already hath beene said. But why doth not Mr. B. answer here, the Question of Bowles and Balls, (for it is very materiall) and the poine concerning a blacke pudding?

I. B.

And lastly, I affirme againe, that God hath determined the use of a Lot to determine Controuersies, so as without

in defence of his owne Arguments.

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without Gods speciall appointment (which is not now to be expected) it cannot be lawfully used to any other purpose: Therefore an Argument from the Negative will hold by M^r. G^s. rule to disallow the use of any other Lot, as well Lusorius as diuinatorie.

I will not stand to discusse here how this helpeth M^r. B^s. arguing, *That is not lawfull whereof no example is found in the word, &c.*

T. G.

I obserue onely how M^r. B. can conclude, by helpe of my Rule, what he would, if you grant him withall, what he can not proue. But the Antecedent should in the former Argument haue beene made good: which yet M^r. B. there not onely hath not done, but hath not so much as indeauoured to doe. And without prooffe for him to ^k affirme it againe and againe, is but lost labour both to his Reader and himselfe.

Propter nostrum affirmare aut negare nihil ponitur in esse. Beda in Axiom.

Thus hauing answered M^r. G^s. reasons inducing him to allow Lusorius Lots as not euill in themselves: and remoued M^r. G^s. answers to mine Arguments, I may more confidently hold mine opinion, which M^r. Dudley Fennor (of reuerend memory) his godly Treatise of Recreations hath taught me, to wit, *That Tables and Cards, as well as Dice, and all other Games consisting in Chance (wherein there is use of a Lot) are viterly unlawfull.*

I. B.

Thus hauing within lesse than three weekes space since this booke of M^r. B^s. came first to mine hands,

T. G.

1 Partus plus quam
Elephantin⁹. Quem
eſi decem annis u-
terum geſtare vulg⁹
exiſtimet : (vide
Plaut. Stich. 1. 3.
Audui ſepe hoc
vulgò dicier, ſolere
Elephantum gravi-
dam perpetuas de-
cem eſſe annos :)
Ariſtoteles tamen
biennio tantum.
Plin. hiſt. nat. l. 8.
c. 10. Verum Ari-
ſtoteles juxta alios
ſeſquiannum, juxta
alios triennium. hiſt.

animal. l. 6. c. 27. Adjoere licet Plinij illud ex præfat. ad Veſpaſ. Audio, inquit, quosdam, quod
ſemper expectavi, parturire adverſus libellos meos, & ſubinde abortus facere, jam decem annis,
quum celerius etiam Elephanti pariant. * I handled this Argument anno 1613. and ſhortly
after the handling thereof deliuered Mr. B. in writing at his request the Answer to his
Arguments, which he vnderooke then to returne Answer vnto.

which he hath beene 'about ſome * ten yeeres a bree-
ding, runne through the ſame, and ſhewed that it
containeth nothing materiall, or of iuſt exception to
ought in my Booke, neither confuting any of mine Ar-
guments produced in the defence of luſorious Lots,
nor confirming and ſtrengthening any of his owne
againſt them, I may the more confidently con-
clude, the rather holding that, that till now of late,
was ſcarce euer questioned of any, that Games depen-
ding upon caſualtie are not in that regard unlawfull,
nor is a Lot excluded from being matter of diſport by
any ground or warrant forth of Gods word.

This handling answered Mr. G's reason touching him
to liberty. I ſhew'd that Lot is not a game of chance, but
remoued Mr. G's. anſwer to mine. I ſhew'd
more confidently hold mine opinion, ſubſtantially
ley Tennor (of ſeuerall matters) in Gods word
of Reuerſions ſaid touching Lot, that it is a game
Cards, as well as Dice, and all other Games conſiſting
in Chance (wherein there is no ſkill) are unlawfull.

This handling with libells than three weeks ſpace
ſince this booke of Mr. B. came into mine hands,
which

AN ADVERTISEMENT to Mr. BALMFORD.

IF Mr. B. shall thinke good to *surreioyne*, I would desire some few things of him (as I suppose) neither vnreasonable nor vnequall.

One is, that he will *deale* more *faithfully* than he hath here done, in relating either mine *Arguments* or mine *Answers* both for *matter* and *manner*; that is,

1. That he doe not in producing them *mangle* and *maime* them, cutting that away that is *materiall*.

2. That he *alter* not *my phrase*, but giue me leave, as I doe him, to vter my *minde* in mine owne *termes*.

Another is, that he would be pleased ^a to *keepe close to the point*: Or if he desire to be dealing ^b in *by-matters*, as in most of this he doth; that he would handle them apart from those things that concerne the maine ^c *matter* in *controuersie*, that the Reader who desireth to be therein more fully informed, may not be constrained to hunt after, what should giue him satisfaction, as if he sought ^d *a needle in a bottle of hay*.

To which purpose I require him to take notice what issue we are at, and as well what either is denied, or is to be denied, as what also is to be performed and made good, either in his *Answer* to mine *Arguments*, or in the *defence* of his owne.

For

2. *μεροῖς τῆς
πρὸς Μινδὲν πα-
ραρροῦς ὅτι δὲ
οὐ δὴ δὲ ἔστιν. Ari-
stoph. ecclef.
b ἐν τοῖς ἑξῶς τῶ
μεγάλωτος.
c τὸ κρινόμενον.*

^a *Acum in acere.
Iul. Scalig. de subtil.
exerc. 216.*

For his Answer to mine Arguments.

In the first he denieth this Proposition: That which may be used in other Civill affaires either weighty or lesse weighty, may be used also in disport. I reply by way of Induction, and require ^c an instance to be given of any thing that may be used indifferently in the one and not in the other: that of an Oath will not serue.

εαν γδ ἐπὶ παι-
των φαίνηται, ὡς ἐ-
ν ἑργασίαι διαίρεσιν,
ἢ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἀξι-
ωτίων ἢ καὶ δόλου
παιγνίου, ἢ ἐν γαστρὶ
φάγειν ὅτι πινὺς
ἔχῃ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ γδ
μυδιότερον τῶν
ποτῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ φα-
γεῖν καὶ πινεῖν.
Aristot. 1.2. c.2.

In the second Argument, the former shape, he denieth this Proposition, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used vnto: which for my part shall neuer be further proued.

In the latter shape (the vaine cauill to the forme of it omitted) he denieth this Proposition; A matter of meere indifferentie, such as a man may lawfully doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, a man may lawfully put to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature whether he shall doe or no: yet with a restraint, vnlesse it be a matter controuerted. And let that, for me, rest too, and others iudge of it.

In the third Argument he affirmeth, The use of a Lot in Game, as it is a Lot, to be against Piety, because it is not of faith; against Charitie, because it scandalizeth. That is an idle consequence; this evidently vntrue of a Lot in Game simply considered: and he maintaineth euery Lot to be holy by some diuine Institution, which I require to be produced.

In the fourth Argument, he denieth nothing at all that I say, not conceiuing or vnderstanding mine Argument aright. I affirme any use of the Creature lawfull,

lawfull, that it hath a naturall power vnto, so the same be kept free from superstition, impiety, iniustice, and dishonestie. Which qualification he suppresseth, and so denieth the forepart.

In the *fift Argument*, he denieth nothing at all, but some *Assertions* of his owne framing, and the effect of the *Conclusion*. Lottery, say I, is a thing of it selfe indifferent, neither simply commanded nor forbidden: therefore by M^r. Fennors grounds, lawfull to be made matter of disport. *Alusorious Lot*, saith M^r. B. is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. Which crosseth nothing but the *Conclusion* onely in mine *Argument*.

The *sixth Argument* he miserably peruerteth, and in roome of it setteth vp one of his owne, which he keepeth much adoe with: Which I would wish him now to take better notice of, being in the plainest manner that may be laid open to his eyesight.

For the fuller answer whereunto, (because it is much materiall to the clearing of the present *point in Controuersie*) I would desire him onely to shew by what *Arguments* or *Argument* deduced from Gods word, the use of *Boules* and *Chesse-play* may be *instified*. Not that I doubt whether it may be done or no; but that I may vnderstand how M^r. B. will doe it: not doubting but his manner of doing it, if it be sound and such as it should be, will bring much light to this matter.

For the *defence* of his owne *Arguments*.

In the *first* hee must proue, if he will make it

good, that *an immediate providence of God in every Lot*, is proved out of *Prou. 16.33.* which as yet he hath not done.

And if hee will disprove or overthrow mine *Arguments* against it, hee must affirme such an *immediate providence in every Casuall Occurrent*: as also a *naturall power in man to make God worke immediately*, and consequently *miraculously at pleasure*: and answer my *reasons* produced to the contrary.

In the *second* hee must prove the same, to wit, *an immediate diuine providence in every Lot*: for that is the ground of this also; and is oft repeated, neuer proved: and that once proved will effect all.

In the *third* he must prove that that place, *Prou. 18.18.* doth so *restraine the use of a Lot to the ending of Controuersies in serious matters*, that to no other use it may be applied: to which purpose there is not a word here.

In the *last*, hee must make good, if hee will maintaine *his owne Proposition*, that *nothing is lawfull whereof there is no example in Gods word*.

Or if Mr. *Easties*, that *nothing is by permission warrantable*; or, *Nothing warrantable but by precept*.

These few points if hee can make good, all will soone be at an end. And these would be handled apart, (other by-matters discussed by themselves) that so what is said to the purpose may the better be seene, and the truth in the

Point

Point controuersed receiue the more light, which * *Mh συμμιξαν-
 τις αὐτὴν ὄγκω
 πύκτω, λαβόμενοι
 ὅσων ἐν χόρῳ
 κασιπτεον ἀφανί-
 σαταις.* * when it is shuffled vp toge-
 ther with so much *impertinent matter.*

*Plut. erotic. Hinc Aristot. Topic. l. 6. c. 1. κρύπτειν βυλαρμόροις πρᾶσιπτι, τὸ μνησκύν-
 κὴ παρεμβάλλειν τὰ μηδὲν χήσιμα πρὸς τὸ λόγον, καὶ δάτω οἱ ψάδοχαφῶντες.
 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ἀδελον ἐν ὁπίω τὸ ψεύδῃ, &c.*

FINIS.

Some things omitted, or misprinted.

Pag. 6. lin. 24. after *anow*, put in *it to be, yea and* * *meritorious too.* and
 in the margine against it, * *Sirusticus citra articulos credat suo. Epi-
 scopo proponenti aliquod dogma bareticum, meretur in credendo, licet sit error,*
&c. Tolet. instruet. sacerd. l. 4. c. 3. §. 6. Pag. 213. l. 11. after *well*, put in
together. Pag. 232. lin. 19. in the margine put in *m* *Matth. 5. 21, 23.*
 Pag. 238. l. 4. put out the point after *neither*, and put it in after *these*. l. 5.
 after *deale*, put in, *in.* Pag. 239 l. 8. after *dare*, put in *wholly*, and after
controuersies, put an interrogatiue point. Pag. 240. l. 14. put the like
 after *reason?* Pag. 257. l. 2 in the margine, for *παρωδ-* reade *πα-
 γωδ-* Pag. 259. l. 1. for *is lawfull*, if by rule, reade *if lawfull, is by rule.*
 Pag. 260. l. 3. for *iustified*, reade *iustifie.* Pag. 261. l. 9. after *on*, put in *it.*
 Pag. 263. * in the marg. after *Gell:*) put in *o.* Pag. 270. l. 1 in the
 marg. for *perpetuas*, reade *perpetuos.*



Some things omitted or misplaced.

The following is a list of the
manuscripts in the collection
of the British Museum
which are now in the
possession of the
British Museum
Library. The list is
given in the order
in which they are
arranged in the
Museum Library.
The list is given
in the order in
which they are
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